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Abstract
This research advances the hypothesis that natural land productivity in the past, and its e¤ect on
the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, had a persistent e¤ect on the evolution
of social capital, the process of industrialization and comparative economic development across
the globe. Exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across a) countries; b)
individuals within a country, and c) migrants of di¤erent ancestry within a country, the research
establishes that lower level of land productivity in the past is associated with more intense cooper-
ation and higher levels of contemporary social capital and development.
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1 Introduction
The origins of the remarkable transformation of the world income distribution in the past two centuries
have been the focus of an intense debate in recent years. The long shadow of history on comparative
economic development has been established empirically, underlying the role of variations in historical
and pre-historical bio-geographical conditions, as well as the persistent e¤ects of cultural, institutional,
and human capital characteristics, in the vast inequality across the globe.
This research advances the hypothesis that natural land productivity in the past, and its e¤ect on
the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, had a persistent e¤ect on the evolution
of social capital, the process of industrialization and comparative economic development across the
globe. Places with favorable natural land productivity had a reduced incentive to cooperate in the
development of agricultural infrastructure. While their favorable land endowment permitted their
domination during the agricultural era, their lower incentive for cooperation resulted in a lower level
of social capital which was crucial for the development of the industrial sector. Consequently, lacking
some of the necessary elements for the emergence of industrialization, they were overtaken in the
transition to the industrialization era.
The fundamental hypothesis of this research originates from the realization that the evolution of
the wealth of nations has been driven in part by the trade-o¤ between land productivity and the
associated level of cooperation and social capital, in di¤erent stages of development. The theory
is based on an underlying mechanism consisting of ve intermediate elements that account for the
di¤erential development of economies and their asymmetric transition from an epoch of Malthusian
stagnation to a regime of sustained economic growth.1 Each of the steps of the mechanism builds
upon a comparison between high and low natural productivity places, while assuming everything else
being constant. This allows to identify the partial e¤ect of natural land productivity in the process of
development. Crucially, the paper does not claim a reversal of fortune along the lines of Acemoglu
et al. (2002) on colonized countries or Olsson and Paik (2014) on the Western reversal. The current
analysis aims at identifying a reversal on the e¤ect of land suitability on economic outcomes, where
land suitability is one of the many forces that a¤ected the fate of countries, without arguing that it is
the dominating force.
The rst element of the mechanism suggests that whereas agricultural infrastructure can be ben-
ecial to both productive and less productive places, yet less productive places had relatively more
incentives to develop agricultural infrastructure, that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural
environment. Resources allocated to the development of agricultural infrastructure enhanced produc-
tivity indirectly, but came on the account of direct agricultural production. Hence, the opportunity cost
of the construction of agricultural infrastructure was higher in more productive places and therefore
investment in infrastructure was more benecial in places with unfavorable land endowment.
The second element establishes that the development of public agricultural infrastructure generated
an incentive for cooperation. Since agricultural infrastructure is primarily a public good, collective
action is essential for its optimal provision, in light of the incentive of individuals to minimize the
allocation of their private resources to the production of public goods. Moreover, since collective action
is conducive to cooperation, places with lower natural land productivity generated higher incentives for
1Appendix A provides a number of sources on which the suggested mechanism builds upon.
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cooperation. Traditional forms of agricultural infrastructure include, among others, irrigation systems,
storage facilities and drainage systems. Importantly, all major forms of agricultural infrastructure
were associated with large-scale cooperation at the community or at the state level, and particularly
in early societies, collective action and broad participation was required to undertake and construct
the necessary infrastructure.2
The third element of the mechanism advances the hypothesis that the emergence of social capital
can be traced to the level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, in the creation of infrastructure that
could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Indeed, according to the social structural
approach, di¤erences in the manifestation of social capital are driven by the social interactions in
which individuals are involved (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Similarly, the emergence and prevalence of
norms that facilitate fruitful interaction (such as norms of mutual trust) can be traced to the need for
large-scale cooperation (Henrich et al., 2001). Relatedly, Putnam (2000) suggests that social capital
is primarily embedded in networks of reciprocal social relations.
The fourth element of the mechanism suggests that social capital has persisted over time via di¤erent
transmission mechanisms. Evolutionary theories, advance the social learning hypothesis, according
to which norms and cultural traits that survive and are transmitted across generations are the ones
that contribute to individual and group survival (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1995; Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman, 1981). The cultural transmission hypothesis suggests that preferences, beliefs and norms are
intergenerationally transmitted via socialization processes, such as social imitation and learning (Bisin
and Verdier, 2001). Finally, political institutions are argued to have a crucial role in the transmission
of social capital across generations (Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008).
The fth element of the mechanism suggests that social capital is complementary not only to the
agricultural but also to the industrial sector. This assumption is designed to capture the importance of
social capital in promoting socioeconomic transitions to an industrialized regime. Evidence suggests,
that economic activities such as commercial transactions, entrepreneurship, innovation, accumulation
of human capital, credit markets and enforcement of contracts, all of which are building blocks of the
industrial sector, are further enhanced and boosted in societies with high levels of social capital and
trust.3
The proposed mechanism is aimed to identify the intermediate elements that can account for the
emergence of social capital, the e¤ect of natural land endowment on the evolution of economies, and
their transition from agriculture to industry. What can be viewed initially as a drawback in economic
development, namely the adverse e¤ect of unfavorable land endowment on agricultural production,
triggers a process that can ultimately lead to better current economic outcomes and higher levels of
social capital.
To model this mechanism a Malthusian model is employed that allows to model the transition.
Social capital is represented as an argument in the utility function of the individuals following (Becker,
1996).4 At early stages of development, the economy is in a Malthusian regime where output is
generated entirely by an agricultural sector that is subject to decreasing returns to labor. Aggregate
2See Appendix A for historical evidence.
3See Appendix A for additional evidence.
4One could model the development of social networks instead, yet this approach allows to capture in a simple
model both the transition from the Malthusian era to industrialization and the evolution of social capital and
to provide a clear testable hypothesis.
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productivity in the agricultural sector, is partly determined by the natural land productivity, and can
be further enhanced by agricultural infrastructure. A fraction of the labor employed in the agricultural
sector is allocated to the production of the private good, whereas the remaining fraction is allocated
to the production of agricultural infrastructure. Technological progress in the agricultural sector is a
gradual process fuelled by knowledge creation, which is positively a¤ected by the size of the workforce
in the agricultural sector. Resources generated by technological progress are channeled primarily
towards an increase in population size, and the economy evolves towards a Malthusian equilibrium
where income per capita remains stagnant along a dynamic path characterized by growing population
and total factor productivity.
The transition from agriculture to industry in the process of development, is driven by sustained
growth in the latent productivity of the industrial sector. The indirect e¤ect of cooperation on the
industrial sector, through the accumulation of social capital, drives growth in the latent industrial
productivity, which ultimately leads to the transition to industry in later stages of development.
Once the industrial technology is adopted, the economy emerges into a Post-Malthusian regime of
development, where the economy operates in both the agricultural and the industrial sector. The
endogenous growth of total factor productivity in the industrial sector, along with intersectoral labor
mobility, generates a dynamic path characterized by endogenously growing population and income per
capita.
The interaction between natural land productivity, cooperation, social capital and the process of
development is examined based on the signicance of their coevolution in the agricultural stage of
development and also in the timing of the take-o¤ from agriculture to industry. In the agricultural
stage, an economy characterized by a relatively higher degree of cooperation in the development of
agricultural infrastructure, aimed to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of low land productivity, is associated
with a relatively inferior Malthusian steady state in terms of the economys level of productivity per
worker and the size of its working population. This inferiority, stems from the fact that the adverse
e¤ect of unfavorable land endowment is signicant in the context of an economy that operates only in
the agricultural sector, and therefore natural land endowments are crucial for agricultural output.
The resulting level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, as triggered by natural land produc-
tivity, has also an e¤ect on the timing of industrialization and, thus, on the take-o¤ to a state of
sustained economic growth. The earlier take-o¤ from the Malthusian steady state by a society with an
unfavorable natural land endowment, stems from the fact that the benecial e¤ect of cooperation in
the agricultural sector, as perceived by the e¤ect of the emerging social capital on the advancement of
knowledge, and therefore on the advancement of industrial productivity relative to that in agriculture,
outweighs the adverse e¤ect of unfavorable land endowment on agricultural production.5
The empirical section of this paper aims to establish the phenomenon of overtaking partly via the
mechanism described above, as well as to establish that land suitability in the past is associated with
more intense cooperation and higher levels of contemporary social capital. The analysis takes place
in three layers exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across: a) countries;
b) individuals within a country, and c) migrants of di¤erent ancestry within a country. The cross-
5 In the context of the theoretical model it is crucial to assume that social capital is relatively more
complementary to the industrial sector, in order to obtain a simple and intuitive testable hypothesis. Yet,
in the context of the empirical analysis this assumption is not essential.
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country analysis (a) allows to establish the overtaking and to further explore the suggested mechanisms
associated with it. The individual (b) and the migrant (c) analysis allow to establish the reduced
form e¤ect of land suitability on the current levels of trust while capturing an increasing number of
unobservables.
Analytically, exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land suitability for agriculture across
countries, the rst part of the empirical analysis (a) establishes the following testable predictions of
the theory: (i) the e¤ect of natural land productivity on the economic prosperity was reversed in
the process of development. While a favorable land endowment had a positive e¤ect on development
in the Malthusian era, its adverse e¤ect on the production of agricultural infrastructure and thus
cooperation, had a detrimental e¤ect on economic prosperity in the modern era, (ii) cooperation,
as reected by agricultural infrastructure, emerged primarily in places where land was not highly
productive and collective action could diminish the adverse e¤ects of the environment and enhance
agricultural output, and (iii) lower level of land suitability in the past is associated with higher levels
of contemporary social capital which expedited the process of industrialization.
Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis rst establishes the change on
the e¤ect of land productivity in the process of economic development.6 Following Ashraf and Galor
(2011), the research employs historical data on population density, as a proxy for productivity in the
agricultural stage of development, as opposed to income per capita and examines the hypothesized
e¤ect of land suitability on population densities in the years 1 CE, 1000 CE and 1500 CE. Land
suitability is proxied by an index of the average suitability of land for cultivation, based on geospatial
data on various ecological factors including (i) growing degree days, (ii) the ratio of potential to actual
evapotranspiration, (iii) soil carbon density, and (iv) soil pH.7 The historical analysis reveals a positive
and signicant relationship between log land suitability and log population density in the year 1500
CE.
To establish the change on the e¤ect of natural land productivity, the analysis exploits cross country
variations in land suitability, to explain the cross-country variations in log average income per capita
in the years 1990-2000 CE. A number of potentially confounding factors and alternative hypothesis
suggested by the related literature on comparative development are accounted for such as the geography
channel, institutions, disease environment, ethnic fractionalization and religion shares.
Importantly, as suggested by the theory, it is not the direct e¤ect of land suitability that drives the
change in its e¤ect, but instead the portable component associated with land suitability, namely the
social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation. In the absence of migration, the countrys
level of social capital is captured by its natural land endowment. However, in the post-colonial era,
where mass migration has taken place, the level of social capital in each country reects the weighted
6The suggested changing e¤ect captures the partial e¤ect of natural land productivity without necessarily
implying that this is the dominating e¤ect. In particular, as established in Ashraf and Galor (2011), consistently
with the predictions of a long-run Malthusian equilibrium, productivity in the preindustrial era, as captured by
overall land quality and the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, had a signicant positive e¤ect on population
density and a negligible impact on income per capita. For the contemporary era, the relevant variable that
captures aggregate productivity is income per capita. Thus, establishing that countries that had high population
density in the preindustrial era also have low per-capita incomes in the contemporary era, is tantamount to
establishing a reversal in terms of aggregate productivity.
7The index is based on geospatial soil pH and temperature data, as reported by Ramankutty et al. (2002)
and aggregated to the country level by Michalopoulos (2012). The average of land quality is thus the average
value of the index across the grid cells within a country.
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average of land suitability among its ancestral population. Hence, in order to capture this distinction,
two empirical strategies are adopted that address potential concerns on migration.8
Second, the empirical analysis establishes that higher suitability of land for agriculture is associated
with a lower level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, as reected by the potential for irrigation
and the actual fraction of irrigated land. The measure of irrigation potential captures the potential
productivity boost due to irrigation. Hence, it can be viewed as an ex ante measure of the potential
for cooperation. The actual fraction of irrigated land can be perceived as an ex-post measure of
actual cooperation. In the absence of extensive cross-country data on actual irrigation prior to
industrialization, the analysis is based on the fraction of irrigated land in a sample of non-industrial
countries in the year 1900. Consistently with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis
reveals a statistically signicant and robust negative e¤ect of the log land suitability on the potential
for irrigation and on the fraction of irrigated land in the year 1900.
The adverse e¤ect of natural land productivity on cooperation in earlier periods is further examined
based on several proxies of cooperation: a) communication in the year 1 CE, b) transportation in the
year 1 CE, and c) medium of exchange in the year 1 CE. According to the theory, sophisticated means
of communication, transportation and medium of exchange have been catalysts in the advancement of
large-scale cooperation, and thus, under-development of these technologies reects the adverse e¤ect
of land suitability on the extent of cooperation. Whereas these three measures could be viewed as
proxies for the stage of development, the analysis suggests that this is not the case. There appears
indeed to be an element in this technologies associated with the stage of development, as suggested
by Comin et al. (2010) nevertheless their correlation with population density whereas positive, is not
su¢ ciently high to be considered solely as proxies of development in the Malthusian era.
Third, having established the intermediate elements of the mechanism linking land suitability of
agriculture with the current levels of trust, the analysis establishes the adverse e¤ect of natural land
productivity on social capital as reected by the contemporary level of generalized trust. Similarly to
rst hypothesis, the measure of land suitability is ancestry adjusted to capture the portable component
of natural land endowment, namely social capital. In particular, the corresponding standardized beta
coe¢ cient indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the ancestry adjusted land suitability
index, is associated with a 0.608 standard deviation decrease in the level of trust, controlling for the full
set of relevant (for the era) controls. The cross country analysis further explores the mediating channel
of cooperation as proxied by irrigation potential. Reassuringly, the coe¢ cient of land suitability
diminishes both in magnitude and signicance, thereby suggesting that land suitability partly operates
via the scope for cooperation it generates.
The second part of the empirical analysis reexamines the hypothesis using a sample of individual
data from the four waves of the WVS (1981-2002). The analysis explores the e¤ect of ancestry adjusted
natural land productivity on the current levels of individual trust, accounting for geographical and
institutional characteristics. Importantly, in contrast to the cross country analysis, this disaggregated
individual data allows to account for individual controls, such as education, religious denomination,
age and gender. In line with the results of the cross country analysis, a 10 percentage point increase
8The strategies are fully analyzed in the empirical section of the paper.
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in land suitability, is associated with a 2 percentage points decrease in probability that an individual
is trustful.9
The third part of the empirical analysis examines the hypothesis using the European Social Survey
(ESS) sample, and in particular the sample of rst and second generation migrants residing in ESS
countries. The analysis employs a sample of 5940 migrants from 116 countries of origin, residing in 26
European countries. This approach allows to explicitly identify the portable cultural component
associated with their country of origin.10 Using this sample, the analysis establishes that land
suitability in the country of origin has a signicant adverse e¤ect on the migrants level of trust.
The analysis is further enhanced by employing a vector of geographical and institutional controls at
the country of origin as well as a set of individual controls, such as age, religion group, gender and
education. Throughout the analysis, regional xed e¤ects (NUTS 2 European Regions) are employed,
thereby eliminating most of the unobserved heterogeneity. In line with the hypothesis advanced in the
paper, this section establishes that a ten percentage point increase in land suitability at the country of
origin, is associated with a 4 percentage points decrease in the probability that a migrant is trustful.11
The analysis is concluded by extensive robustness checks. In particular, the cross-country robustness
section explores the e¤ect of slavery, trade and eliminates the possibility that the results are drive by
regions with very low natural productivity. It also establishes the validity of the identifying assumption
of the paper, i.e. that the measures of current productivity are a good proxy for past productivity. The
ESS results are further validated via accounting for the potential selection of migrants by limiting the
sample to second generation migrants only and by controlling for parental and partner characteristics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 presents a model that derives the testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents empirical ndings consistent
with the proposed hypotheses. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Advances with Respect to the Related Literature
This research contributes to the literature that explores the origins of comparative development and
the emergence of social capital.
First, the research sheds new light on the origins of the contemporary di¤erences in income per
capita across the globe. Various theories of comparative development have been advanced in the
literature. The role of geography, institutions, colonialism, culture, human capital, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization and genetic diversity has been at the center of research attempting to account for
di¤erential development patterns across the globe.
The geographical hypothesis suggests that environmental conditions a¤ected economic performance
directly, through their e¤ect on health, work e¤ort, productivity and multiple other channels (Hunting-
9The numbers are drawn from the marginal e¤ect estimated from the logit regression of the model, reported
in the Appendix C (table C.3).
10See Fernandez and Fogli (2009); Algan and Cahuc (2010); Luttmerand Singhal (2011).
11The numbers are drawn from the marginal e¤ect estimated from the logit regression of the model, reported
in the Appendix D (table D.5).
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ton, 1915; Myrdal, 1968; Jones, 1981; Landes, 1998; Sachs and Malaney, 2002). The indirect e¤ect of
geography on economic outcomes via several channels has been explored by a number of researchers.12
The role of institutions in fostering economic growth has been advanced by North and Thomas
(1973), Mokyr (1990), and Greif (1993), and has been empirically established by Hall and Jones
(1999), La Porta et al. (1999), Rodrik et al. (2004). In addition, initial geographical conditions and
their association with inequality gave rise to persistent di¤erences in institutional quality across regions
(Engerman and Sokolo¤, 2000; Galor et al., 2009).
The cultural hypothesis, as advanced by Weber (1905, 1922) and Landes (1998, 2006) proposes,
that norms and ethics that enhanced entrepreneurial spirit and thus innovation brought about a rapid
transition at industrial stages of development. The adverse e¤ect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization
on economic development has been examined by Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (2003).
Ashraf and Galor (2011b), establish that societies that were geographically isolated, and thus culturally
homogeneous, operated more e¢ ciently in the agricultural stage of development, but their lack of
cultural diversity reduced their adaptability and thus delayed their industrialization. The hump-
shaped e¤ect of genetic diversity on economic outcomes, reecting the trade-o¤ between the benecial
and the detrimental e¤ects of diversity on productivity, is explored in Ashraf and Galor (2013).
Finally, the role of human capital formation has been advanced as an alternative hypothesis,
according to which the technologically driven demand for human capital, during the second phase
of industrialization, led to an expansion in investment in human capital, which in turn led to an even
more rapid increase in technological progress and accelerated the transition to a regime of sustained
growth (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor and Moav, 2002; Lucas, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004; Galor, 2011).
This research, in contrast, identies a novel mechanism through which geographical characteristics
a¤ect contemporary economic outcomes, underlining the role of unfavorable land endowment in the
emergence of cooperation, and thus social capital, and its persistent e¤ect on comparative economic
development.
Second, the research contributes to the understanding of the geographical elements that contributed
to the emergence of social capital. Existing studies suggest that cooperation, risk sharing attitude and
sociopolitical networks gave rise to social capital (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Henrich et al., 2001).13
This research extends the argument and suggests that indeed the origins of social capital can be traced
to large-scale cooperation, which however emerged as early as thousands of year ago, coinciding with
the emergence of agriculture and the need of the community to cooperate for the development of
agricultural infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment.
12See e.g., Diamond (1997); Michalopoulos (2012); Ashraf and Michalopoulos (2013); Fenske (2013); Fenske
and Kala (2013); Michalopoulos et al. (2013)
13Unlike the proposed mechanism that focuses on the e¤ect of unfavorable natural land productivity on
cooperation in the construction of physical agricultural infrastructure, Durante (2010) explores the role of
climatic variability and thus the insurance motive in the emergence of trust. Moreover, in contrast to Durante
who establishes empirically only the reduced form relationship between climatic variability in the past and
contemporary level of trust, the current paper explores empirically the channel through which unfavorable land
productivity a¤ected the contemporary level of trust, establishing the intermediate e¤ect on cooperation in the
agricultural stage of development. Furthermore, the current research also focuses primarily on comparative
development, whereas the emergence of trust is an intermediate element of the mechanism.
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Crucially, the paper does not claim a reversal of fortune along the lines of Acemoglu et al. (2002)
on colonized countries or Olsson and Paik (2013) on the Western reversal.14 The current analysis aims
at identifying a reversal on the e¤ect of land suitability on economic outcomes, with land suitability
being one of the may forces a¤ecting the fate of countries, without arguing that it is the dominating
force.
3 The Basic Structure of the Model
The theoretical part employs a Malthusian model that captures the transition to industrialization
partly driven by the social capital developed in the agricultural sector. Social capital enters as an
argument in the utility function following Becker (1996). Whereas there are several alternative ways
to model the emergence of social capital, this approach allows to capture in a simple model both the
transition from the Malthusian era to industrialization and the evolution of social capital as well as
to provide a clear testable hypothesis.
Consider a perfectly competitive overlapping-generations economy in the process of development
where economic activity extends over innite discrete time.15
3.1 Production in the Agricultural and Industrial Sector
In every period, a single homogenous good is being produced either in an agricultural sector or in
both an agricultural and an industrial sector. In early stages of development, the economy operates
exclusively in the agricultural sector, whereas the industrial sector is not economically viable. However,
since productivity grows faster in the industrial sector, it ultimately becomes economically viable and
therefore, in later stages of development, the economy operates in both sectors.
The output produced in the agricultural sector in period t, Y At ; is determined by land, Xt; and labor
employed in the agricultural sector, LAt ; as well as by aggregate agricultural productivity. Aggregate
agricultural productivity comprises three components: the natural level of land productivity,  2 (0; 1);
acquired productivity (based on learning by doing), AAt , and public infrastructure, Gt:
The production is governed by a Cobb-Douglas, constant-returns-to-scale production technology
such that
Y At =

AAt +Gt
a
Xa

LAt
1 a
; a 2 (0; 1); (1)
where the supply of land is constant over time and is normalized such that X = 1.16 Hence, natural
land productivity, ; is complemented by acquired productivity, AAt :
The labor force in the agricultural sector is allocated between the production of public infrastructure
and the direct production of nal output. A fraction (1   zt) of the labor force employed in the
agricultural sector is employed in the production of the nal output, whereas the remaining fraction
zt is devoted to the production of public infrastructure, Gt: Hence, the output of public infrastructure
14The reversal of fortune has been extensively debated in a series of papers, see e.g., (Putterman and Weil,
2010; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; Chanda et al., 2014).
15The full version of the model with all the intermediate steps and the proofs can be found in the online
Appendix (Part A).
16For the emergence of a stable Malthusian equilibrium in the agricultural stage of development, diminishing
returns to labor, implied by the presence of a xed factor, is essential.
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is Gt = ztLAt =; reecting the supposition that the marginal productivity of labor devoted to the
development of agricultural infrastructure is higher in less productive places.17
Hence the production of agricultural output is
Y At =

AAt +
1

zttLt
a
Xa [(1  zt) tLt]1 a ; (2)
where t is the faction of labor employed in the agricultural sector and Lt denotes the total labor force
of the economy in every time period t: Aggregate productivity in the agricultural sector,

AAt +Gt

;
captures the trade-o¤ between allocating labor in the production of the nal good and the production
of the public good. Places that are faced with favorable land endowment, may nd it optimal to
allocate more resources to the production of the nal good, whereas unfavorably endowed places, may
nd it optimal to invest more in infrastructure to further enhance land productivity.18
The output of the industrial sector in period t, Y It , is determined by a linear, constant-returns-to-
scale production technology such that
Y It = A
I
tL
I
t = A
I
t (1  t)Lt (3)
where LIt is the labor employed in the industrial sector, (1   t) is the fraction of total labor force
employed in the industrial sector in period t, and AIt is the level of industrial productivity in period t.
The total labor force in period t, Lt, is allocated between the two sectors. As will become evident,
in early stages of development, the productivity of the industrial sector, AIt , is low relative to that of
agricultural sector, and output is produced exclusively in the agricultural sector. However, in later
stages of development, AIt rises su¢ ciently relative to the productivity of agricultural sector, and
ultimately the industrial technology becomes economically viable.
3.1.1 Collective Action in the Production of the Agricultural Infrastructure
Labor in the agricultural sector is allocated between two di¤erent activities. A fraction of the labor,
1  zt; is employed in the production of the nal good, whereas the remaining fraction, zt; is employed
in the production of agricultural infrastructure that is aimed to further enhance land productivity.
Therefore the community faces a trade-o¤ in the decision to allocate labor to the production of
agricultural infrastructure. More labor in the production of agricultural infrastructure increases land
productivity, but it reduces the labor employed in the production of the nal good.
Members of the community in every time period t; choose the fraction of labor employed in the
agricultural sector that will be allocated to the production of the public good, so as to maximize
agricultural output, i.e. fztg = argmaxY At :
Hence, noting (1),
zt = a 

(1  a)2AAt =tLt

: (4)
17The substitutability between natural land productivity and agricultural infrastructure is further explored in
the empirical section of the paper. In particular, it will be established that higher land suitability for agriculture
is associated with lower incentives to invest in agricultural infrastructure.
18Di¤erent formulations of the production function, e.g. Y At = AAt [ +Gt()]
aXa

LAt
1 a would yield
qualitatively similar results under certain assumptions, nevertheless they would complicate the model to the
level of intractability.
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Interestingly, the optimal fraction of labor allocated to the development of agricultural infrastructure
is a decreasing function of natural land productivity, , as well as of acquired agricultural productivity,
At; thereby implying that countries with more favorable land endowment have a reduced incentive to
invest in infrastructure and therefore, choose to allocate more labor to the direct production of the
nal good.
3.1.2 Factor Prices and Aggregate Labor Allocation
The markets for labor and the production of the nal good are perfectly competitive. Workers in the
agricultural sector receive their average product, given that there are no property rights to land, and
therefore the return to land is zero. Given (2), the wage rate of agricultural labor in time t; wAt ; is
wAt 
Y At
tLt
=

AAt
tLt
+
1

zt
a
(1  zt)1 a (5)
The inverse demand for labor in the industrial sector, given by (3), is wIt = A
I
t , where w
I
t is the
wage rate of the industrial labor in period t.
Evidently as employment in the agricultural sector decreases, the demand for labor increases
without bound, while productivity in the industrial sector remains nite. Hence, the agricultural
sector will be operative in every period, whereas the industrial sector will be operative if and only if
labor productivity in this sector exceeds the marginal productivity of labor in the agricultural sector,
if the entire labor force is employed in the agricultural sector. Once the two sectors become operative,
the perfect labor mobility assumption implies an equalization of wages across sectors (Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
3.2 Individuals
In every period t, a generation comprising a continuum of Lt economically identical individuals, enters
the labor force. Each member of generation t lives for two periods. In the rst period of life (childhood),
t   1, individuals are raised by their parents who face a xed cost of child-rearing for every child in
the household.19 In the second period of life (parenthood), t, individuals are endowed with one unit
of time, which they allocate entirely to labor force participation.
The preferences of members of generation t (those born in period t 1) are dened over consumption
as well as the number of their children. They are represented by the utility function
ut = (ct)
 (nt)
1  ;  2 (0; 1) , (6)
where ct is consumption, and nt is the number of children of individual t.
Let  > 0 be the cost (in terms of the consumption good) faced by a member of generation t for
raising a child. Income from labor force participation is allocated between expenditure on children
19 It is assumed that each child is associated with a xed cost that can be interpreted as purchasing child-
rearing services. Imposing a time cost would not qualitatively change the predictions of the model, as long as
technological progress reduces the amount of time required to raise a child.
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(at a real cost of  per child) and consumption. Hence, the budget constraint faced by a member of
generation t is ct + nt  wt,where wt is the labor income of individual t:
Members of generation t choose the number of their children and, therefore, their own consumption
so as to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint. The optimal number of children for
a member of generation t is therefore
nt =
1  

wt, (7)
4 The Time Paths of the Macroeconomic Variables
The time paths of the macroeconomic variables are governed by the dynamics of acquired factor
productivity in both the agricultural and the industrial sector, AAt and A
I
t , as well as the evolution
of the size of the working population, Lt. The evolution of industrial productivity and the size of
the working population are in turn governed by the amount of labor allocated to the production of
agricultural infrastructure and therefore by natural land endowment.20
4.1 The Dynamics of Sectoral Productivity
The level of the acquired productivity in the agricultural and industrial sectors, AAt and A
I
t , is a¤ected
by the productivity level in the previous time period as well as by technological progress, which
reects the incorporation of new knowledge into existing technologies. Industrial productivity is further
enhanced by the level of social capital on industrial specic knowledge creation.
In each time period, a fraction of the workforce that is employed in the agricultural sector is
allocated to the construction of the public good. The newly created infrastructure has two e¤ects on
the economy as a whole. A short run and a long run e¤ect. In the short run, it boosts agricultural
production directly, by mitigating the adverse e¤ect of unfavorable natural land endowment.21 In the
long run, the cooperation in the production of agricultural infrastructure, contributes to societal social
capital that ultimately benets the process of industrialization.22
4.1.1 Industrial Productivity
Industrial productivity is being enhanced by two distinct components. The rst component reects
improvements in industrial technology, driven by the new knowledge added by the population employed
in the industrial sector. The second component can be viewed as the social component, namely the
acquired level of social capital (as emerging from cooperation in the agricultural sector), and its
benecial e¤ect on industrial specic new knowledge.23
The evolution of productivity in the industrial sector between periods t and t+1 is determined by
AIt+1 = A
I
t + (! + ztt)LtA
I
t  AI
 
AAt ; Lt; A
I
t

; (8)
20The structure of the dynamical system is inspired by Ashraf and Galor (2011b).
21For simplicity it is assumed that agricultural infrastructure fully depreciates within a period.
22 It is plausibly assumed that when the community decides to construct agricultural infrastructure, it cannot
internalize the externality of the emerging social capital in the latent industrial sector.
23Higher levels of social capital are associated with higher innovation and entrepreneurship, via reducing the
associated risks and providing the necessary network (Putnam, 2000; Greif, 1993)
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where the initial level of industrial productivity, AI0 > v
 a, is given.
In particular, AIt reects the inertia of past productivity in the industrial sector; !LtA
I
t ; captures
the advancement in productivity due to the application of new knowledge to the existing level of
productivity; ! 2 (0; 1).24
The benecial e¤ect of cooperation for the creation of agricultural infrastructure, on the industrial
productivity, is captured by zttLtAIt , where ztt is the fraction of the population employed in the
production of agricultural infrastructure.25
The benecial e¤ect of past cooperation on the industrial sector through the creation and accumu-
lation of social capital and ultimately through its e¤ect on the creation of industrial specic knowledge,
is being captured by the level of past productivity, AIt : Cooperation at time t is captured implicitly as
social capital in period t+ 1:
4.1.2 Agricultural Productivity
Similarly, the evolution of productivity in the agricultural sector between periods t and t + 1 is
determined by
AAt+1 = A
A
t + (Lt)
(AAt )
b  AA  AAt ; Lt , (9)
where the initial level of agricultural productivity, AA0 > 0, is given.
AAt captures the inertia from past productivity of the agricultural sector in period t; where
 2 (0; 1) captures the erosion in agricultural productivity due to imperfect transmission from one
generation to the other.26 The term (Lt)(AAt )
b captures a "learning by doing e¤ect". In particular the
formulation implies both diminishing returns to population driven knowledge creation, and a "shing
out" e¤ect (i.e.  2 (0; 1)); namely the negative e¤ect of past discoveries on current discoveries. In
addition, it is assumed that there is a lower degree of complementarity between the advancement of
the knowledge frontier and the existing stock of sector-specic productivity in the agricultural, namely
b < 1: Furthermore + b < 1:
It should be noted that agricultural infrastructure is assumed to be fully depreciated within one
period, and the productivity in the agricultural sector is not a¤ected by the level of agricultural
infrastructure.27
24! 2 (0; 1) captures the fact that only a fraction of the population contributes to the creation of new knowledge
in the industrial sector. While it can be argued that people employed in the industrial sector can contribute
to the creation of new knowledge in the industrial sector, indirectly, it would be less plausible to argue that all
people employed in the agricultural sector can positively inuence knowledge creation in the industrial sector.
It is therefore assumed that a constant fraction of the total workforce is positively a¤ecting knowledge creation
in industry.
25One can assume that once the industrial sector is active each extended household allocates labor to both the
industrial and the agricultural sector. Hence, the entire society is exposed to the externalities of contemporary
cooperation in the agricultural sector.
26 It is assumed that erosion takes place in the agricultural sector, since agricultural technology reects mostly
human embodied knowledge and therefore imperfect transmission, as opposed to industrial knowledge. The
assumption that there is no erosion in the industrial sector is a simplication aimed to capture this particular
aspect. Nevertheless the results would hold under any parameterization that would assure smaller depreciation
in the industrial sector.
27 If contemporary infrastructure is long lasting and society would internalize its future e¤ects on agricultural
output, the qualitative analysis will remain similar, however it would complicate the model to the level of
intractability.
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4.2 The Dynamics of Population Size
The size of the labor force in any period is determined by the size of the preceding generation and its
fertility rate. As follows from (7), the adult population size evolves over time according to28
Lt+1 = ntLt =
(
[(1  ) = ]wAt  LA
 
ARt ; Lt

if Lt < L^t
[(1  ) = ]wIt  LI
 
AIt ; Lt

if Lt  L^t,
(10)
In the agricultural stage of development the dynamics of the population are governed by acquired
productivity in the agricultural sector as well as the size of the adult population, whereas when both
sectors become active, population dynamics are determined by the level of the productivity in the
industrial sector and the size of the adult population.
5 The Process of Development
This section focuses on the role of natural land endowment in determining the characteristics of the
Malthusian equilibrium and the timing of the take-o¤ from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to
a state of sustained economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that countries with unfavorable
natural land endowment are being dominated by more favorably endowed countries in the Malthusian
regime. Hence, in an e¤ort to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of land, they cooperate more intensely in the
production of agricultural infrastructure, which ultimately results to the emergence of higher levels of
social capital. Due to the complementarity of social capital with the industrial sector, these countries
industrialize faster, and therefore, escape Malthusian stagnation to enter a state of sustained economic
growth.
The process of economic development, given the natural land productivity, ; is fully determined by
a sequence

AAt ; A
I
t ; Lt; 
	1
t=0
that reects the evolution of the acquired productivity in the agricultural
sector, AAt , the productivity in the industrial sector, A
I
t , and the size of adult population, Lt. The
dynamic path of the economy is given by eqs. (8), (9), and (10)
5.1 The Evolution of the Economy
In early stages of development, the economy operates exclusively in the agricultural sector due to
the fact that the productivity in the (latent) industrial sector, AIt , is too low to allow the industrial
sector to become operative (satisfying assumptions (A1) and (A3)). In this stage of development, the
economy is in a Malthusian regime and the dynamical system, illustrated in Figure 2, has a globally
stable steady-state equilibrium, (AIss; Lss); towards which it gravitates monotonically.
[FIGURES 2 AND 3 HERE]
The driving force behind the transition from agriculture to industry, is the growth of productivity in
the (latent) industrial sector. In the process of development, increases in the industrial productivity,
rotate the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt clockwise in the
 
AAt ; Lt

space of Figure 2.
Eventually, productivity of the industrial sector surpasses the critical threshold level which renders
28The initial size of the adult population, L0 > 0, is given.
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the industrial sector operative and drops the Conditional Malthusian Frontier below the LL locus as
depicted in Figure 3.
As the economy enters the era of industrialization, there no longer exists a globally stable Malthu-
sian steady state in the
 
AAt ; Lt

space. Upon entering into the industrialization regime, the economy
enters into an era of sustained endogenous growth, where income per worker is growing over time
driven by the growth of industrial productivity.
5.2 Natural Land Endowment and Comparative Development
The e¤ect of natural land endowment on comparative development, through the emergence of coop-
eration and social capital, can be examined based on the e¤ect of the land endowment on Malthusian
equilibrium outcomes in the agricultural stage of development, and on the timing of industrialization
and the take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
Proposition 1 (The E¤ect of Natural Land Endowment on the Equilibrium in the Agricultural Stage
of Development) An increase in the quality of natural land endowment has a benecial e¤ect on the
steady-state levels of productivity in the agricultural sector and the size of the adult population,i.e.
dAAss=d > 0 and dLss=d > 0
[FIGURES 4 AND 5 HERE]
Geometrically, as depicted in Figure 4, a higher value of ; while it leaves the AA locus una¤ected,
it causes the LL locus to reside closer to the Lt-axis in
 
AAt ; Lt

space, thereby yielding higher steady-
state levels of adult population size and agricultural productivity. Therefore, an economy that is
characterized by more favorable natural land endowment, is also associated with a relatively superior
conditional Malthusian steady state in terms of the economys level of agricultural productivity per
worker and the size of its working population.
Variations in natural land endowment, however, have an e¤ect on the level of cooperation in the
production of agricultural infrastructure and on the timing of industrialization (through the creation
and transmission of social capital) and thus, on the take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
This e¤ect is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (The E¤ect of Natural Land Endowment on the Timing of Industrialization and the
Take-o¤ from Malthusian Stagnation) Consider an economy in a conditional Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium. An increase in natural land productivity, can have a detrimental e¤ect on the timing of
the adoption of industry and, thus, on the timing of the take-o¤ from Malthusian stagnation, i.e.,
dgIss=d > 0
Following Propositions 1 and 2, variation in natural land endowment across societies is associated
with the phenomenon of overtaking.
Corollary 1 (Natural Land Endowment and Overtaking) Consider two societies indexed by i 2 fU;Pg.
Suppose that society U is characterized by a lower natural land endowment and that U < P , where
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i is the natural land endowment of society i. Society U will then be characterized by an inferior
productivity in the Malthusian regime, but it can overtake society P via an earlier take-o¤ into the
industrial regime.
6 Empirical Evidence
The empirical section aims to establish the phenomenon of overtaking, to account partly for it via the
mechanism described above as well as to establish that land suitability in the past is associated with
more intense cooperation and higher levels of contemporary social capital. The analysis takes place
in three layers exploiting exogenous sources of variations in land productivity across: a) countries;
b) individuals within a country, and c) migrants of di¤erent ancestry within a country. The cross-
country analysis (a) allows to establish the overtaking and to further explore one potential mechanism
associated with it. The individual (b) and the migrant (c) analysis allow to establish the reduced
form e¤ect of land suitability on the current levels of trust while capturing an increasing number of
unobservables.
6.1 Cross-Country Evidence
Exploiting exogenous sources of variation in land suitability for agriculture across countries, the rst
part of the empirical analysis establishes the following testable predictions of the theory: (i) the e¤ect
of natural land productivity on the economic prosperity was reversed in the process of development.
While a favorable land endowment had a positive e¤ect on development in the Malthusian era, its
adverse e¤ect on the production of agricultural infrastructure and thus cooperation, had a detrimen-
tal e¤ect on economic prosperity in the modern era, (ii) cooperation, as reected by agricultural
infrastructure, emerged primarily in places where land was not highly productive and collective action
could diminish the adverse e¤ects of the environment and enhance agricultural output, and (iii) lower
level of land suitability in the past is associated with higher levels of contemporary social capital which
expedited the process of industrialization.
6.1.1 Empirical Strategy and Data
Empirical Strategy
Testable Hypothesis I: Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis rst
establishes that the e¤ect of land suitability varied over time, depending on the stage of development
and on whether its direct e¤ect on the economy, through increasing agricultural output, or its indirect
e¤ect, via determining the desirable level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, was a rst order
e¤ect in each era. The examination of comparative development at the agricultural stage of develop-
ment employs a Malthusian perspective, thereby assuming that technologically advanced economies
had a larger rather than richer population (Ashraf and Galor, 2011). Hence, as a proxy for prosperity
in the agricultural stage of development, the research employs historical data on population density as
opposed to income per capita and examines the hypothesized e¤ect of land suitability on population
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densities in the years 1, 1000 CE and 1500 CE.29 In examining the impact of land suitability on
economic outcomes in agricultural societies, the analysis controls for a number of alternative channels.
These channels include the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, due to its impact on the advancement
and di¤usion of agricultural technologies, as well as geographical factors, such as absolute latitude,
access to waterways, average ruggedness, average elevation as well as dummies for landlocked countries,
islands and continental xed e¤ects, all of which may have had a persistent e¤ect on agricultural output
and economic outcomes.
To establish the change on the e¤ect of land suitability on current economic outcomes the analysis
employs cross country variation in land suitability, to explain the cross-country variation in log average
income per capita in the years 1990-2000 CE. A number of potentially confounding factors and
alternative hypothesis suggested by the related literature on comparative development are accounted
for. The geography channel is controlled through a number of geographical controls that may a¤ect
economic outcomes today. The institutional hypothesis, that suggests that a "reversal of fortune" can
be traced to the impact of European colonization on comparative development, is accounted for through
a number of controls including European colonies dummies, legal origins dummies and institutional
quality controls.30 Furthermore, controls for the disease environment, ethnic fractionalization and
religion shares are employed.
Importantly, as suggested by the theory, it is not the direct e¤ect of land suitability that drives
the change in its e¤ect but instead the portable component associated with land suitability, namely
the social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation. In the absence of migration, the
countrys level of social capital is captured by its natural land endowment. However, in the post-
colonial era, where mass migration has taken place, the level of social capital in each country reects
the weighted average of land suitability among its ancestral population. Hence, in order to capture this
distinction, two alternative empirical strategies are adopted. First, the sample is restricted to countries
with a large percentage of native population, thereby implying that the social capital that has been
accumulated in the past, is still a prevalent norm among the native population. Second, the measure
of land suitability is ancestry adjusted to capture the portable component of natural land endowment.
Therefore a measure of ancestry adjusted land suitability is constructed using the weighted average
of the land suitability of the ancestral population of each country today. The adjustment of the land
suitability index is based on the migration matrix constructed by Putterman and Weil (2010), which
provides estimates of the proportion of the ancestors in the year 1500 CE of one countrys population
today that were living within what are now the borders of that and each of the other countries.
Testable Hypothesis II: Second, the empirical analysis explores the mediating factor of co-
operation, by establishing that higher suitability of land for agriculture is associated with a lower
level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, as reected by the scope for irrigation as well as the
actual fraction of irrigated land. The scope for irrigation measure captures the potential productivity
due to irrigation.31 Hence it can be viewed as an ex ante measure of the potential for cooperation.
29The tables for the years 1000 CE and 1 CE can be found in the Appendix B.
30Other institutional controls have been explored as well, such as constraints on the executive or expropriation risk,
without a¤ecting the results (results not available in the paper).
31The advantage of this approach has also been highlighted by Bentzen et al. (2012) who have constructed
an alternative measure for irrigation potential.
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The actual fraction of irrigated land can be perceived as an ex-post measure of actual cooperation.
In the absence of extensive cross-country data on irrigation prior to industrialization, the analysis is
based on the fraction of irrigated land for a sample of non-industrial countries in the year 1900. The
exclusion of industrialized countries is based upon membership in the OECD in the year 1985, under
the assumption that membership was restricted to advanced, and thus early industrialized countries.
In the light of the fact that industrialized countries are more advanced technologically, the restriction
of the sample is aimed to eliminate the possibility that the extent of irrigation is capturing the stage
of development as opposed to the trade-o¤s associated with the development of infrastructure.
Given that in the year 1900 mass migration has already taken place in a number of countries, a
potential concern would be that actual irrigation is a¤ected by some sort of specic human capital
carried by the migrants, which could reduce the opportunity cost associated with the development
of irrigation. Hence in order to capture this aspect the sample is restricted to countries with a large
percentage of native population.32
In the absence of more extensive data on agricultural infrastructure in antiquity, the adverse
e¤ect of natural land productivity on cooperation in earlier periods is examined based on several
proxies of cooperation: a) communication in the year 1 CE, b) transportation in the year 1 CE,
and c) medium of exchange in the year 1 CE. According to the theory, sophisticated means of
communication, transportation and medium of exchange have been catalysts in the advancement of
large-scale cooperation, and thus, under-development of these technologies reects the adverse e¤ect
of land suitability on the extent of cooperation.
Two main concerns may arise with respect to these proxies. First that they are not proxies of
cooperation, instead that they could be proxies of development. The analysis suggests that this is
not the case. There appears indeed to be an element in this technologies associated with the stage
of development, as suggested by Comin et al. (2010) nevertheless their correlation with population
density whereas positive, is not su¢ ciently high to be considered as proxies of development (<0.4).
Moreover, the fact that land suitability has a positive e¤ect on population density in the past but a
negative e¤ect on the level of these technologies indicates that there is an element in these technologies
that is orthogonal to the measure of development in the Malthusian era.
Second, it could be plausibly argued that the advancement of these technologies captures the degree
of trade, that could be potentially associated with higher land suitability, as opposed to the emergence
of cooperation in an environment characterized by lower land suitability. Reassuringly however, a more
suitable land for agriculture in these societies had an adverse e¤ect on the technological levels of these
three sectors, suggesting that the dominating e¤ect was indeed that of reduced cooperation. Moreover,
the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the development of these technologies remains signicant if
the degree of inequality in the suitability of land for agriculture a more direct proxy for the trade
channel in early stages of development is accounted for.33
The analysis further controls for a number of channels, that may have had a persistent e¤ect on
cooperation, including the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, geographical factors, such as absolute
32 It could be plausibly argued though that since early industrialized countries are excluded from the sample,
migration is unlikely to be a major factor in the analysis.
33All the baseline regressions are repeated in the Appendix B while controlling for the trade channel.
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latitude, access to waterways, average ruggedness, average elevation as well as dummies for landlocked
countries, islands and continents.
Testable Hypothesis III: Third, the empirical analysis establishes that the change on the
e¤ect of natural land productivity captures its adverse e¤ect on social capital as reected by the
contemporary level of generalized trust. Importantly, since the portable component associated with
land suitability, namely the social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation, a¤ects the
current level of trust, the measure of land suitability is ancestry adjusted to capture the portable
component of natural land endowment, namely social capital, using the weighted average of the land
suitability of the ancestral population of each country today. A number of alternative channels
are accounted for, namely geographical and institutional factors, ethnic fractionalization, disease
environment and dummies for continents, legal origins, European colonies and major religion shares.
In addition, alternative measures of trust are employed, e.g. distrust in civil servants. Furthermore, as
an additional robustness check, the unadjusted measure of land suitability is employed and the sample
of countries is restricted to those with native population larger than 80%.34
In order to establish that natural land productivity is partly a¤ecting the current levels of trust
through the incentives for cooperation it generated in the agricultural sector, a horse race regression is
employed between the measure of natural land productivity and the irrigation potential which proxies
the scope for cooperation. The measure of irrigation potential, is also ancestry adjusted in order to
capture the portable component associated with it, i.e. the incentives it generated for developing
irrigation infrastructure and thus the cooperation incentives associated with it. Reassuringly the
signicance and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of natural land productivity is reduced.
A theory on the emergence of social capital due to geographical conditions, generates plausible
concerns such as the potential use of slavery and the e¤ect of very low land productivity countries. All
these concerns are addressed in the robustness section of the model, along with a number of robustness
checks on the validity of the model.
The Data Data on historical population density (in persons per square km) are derived by McEvedy
and Jones (1978). Despite the inherent measurement problems associated with historical data, they
are widely regarded as a standard source for population and income per capita data in the long-run
growth literature.35
Land suitability measure is an index of the average suitability of land for cultivation, based on
geospatial data on various ecological factors, related to climatic factors and soil quality. These factors
include (i) growing degree days, (ii) the ratio of potential to actual evapotranspiration, (iii) soil
carbon density, and (iv) soil pH. Therefore biophysical factors, such as topography and irrigation, and
socioeconomic factors such as market price or incentive structure, which are important for determining
whether land will be cultivated, are not part of the index.36 The index is reported at a half-degree
34The result is robust to other thresholds as well.
35For a more extensive discussion on this data see Ashraf and Galor (2011). Moreover the concerns associated
with measurement errors are mitigated by the introduction of continental xed e¤ects.
36The argument for adopting such an approach is based upon the observation that at the global scale, climate
and soil factors form the major constraints on cultivation, and adequately describe the major patterns of
agricultural land (Ramankutty et al., 2002),
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resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002). The average of land quality is thus the average value of the
index across the grid cells within a country. This measure is obtained from Michalopoulos (2012).
Current suitability as a proxy for past suitability: One potential source of concern with
respect to the measure of land suitability is whether current data on the suitability of land for
cultivation reect land suitability in the past. Importantly, the critical aspect of the data for the
tested hypothesis is the ranking of countries with respect to their land suitability as opposed to the
actual measure of land suitability. Hence the identifying assumption is that the ranking of land
suitability as measured today, reects the ranking of land suitability in the past.37
If intense cultivation and human intervention a¤ected soil quality over time, this could have a¤ected
all countries proportionally and therefore it would introduce a non-systematic error. This would not
only leave the ranking of countries with respect to land suitability for agriculture una¤ected, but would
also enhance the di¢ culty to detect a signicant e¤ect on land suitability. Importantly, even in the
presence of a systematic error, it would be implausible to argue that the ranking of countries with
respect to land suitability has been reversed, based on two arguments, similar to the ones made by
Michalopoulos (2012). First, one of the two components of the index is based upon climatic conditions,
which have not signicantly changed during the period of examination (Durante, 2010; Ashraf and
Michalopoulos, 2013).38 Therefore, even if the characteristics of soil quality have signicantly changed
over time, this would still have a limited e¤ect on the total index of land suitability. Second, given that
the measure of land suitability captures the average level of land suitability within a given country,
it would be implausible to anticipate that deteriorations in land quality in particular segments of the
country, could a¤ect the average land quality of a country, to the extent that it would change its
overall ranking. Finally, to further alleviate potential concerns about the importance of the e¤ect
of human intervention on soil quality, the baseline regressions are repeated using each component of
the land suitability index separately, namely climatic suitability and soil suitability. Reassuringly the
qualitative results remain intact.39
Accounting for migration: The adjustment of the land suitability index is based on the use
of the migration matrix constructed by Putterman and Weil (2010) which provides estimates of the
proportion of the ancestors in the year 1500 CE of one countrys population today that were living
within what are now the borders of that and each of the other countries. The measure of ancestry
adjusted land suitability is the weighted average of the land suitability of the ancestral population
of each country today. The migration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010) is also the basis of the
measure of the percentage of native population, as constructed by Ashraf and Galor (2011).
37 It should be noted that it is not the ranking of countries that is used as the measure of the explanatory variable,
instead it is the actual measure of land suitability. The argument about the ranking of countries aims to highlight that
changes in land productivity, as captured by the index, are hardly so drastic to change the ranking of countries.
38Durante (2010) has examined at the relationship between climatic conditions for the years 1900-2000 and
1500-1900. In particular he looks at the relationship separately for average precipitation, average temperature,
precipitation variability and temperature variability. His ndings conrm that regions with more variable climate
in the present years were also characterized by more variate climate in the past, thereby reassuringly implying
that climatic conditions have not signicantly changed over time. A similar argument has been made by Ashraf
and Michalopoulos (2013).
39The robustness section addresses these concerns by employing as the explanatory variable climatic and soil
suitability respectively.
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Data on irrigation potential are obtained from the FAO-Aquastat dataset. The index of irrigation
potential is calculated as the extend of land that becomes marginally suitable for cultivation under
rainfed conditions and irrigation conditions over the fraction of total arable land under only rain-fed
conditions. It therefore captures the potential boost in the productivity of land due to irrigation.
Proxies of cooperation: Data on actual irrigation are reported by Freydank and Siebert (2008),
who have constructed a set of annual values of area equipped for irrigation for all 236 countries
during the time period 1900 - 2003.40 The Irrigation variable employs data for the year 1900 and is
expressed as the fraction of irrigated land over arable land. Despite the fact that data is from the year
1900, evidence suggests that most countries have changed little with respect to the land equipped for
irrigation during the 20th century, thereby implying that major expansions in their irrigation systems
have primarily occurred prior to industrialization. In addition, data for the period prior to 1900 were
used as a basis for interpolation, again indicating that a signicant part of the irrigation infrastructure
had been constructed in the years prior industrialization (Framji et al., 1981).
Data on a) Communication in the year, 1 b) Transportation in the year 1, and c) Medium of
Exchange in the year 1 are constructed from Peregrines (2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution, and
aggregated at the country level by Ashraf and Galor (2011). Each of these three sectors is reported on
a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various anthropological and historical sources. The level of technology
in each sector is indexed as follows. In the communications sector, the index is assigned a value of 0
under the absence of both true writing and mnemonic or non-written records, a value of 1 under the
presence of only mnemonic or non-written records, and a value of 2 under the presence of both. In
the transportation sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence of both vehicles and
pack or draft animals, a value of 1 under the presence of only pack or draft animals, and a value of
2 under the presence of both. In the Medium of Exchange sector, the index is assigned a value of 0
under the absence of domestically used articles and currency, a value of 1 under the presence of only
domestically used articles and the value of 2 under the presence of both. In all cases, the sector-specic
indices are normalized to assume values in the [0,1]-interval. Given that the cross-sectional unit of
observation in Peregrines dataset is an archaeological tradition or culture, specic to a given region on
the global map, and since spatial delineations in Peregrines dataset do not necessarily correspond to
contemporary international borders, the culture-specic technology index in a given year is aggregated
to the country level by averaging across those cultures from Peregrines map that appear within the
modern borders of a given country.
Data on trust come for the World Values Survey. They are built upon the fraction of total
respondents within a given country, from four di¤erent waves (1981-2002) based on their answers
on the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant
be too careful in dealing with people".
6.1.2 Empirical Findings
Hypothesis I-The Impact of Land Suitability on Development in the Agricultural Stage
Table 1 establishes, in line with the theory, that favorable land endowment had a benecial impact
40The values are provided in 1000 ha units.
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on economic development in the agricultural stage. Specically, accounting for a variety of potentially
confounding factors, the table demonstrates the positive e¤ect of land suitability on log population
density in the year 1500 CE.41
Employing a 130 cross-country sample for which the full set of controls is available, Column (1)
reveals that log land productivity possesses a statistically signicant and positive relationship with
population density in the year 1500 CE, conditional on continental xed e¤ects. Column (2) augments
the analysis with the full set of exogenous geographical controls.
The regression presented in Column (3) further augments the analysis with additional controls
on the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, a major determinant of prosperity in the Malthusian era.
Column (4) introduces into the analysis the log of the distance from the nearest technological frontier.
As predicted in the research of Ashraf and Galor (2011), distance from the nearest technological
frontier has a signicant negative impact on economic development. In all columns the point estimate
and statistical signicance of the coe¢ cient associated with log land suitability remains quite stable.
The evidence presented in Table 1 therefore establishes, in accordance with the theory, that
favorable land endowment had a benecial impact on economic development during the agricultural
stage of development. The positive e¤ect of land suitability on economic outcomes in the year 1500
CE is depicted on the scatter plot in Figure B.3. Importantly, as suggested in the footnote and the
robustness section the result is not driven by the very low productivity places.42
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Hypothesis I-The Impact of Land Suitability on Development in the Industrial Stage
Table 2 establishes, in line with the theory, a change on the e¤ect of land productivity on aggregate
productivity in the industrial era.
In particular the empirical analysis establishes that favorable land endowment has an adverse
e¤ect on current economic outcomes as proxied by the average level of income per capita in the years
1990-2000 CE. As already argued in the empirical implementation section, the measure of ancestry
adjusted land suitability is employed, in order to capture the portable component associated with
natural land productivity. Specically, accounting for a variety of potentially confounding factors,
the table demonstrates the negative e¤ect of the log ancestry adjusted land suitability on the log of
average income per capita in the years 1990-2000 CE.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
41Similar results are established for the e¤ect of log land on log population density in the years 1 CE and 1000
CE. and can be found in the Appendix B.
42One concern would be the case of some countries which are uninhabited due to being non-suitable for
agriculture (e.g. Egypt which is largely uninhabited due to the desert). In this case, population density
would be underestimated and this could lead to a spurious positive correlation between land suitability and
population density. To mitigate this concern, the regression in Column (4) has been repeated using a measure
of population density dened as population in 1500 CE divided by arable land. The results remain intact. The
same concern could be raised for the measure of land suitability as well. In this case however, the index of land
suitability is underestimated thereby attenuating the coe¢ cient on land suitability towards zero. Constructing
the corresponding index of suitability while taking into account only the fraction of arable land would strengthen
the results.
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Exploiting variations across a sample of 132 countries for which the full set of controls is available,
Column (1) reveals that, conditional on continental xed e¤ects, ancestry adjusted land suitability
possesses a statistically signicant negative relationship with average income per capita in the years
1990-2000 CE.43 Column (2) augments the analysis with exogenous geographical controls capturing
the direct e¤ect of geography, as well as with the timing of the Neolithic Revolution, ancestry adjusted.
Column (3) explores the institutional hypothesis by introducing into the analysis controls for
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, institutional controls (e.g. the quality of institutions) and disease
environment. To ensure that the change in the impact of ancestry adjusted land suitability on economic
outcomes is not being driven by the institutional channels associated with European colonialism, the
regression in Column (4) introduces controls for legal origins and colonial dummies. Moreover it
introduces some cultural controls for major religion shares as well as for a proxy of human capital,
namely average enrollment rates during the years 1990-2000 CE.
Column (5) is employing a measure of unadjusted land suitability and is restricting the analysis to
a sample of 89 countries that have native population over 80% of the total population, while retaining
all the controls introduced in Column (4). Remarkably, despite the smaller size of the sample, the
results strongly support the hypothesis. 44
Column (6) gives credence to an intermediate element of the mechanism. More analytically, the
mechanism suggests that low land suitability is associated with better economic outcomes today due to
the fact that it allows for an early industrialization. Thus, the last column establishes, for a sample of
46 countries45, that higher land suitability is associated with an earlier transition to industrialization,
while controlling for all the relevant controls employed in Column (5).46
The evidence presented in Table 2 therefore demonstrates, consistently with the theory, that
land suitability has had a persistent detrimental impact on economic development in the course of
industrialization. As is established in the following sections, this adverse e¤ect is operating via the
reduced incentive it generated for cooperation in the agricultural sector and ultimately the lower level
of social capital that emerged as the outcome of the reduced cooperation. The negative e¤ect of
ancestry adjusted land suitability on current economic outcomes proxied by the average income in the
years 1990-2000 CE is depicted on the scatter plot in Figure B.4.47
43The sample is extended to the maximum number of countries available for the industrial era. These countries already
contain the 130 countries that are available in the Malthusian era.
44The threshold level of the native population is chosen in a way that minimizes the trade-o¤ between the
reduced observations and a su¢ ciently high fraction of the native people that allows to infer that the portable
component of land suitability is present within the population. As a robustness di¤erent thresholds have been
employed as well and the results remain qualitatively the same.
45 It should be noted that the sample is restricted to the countries with a fraction of native population higher
than 80%. Since the migration matrix is referring to the ancestors of the population in the year 2000 CE, it is
not possible to calculate the ancestry adjusted land suitability. Similarly, certain controls such as schooling are
not relevant for this analysis.
46The timing of industrialization is determined as the year in which the share of agricultural sector became
less than 30% of the aggregate economic activity. The measure used is provided by Oded Galor. Bentzen,
Kaarsen and Wingender (2013) have also constructed and provided a measure of industrialization, where the
timing of industrialization is determined as the year in which the share of agricultural sector became less than
50% of the aggregate economic activity.
47One potential concern may be that the adverse e¤ect of land productivity on current economic outcomes
is reecting the e¤ect of the natural resource curse. Reassuringly though, the negative correlation between
the index of land productivity and income from natural resources as a fraction of GDP (-0.4), implies that the
adverse e¤ect of land productivity on contemporary economic outcomes does not capture the resource curse.
Controlling though for OPEC countries as an additional robustness check, does not qualitatively a¤ect the
22
Hypothesis II-Cooperation: The Impact of Land Productivity on Cooperation in the
Agricultural Stage The evidence presented so far establishes a change of the e¤ect of natural land
productivity during the process of economic development. As described in the mechanism, natural land
productivity had an indirect e¤ect on the incentives to invest in agricultural infrastructure and thus on
the opportunities to cooperate for its development. Tables 3 and 4 establish this particular element,
i.e. that this indirect e¤ect operates through the cooperation that emerged in the agricultural sector in
an e¤ort to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of land. Cooperation, as reected by agricultural infrastructure,
emerged primarily in places where land was not highly productive and collective action could diminish
the adverse e¤ects of the environment and enhance agricultural output.48
Irrigation Potential and Actual Irrigation Consistently with the assumptions of the model,
Table 3 establishes that the returns to the development of agricultural infrastructure are higher in
countries with unfavorable land endowment. In particular, the analysis reveals a statistically signicant
and robust negative e¤ect of the log land suitability on irrigation potential. As has been elaborated in
a previous section, the measure of irrigation potential reects the returns to irrigation and therefore
the scope for cooperation. It also establishes a signicant and robust negative e¤ect of the log land
suitability on the fraction of irrigated land in the year 1900.
Exploiting variations across a sample of 130 countries already employed for the Malthusian era
analysis, Column (1) in Table 3 controls for continental xed e¤ects.49 Column (2) enriches the
analysis with a number of exogenous geographical controls that can confer a signicant e¤ect on the
scope for irrigation. Columns (3) and (4) introduce some additional controls such as the timing of the
Neolithic Revolution and the distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year 1500 CE.50
The coe¢ cient retains both its signicance and its magnitude suggesting that higher land suitability
is associated with less incentives to invest in infrastructure.
Column (5) in Table 3 employs an alternative measure of irrigation, i.e., actual irrigation. As already
analyzed in the empirical implementation section, the analysis on ex-ante cooperation is employing
the fraction of irrigated land for a sample of non-industrial countries in the year 1900. The reason for
choosing non-industrialized countries is to mitigate the problem of reverse causality running from the
stage of industrialization to actual irrigation. Moreover given that in the year 1900 mass migration has
already taken place in a number of countries, a potential concern would be that irrigation is a¤ected
by some sort of specic human capital carried by the migrants, which could reduce the opportunity
cost associated with the development of irrigation. Hence in order to capture this aspect and in the
absence of the equivalent of the migration matrix data for the year 1900, the sample is restricted to
countries with a percentage of native population higher than 80%, thereby implying that migration
results (results are reported in the Appendix B).
48 If coordination problems among members of the community dictate a suboptimal level of investment in
infrastructure, the qualitative results would be enhanced. Since the complexity of coordination increases with
the size of the community, less favorably endowed places, and therefore more sparsely populated places (according
to the Malthusian mechanism) would coordinate more easily than more densely populated places. Hence, the
sub-optimally level of investment in infrastructure will be larger in favorably endowed places, enhancing the
hypothesis that less favorably endowed places invest more in infrastructure.
49As in Table 1, which refers to the Malthusian era, the relevant sample for Table 4 is that of the 130 countries for
which the full set of controls is available.
50The full set of controls is sustained for the shake of symmetry with the baseline regressions.
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has not a¤ected the composition of the human capital of the native population. This restricts the
sample to 42 observations. Note that the number of observations di¤ers from that in Columns (1)-(4)
since the measure employed in these columns was that of potential irrigation which i) is available for
a large number of countries, and ii) does not su¤er from endogeneity concerns.
Column (5) in Table 3 thus reports a statistically signicant e¤ect of land suitability on the actual
fraction of irrigated land. Despite the large number of observations the results are conrmed, i.e. that
natural land productivity negatively correlates with actual levels of irrigation.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
Overall, the evidence presented in table 3, establishes the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on ex
ante and ex post measures of irrigation, and thus as is argued, on proxies of ex-ante and ex-post
cooperation. The negative e¤ect of land suitability on irrigation potential is depicted on the scatter
plots in Figure B.5.51
Medium of Exchange, Transportation and Communication In the absence of more ex-
tensive data on agricultural infrastructure in antiquity, the adverse e¤ect of natural land productivity
on cooperation in earlier periods is examined based on several proxies of cooperation: a) medium
of exchange in the year 1 CE, b) communication in the year 1 CE, and c) transportation in the
year 1 CE. According to the theory, sophisticated means of communication, transportation and
medium of exchange have been catalysts in the advancement of large-scale cooperation, and thus,
under-development of these technologies reects the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the extent of
cooperation.
Exploiting variations across a sample of 130 countries, Column (1) in Table 4 establishes a statis-
tically signicant negative e¤ect of land suitability on the development of sophisticated medium of
exchange in the year 1 CE, while controlling for continental xed e¤ects, a number of geographical
controls, the timing of the Neolithic Revolution and distance from the nearest technological frontier.
Similarly Columns (2) and (3) establish a statistically signicant negative e¤ect of land suitability on
means of communication and transportation in the year 1 CE.
It could be argued that the advancement of means of communication, transportation and medium
of exchange could be driven by larger volumes of trade ows, that could be potentially associated with
higher land suitability. This would suggest that higher land suitability is positively associated with
each of these measures. Reassuringly however, more suitable land for agriculture in these societies
had an adverse e¤ect on the technological level of this sector, suggesting that the dominating e¤ect
was indeed that of reduced cooperation. Moreover, to control for this channel, an additional control
is added, namely inequality in the land suitability for agriculture, a more direct proxy for trade in
early stages of development. Consistently with the predictions of the theory, the adverse e¤ect of
land suitability on the development of these technologies remains signicant, despite the positive and
statistically signicant e¤ect of land inequality on cooperation technology.52
51The argument that irrigation as well as any other type of infrastructure can be associated with autocratic
regimes and the use of slaves is extensively discussed in the robustness section and empirically addressed in the
Appendix B.
52Results are reported in the Appendix B.
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A second concern could be that the advancement in the technology of each sector could be attributed
to the use of slaves, in which case cooperation would not be the nal outcome. The intuition why this
should not be a concern is similar to the rst argument, i.e. that in such a case higher land suitability
would be negatively associated with all these proxies of cooperation which supported by the empirical
evidence. Moreover, to net out the potential e¤ect of slavery, a measure of the level of stratication
of societies in the year 1 CE is employed that captures the potential use of slaves in the development
of infrastructure. The results remain intact suggesting that the scope for cooperation remains valid
even in the presence of slaves.53
Overall the analysis in Tables 3 and 4 and the scatter plots depicted in Figures B.6, B.7 and B.8,
suggests that there is a statistically signicant adverse e¤ect of land suitability on a number of proxies
for cooperation during the agricultural stage of development, namely a) irrigation potential, b) fraction
of irrigated land in the year 1900, c) medium of exchange in the year 1 CE, d) communication in the
year 1 CE, and e) transportation in the year 1 CE.
The validity of the results is enhanced by employing ex ante and ex post proxies of cooperation in
the agricultural sector as well as alternative measures that can be viewed as by-products of cooperation
in the process of building agricultural infrastructure.54
[TABLE 4 HERE]
Hypothesis III-Trust: The Impact of Land Suitability on Trust in the Industrial Stage
The purpose of the rst two sub-sections was to establish some intermediate elements of the mechanism
that associate lower land suitability with higher levels of trust today. This section explores explicitly
the e¤ect of land productivity on the current levels of trust, as well as the mediating factor of
cooperation.
Consistently with the predictions of the theory, Table 5 establishes that countries with unfavorable
land endowment manifest higher levels of social capital and trust today. In particular, the analysis
reveals a statistically signicant and robust negative e¤ect of the ancestry adjusted land suitability55
on the index of trust.
Exploiting variations across a sample of 67 countries for which all controls are available, Column (1)
controls for continental xed e¤ects. Column (2) explores the direct and/or indirect e¤ect of geography
on current levels of trust. whereas Column (3) further extends the analysis by introducing additional
controls for ethnolinguistic fractionalization, institutional controls and disease environment.
53Results are reported in the Appendix B.
54 It could be argued that the threat of war and the fear of being invaded could enforce cooperation in the
past. However, the presence of this plausible e¤ect would suggest that the identied adverse e¤ect of land
productivity on cooperation represents an upper bound of the actual e¤ect. First, if one plausibly assumes that
the more fertile places faced an increased risk to be invaded then land productivity would generate a positive
e¤ect on cooperation via this channel, mitigating the actual adverse e¤ect identied in the regression analysis.
Moreover, even if implausibly, less fertile places were faced with an increased probability of being invaded, it
would only constitute a complementary channel through which land productivity is a¤ecting cooperation and
trust, since as the established e¤ect of low land productivity on cooperation, via irrigation, medium of exchange,
and communication technologies are tangential to cooperation for defensive purposes.
55As already argued, adjusted land suitability is the appropriate measure of land suitability since vast
migration has taken place in current years.
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[TABLE 5 HERE]
To ensure that the observed impact of land suitability on trust is not being driven by the institu-
tional channels associated with European colonialism, the regression in Column (4) introduces controls
for legal origins, colonial dummies as well as dummies for major religion shares. Even after controlling
for all this additional channels, the regression coe¢ cient associated with the land suitability remains
largely robust.56 The corresponding standardized beta indicates that a one standard deviation increase
in the land suitability index, is associated with a 0.608 standard deviation decrease in the levels of
trust.
Whereas ancestry adjusted land suitability is one way to capture the portable component associated
with land suitability, Column (5) conducts a robustness check by using the measure of unadjusted land
suitability and restricting the sample to the countries that have a percentage of native population
higher than 80%, thereby making implicitly the assumption that the norms of social capital and trust
are still prevalent among the native population. The results indicate that the coe¢ cient increases in
magnitude and its statistical signicance remains una¤ected.
Reassuringly, similar results, that establish a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect of land
productivity on current levels of social capital are obtained, when employing an alternative proxy of
social capital, namely distrust in civil servants, as indicated in Column (6). Column (6) uses the
ancestry adjusted measure of suitability and employs the full set of controls. Overall the negative
e¤ect of ancestry adjusted land suitability on the generalized level of trust is depicted in the scatter
plot in Figure B.9.57
The Mediating Factor of Cooperation The evidence presented in Table 5 therefore demon-
strates, consistently with the theory, that land suitability has had a persistent detrimental impact
on the current levels of trust. As argued by the theory, the channel through which geography is
indirectly a¤ecting current levels of trust is via the reduced incentives it generated for cooperation in
the agricultural sector and ultimately the lower level of social capital that emerged and persisted as
the outcome of reduced cooperation.
Table 6 explores the mediating factor of cooperation, i.e. it employs as a proxy for the scope
of cooperation the measure of irrigation potential and introduces it to the existing analysis.58 In
particular using the same sample of countries employed in Table 5 it establishes that high land
56Further analysis in the robustness section explores the channel of slavery by controlling for a measure of
stratication ancestry adjusted. Reassuringly the results are una¤ected, thereby suggesting that despite the fact
that in some cases infrastructure may have been developed by slaves, nevertheless non fertile land is associated
with more incentives for cooperation and higher levels of trust today.
57One concern that may arise is that land productivity is correlated with the degree of land diversity and
high land diversity may generate conict and therefore hinder cooperation and ultimately trust. To address
this concern, one could capture this channel by controlling for land diversity. Reassuringly, as established in the
Appendix, controlling for land diversity does not a¤ect the qualitative results. In addition, the coe¢ cient of land
diversity is positive thereby implying that if indeed conict emerges, it is not the dominating e¤ect. In particular,
it is plausibly suggested by the positive coe¢ cient, that unequal land productivity fostered cooperation and trade
among regions, generating positive e¤ects on economic outcomes in the past and the present as well as on the
current levels of trust.
58There are three reasons for focusing on irrigation potential. First it is more precisely measured than all
other variables, second it is available for a larger number of countries and last it is more exogenous control than
actual irrigation.
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productivity is associated with lower levels of trust today operating partly through the incentives
that it generates for cooperation.
In particular, Column (1) of Table 6 employs a sample of 67 countries for which all controls
including the control for irrigation potential is available, and repeats the regression in Column (4) of
Table 5.59 Column (2) introduces in the analysis the mediating factor of cooperation, using as a proxy
of the incentive to cooperate the measure of irrigation potential, ancestry adjusted. Importantly the
coe¢ cient of irrigation potential is positive and signicant, suggesting that the higher the scope for
irrigation (and thus for cooperation), the higher the current levels of trust. Moreover, the coe¢ cient
of land suitability reduces in magnitude, implying that the adverse e¤ect of ancestry adjusted land
suitability on current levels of trust is partly operating via the associated reduced incentives for
cooperation. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the same exercise using the restricted sample of countries
with native population higher than 80% and remarkably the coe¢ cient reduces both in magnitude
and signicance, conrming the ndings of the rst two columns.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
6.1.3 Robustness
The aim of this section is to establish the robustness of the results. All tables can be found in the
Appendix B, along with a number of scatter plots and summary statistics.
Validity of the Land Suitability Index One potential source of concern with respect to the
measure of land suitability is whether current data on the suitability of land for cultivation reect
land suitability in the past. It can be plausibly argued that human intervention may have a¤ected
soil quality (e.g. the use of fertilizers or the heavy plow) and therefore current land suitability may
not be a good proxy for past suitability. As has already been discussed in the description of the data,
it is the ranking of countries that is crucial for the hypothesis advanced in the paper. Given the
construction of the variable, it has been argued that the identifying assumption, i.e. that the ranking
of land suitability as measured today reects the ranking of land suitability in the past, is plausible.
Nevertheless, to further alleviate concerns about the e¤ect of human intervention on soil quality,
all the baseline regressions are repeated using each component of the land suitability index separately,
namely climatic suitability and soil suitability.60 Employing the climatic component, given that the
climate is less vulnerable to human intervention, is reassuring with respect to the validity of the
results.61 The soil suitability index is employed as well, which yields interesting information as to the
impact of each component.
59The repetition of the results is to make the two samples comparable.
60Soil suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of
soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH whereas climatic suitability is a geospatial
index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation
such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration.
61Durante (2010) has examined at the relationship between climatic conditions for the years 1900-2000
and 1500-1900. His ndings conrm that regions with more variable climate in the present years were also
characterized by more variate climate in the past, thereby reassuringly implying that climatic conditions have
not signicantly changed over time.
27
Table B.2 in the Appendix repeats the baseline regressions of past outcomes (Population Density
in 1500 CE, Irrigation Potential, Medium of Exchange in the Year 1 CE, Communication in the Year
1 CE, Transportation in the Year 1 CE) using the climatic component of the land suitability index
and the full set of controls (geographical controls, years since the Neolithic transition and distance
from the nearest technological frontier). Reassuringly the results are very robust to this specication
and interestingly the coe¢ cients are very similar to the coe¢ cients obtained under the specication
that is employing the aggregate land suitability index.
Table B.3 repeats the baseline regressions for past outcomes (Population Density in 1500 CE,
Irrigation Potential, Irrigation in 1900, Medium of Exchange in the Year 1 CE, Communication in the
Year 1 CE, Transportation in the Year 1 CE) using the soil component of the land suitability index
and the full set of controls (geographical controls, years since the Neolithic transition and distance
from the nearest technological frontier). Similarly the results are very robust to this specication as
well.
Table B.4 repeats the baseline regressions for current outcomes (Average Income per Capita in
1990-2000 CE, Trust) employing both the climatic and the soil component. Columns (A.1) and (A.2)
employ the ancestry adjusted climatic component and the full set of controls (geography, institutions,
disease environment, ethnolinguistic fractionalization). The results of Table B.4 establish a statistically
signicant adverse e¤ect of ancestry adjusted climatic suitability on current outcomes. Columns
(B.1) and (B.2) employ the ancestry adjusted soil component and the full set of controls (geography,
institutions, disease environment, ethnolinguistic fractionalization).62 The results suggest that the soil
component is also statistically signicant.
Overall, the results in tables B.2, B.3 and B.4 conrm the robustness of the results to each of the
components of the suitability index. Reassuringly, given that human intervention has a smaller e¤ect
on climate rather than on soil quality, this analysis suggests that the identifying assumption, i.e. that
the ranking of land suitability as measured today reects the ranking of land suitability in the past,
is plausible.
Validity of Historical Population Estimates Data on historical population density (in persons
per square km) are primarily derived by McEvedy and Jones (1978). Despite the inherent measurement
problems associated with historical data, they are widely regarded as a standard source for population
and income per capita data in the long-run growth literature. The robustness of the results regarding
the e¤ect of land suitability on population density is established also for the years 1000 CE and 1 CE.
Historical population estimates are also available from Maddison (2003), albeit for a smaller set
of countries than McEvedy and Jones. Table B.5 in Appendix B repeats the baseline regressions,
while employing the Maddison (2003) data on population density. It establishes that land suitability
has a statistically signicant e¤ect on population density in the years 1500 CE, 1000 CE and 1 CE
respectively, while controlling for the full set of controls, i.e. geographical factors, years since the
62A measure of adjusted climatic (soil) suitability is constructed using the weighted average of the climatic
(soil) suitability of the ancestral population of each country today. The adjustment of the land suitability index
is based on the migration matrix constructed by Putterman and Weil (2010), which provides estimates of the
proportion of the ancestors in the year 1500 of one countrys population today that were living within what
are now the borders of that and each of the other countries. The adjustment captures the portable component
associated with land suitability, namely the social capital that emerged as the outcome of cooperation.
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Neolithic transition and distance from the nearest technological frontier. Reassuringly the baseline
results are quantitatively unchanged under Maddisons alternative population estimates.
Potential Omitted Heterogeneity and Spatial Autocorrelation An attempt to deal with
specic unobservables is already made in the baseline regressions by including continental xed e¤ects.
Therefore all the results are robust to the xed e¤ects specication. An alternative attempt to capture
unobserved heterogeneity, is to use regional xed e¤ects instead of continental xed e¤ects. The xed
e¤ects that have been used are regional dummies for (i) Sub-Saharan Africa (ii) Middle East and
North Africa, (iii) Europe and Central Asia, (iv) South Asia, (v) East Asia and Pacic and (vi) Latin
America and the Caribbean. The results are robust to this specication as well (Tables B.12 and B.13
in Appendix B).
It is important to note that all the results have been replicated without the use of regional xed
e¤ects. The results remain una¤ected with the exception of the e¤ect of land suitability on population
density which is marginally insignicant with a positive coe¢ cient. This nding suggests that the
patterns observed are applied both globally and within regions (results not reported).
Furthermore, given the possibility that the disturbance terms in the baseline regression models
may be non-spherical in nature, particularly since economic development has been spatially clustered
in certain regions of the world, the standard errors of the point estimates are corrected for spatial
autocorrelation following the methodology of Timothy G. Conley (results not reported).
Validity of the Estimation This section establishes that the main results are not driven by the
employed specication. More analytically, the baseline analysis is repeating by weighting inuential
observations in the sample. The choice of inuential observations is conducted using quantile regression
analysis.63 Reassuringly all the results are robust and in line with the baseline regressions (Tables
B.10 and B.11 in Appendix B).
Competing Channels When exploring the emergence of trust as driven by geography, three
concerns could be raised throughout the analysis. The rst concern could be associated with the
modern era analysis (GDP in 2000 CE and Trust) and the presence of potential corner solutions i.e.
that the results may be driven by very unproductive places. One explanation would be that some
countries have almost zero suitability for agriculture and thus it is the presence of corner solutions
that drives the results. Or even more plausibly, it could be argued that oil-producing places are
driving the results since while they have low land productivity, nevertheless they have high income
due to the presence of oil. In order to mitigate these concerns the current era analysis adopts two
alternative strategies: i) it censors the sample by excluding a number of countries that have very low
land productivity and ii) it employs a dummy for OPEC countries. The ndings suggest that the
results are robust to these tests (Table B.14 in Appendix B).
A second argument is related to the potential presence of slaves. It can be argued that if slaves were
used in the development of infrastructure then increased need for agricultural infrastructure would not
be associated with more cooperation. The use of slaves in the development of infrastructure would
63Quantile regression analysis aims at estimating either the conditional median of the response variable and
thus the estimates are more robust against outliers.
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operate against the advanced hypothesis and thus one would anticipate that high land suitability in
the past would positively a¤ect current levels of trust today. Therefore, since the coe¢ cient of land
suitability would capture two opposite e¤ects, the sign of the coe¢ cient would reect the dominating
e¤ect. Reassuringly, after controlling for all relevant controls the results suggest that the channel of
cooperation is the dominating e¤ect. Moreover this result is consistent with both the coe¢ cient of land
suitability and the coe¢ cient of irrigation potential. However, to further mitigate these concerns, the
analysis employs a measure of stratication that captures the degree of stratication in early societies
and the presence of slaves. All the results are robust to this specication (Tables B.8 and B.9 in
Appendix B).
Finally the last concern would be associated with the role of trade in fostering cooperation.
More productive places could be associated with higher propensity to trade and this could lead to
better communication, transportation and exchange technology. Following the rational of the second
argument, the negative e¤ect of land suitability on trust is associated with lowers levels of cooperation,
thereby suggesting that the dominating e¤ect is that of reduced cooperation due to the reduced
incentives to develop infrastructure. Nonetheless, to net out the potential e¤ect of trade, the analysis
employs as a proxy for the propensity to trade in the Malthusian era, i.e. the degree of inequality in
land suitability within a country (Litina, 2013). The results are robust to this specication as well
(Tables B.6 and B.7 in Appendix B).
To capture more explicitly the channel suggested by Durante (2010), i.e., the e¤ect of weather
variability on the emergence of trust, the analysis has also controlled for a measure of climatic
suitability range. The results remain stable (results not available in the paper).
6.2 World Values Surveys
The second part of the empirical analysis reexamines the hypothesis using a sample of individual data
from the four waves of the WVS (1981-2002). The analysis explores the e¤ect of ancestry adjusted
natural land productivity on the current levels of individual trust, accounting for geographical and
institutional characteristics. Importantly, in contrast to the cross country analysis, this disaggregated
individual data allows to account for individual controls, such as education, religious denomination,
age and gender. Since a fraction of the individuals are migrants, the measure of ancestry adjusted
land suitability is employed, thereby capturing the portable component associated with it, i.e. the
trait of cooperation.64
6.2.1 Empirical Strategy and Data
Empirical Strategy The goal of this section is to further explore the e¤ect of ancestry adjusted
land suitability on current levels of trust, by introducing all the country controls employed in the cross
64The WVS sample is not su¢ ciently detailed to trace all migrants and their country of origin (except for
the Vth wave in which case the sample size is dramatically reduced) Therefore the analysis in this section,
employs the same measure of ancestry adjusted land suitability for each individual in the country. Importantly
though recall that the results are robust to the use of the measure of unadjusted land suitability in the sample
of countries with a high fraction of native population as Table 5 suggests.
An analysis exploiting variations in land suitability associated with migrants, is conducted in the next section
of the paper, using a much more extensive sample from the ESS.
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section analysis, as well as a number of individual controls that can co-determine the current levels of
trust.
To conduct this analysis, the four waves of the WVS (1981-2002) are employed. In particular the
analysis takes into consideration 86.498 individuals living in 54 countries. Whereas the analysis is
conducted at the country level, nevertheless it establishes that land suitability is a good predictor
of individual levels of trust even after controlling for a large set of individual characteristics. More
analytically the estimated equation is given by:
Tji = 0 + 1Si +2Xi +3Ij +4
j +3i + "ji (11)
where j indicates the individual and i indicates the country. Tji is the level of trust of individual
j living in country i: Si is the index of the ancestry adjusted suitability of land for agriculture which
is invariant for all individuals living in the same country and thus varies only across countries; Xi
is a vector of geographical, historical controls and institutional controls that are applicable only at
the country level. These controls are critical for netting out potentially confounding factors related
to country characteristics; Ij is a set of individual controls that have been already established in
the trust literature to a¤ect the current levels of trust, such as age, gender, education and religious
group to which they belong.; 
 is a vector of dummies for each round of the survey; i is a vector of
continental xed e¤ects and "ji is an individual specic error term. The standard errors are corrected
for clustering at the dimension of the country where the interview was taken as well as at the religious
group dimension.65
Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis establishes that ancestry
adjusted land suitability has an adverse e¤ect on the average individual of each country. This e¤ect
remains negative and statistically signicant even after including all geographical and institutional
controls associated with the country of origin as well as a full set of individual controls.
As a robustness test, the analysis, restricts the sample to countries with the fraction of native
population higher than 80% and uses as the explanatory variable, the measure of unadjusted land
suitability. The rational in this exercise is similar to the one used in the cross country analysis, i.e.
that when the native population is su¢ ciently high, the portable component associated with land
suitability is still present in the population. This robustness test further reinforces the analytical
results.
Moreover the results are robust to a number of alternative tests, i.e. the decomposition of the
index into its climatic and soil component, the specication of the model and potentially competing
channels (such as the slavery channel and the trade channel).
In line with the cross-country analysis, it is explored whether the e¤ect of land suitability on
trust is operating via the scope for cooperation. For that purpose the analysis employs as a proxy
for cooperation the irrigation potential measure used in the cross country analysis. The positive
and signicant coe¢ cient of irrigation potential suggests that higher scope for irrigation is associated
with higher levels of trust, via the increased incentives it provides for cooperation. Moreover the
65 In principle it would be preferable to use ethnic group instead of religious groups. However, responses on
ethnic groups are much more limited and therefore signicantly reduce the sample size. Yet, religious group are
so detailed (90 religious groups are reported) that can be viewed as a good proxy for ethnic groups.
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magnitude of the coe¢ cient of land suitability is reduced, thereby suggesting that the e¤ect of
land suitability is partly operating via the reduced incentives to cooperate for the development of
agricultural infrastructure.
The Data All the data that are associated with the country of origin and vary only at the ancestry
level are the same data employed in the cross-country analysis (land suitability for agriculture,
irrigation potential, geographical and institutional controls).
The individual data come from all four rounds of the World Values Survey (1981-2002), a cross
sectional survey conducted in a number of countries all over the world.
The analysis reports attitudes of N=86.498 individuals from 54 countries. The survey design
weights, as provided by the WVS dataset, have been taken into account.
Respondents are given the statement "Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?". The index is scaled
on a two-point scale, with the value 0, capturing indicating that "Most people can be trusted" and the
value of 1 indicating that "Need to be very careful". The variable in this paper has been re-ordered
with the value of 1 indicating more trust, so as to make the interpretation easier.
The WVS also provides information about the age of the respondent, the gender, the religious
denominations where he belongs and the highest level of education achieved.66 All this information
about the individual is introduced in the analysis as controls.
6.2.2 Empirical Findings
The Impact of Land Suitability on Current Levels of Trust In line with the theory and
the empirical ndings of the cross country section, Table 7 establishes that higher land suitability, is
associated with lower levels of trust of the average individual.
In particular Column (1) controls only for continental xed e¤ects. Column (2) introduces the
full set of relevant controls that have been employed in the cross-country analysis, i.e. geographical
and institutional controls (ruggedness, elevation, distance to waterways, absolute latitude and ances-
try adjusted years since the Neolithic) as well as institutional and current controls such as ethnic
fractionalization, disease environment, quality of institutions and xed e¤ects for dominant religion,
former colony and legal origins. Column (3) introduces in the analysis individual controls that have
been established as critical determinants of trust in the related literature, such as the age of the
respondent, the gender, the educational level and the religious group in which the respondent belongs.
Reassuringly, the negative and signicant coe¢ cient of trust indicates that even after controlling for
the full set of country and individual controls, land suitability confers a negative e¤ect on individual
levels of trust. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is di¢ cult to interpret since trust is a binary variable
and the regression in Column (3) is a linear regression. Column (1) in Table C.3 of the Appendix C
66The questionnaire covers 90 categories of religious denominations. As to education attained, the
questionnaire distinguishes seven di¤erent levels of education (inadequately completed elementary education,
completed (compulsory) elementary education, (compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational
qualication, secondary, intermediate vocational qualication, secondary, intermediate general qualication,
full secondary, maturity level certicate, higher education - lower-level tertiary certicate, higher education -
upper-level tertiary certicate).
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reports the marginal e¤ect of the suitability index. In particular a ten percentage point increase in
land suitability, increases the probability of an individual being trustful by 2 percentage points.
Column (4) replicates the analysis, by excluding from the sample countries with native population
lower than 80% and using the unadjusted measure of land suitability instead. The results remain
qualitatively intact.67
Finally, Column (5) explores whether the adverse e¤ect of land suitability is operating via the
reduced incentives that fertile land provided for cooperation. For this purpose, the analysis introduces
the control on irrigation potential, proxying for cooperation potential, as the mediating factor. Indeed
the reduced, in magnitude, coe¢ cient on land suitability suggests that the adverse e¤ect of and
suitability on the current levels of trust, is partly mitigated by the scope for cooperation. Moreover
the coe¢ cient of irrigation potential is positive and signicant thereby suggesting that the higher the
scope for cooperation, the higher the current levels of trust.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
6.2.3 Robustness
The aim of this section is to establish the robustness of the results. All tables can be found in the
Appendix C.
Validity of the Land Suitability Index Similarly to the cross country study, in order to mitigate
the concerns about the measure of land suitability, the analysis employs separately the climatic
component and the soil component.
Overall, the results in Table C.2 in Appendix C, conrm the robustness of the results to the use of
each of the components of the suitability index.
Validity of the Estimation: Model Specication Table C.3 explores the validity of the esti-
mation to the use of a non-linear model and to the model specication. In particular, since the trust
variable is binary, Column (1) estimates a logit model employing the full set of controls. The results
are quite similar, conrming the robustness of the linear model. Column (2) is estimating the linear
model and controls for the ancestry adjusted measure of stratication in the year 1 CE, in order to
net out the potential e¤ect of slavery. Column (3) introduces in the analysis a control for the range
of land suitability for agriculture, a proxy for trade in the past. Column (4) employs a xed e¤ect
for OPEC countries in order to exclude non-fertile countries that may have very high levels of current
income due to the presence of natural resources. Finally Column (5) is eliminating corner solutions
by censoring the sample to values of land suitability higher than 0.1.68 The results are robust to all
the di¤erent specications.
67The information provided from the WVS is not su¢ cient to exclude migrants and to repeat the same analysis
for the natives only. This approach will be adopted in the next section of the paper, where this information is
available for the full sample.
68The rational behind these robustness tests is analytically described in the robustness part of the cross
country section.
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6.3 European Social Survey
The last part of the analysis explores the e¤ect of natural land productivity on the current levels of
trust. The aim of this section is to capture directly the portable component of land productivity.69
To this end, the analysis adopts the strategy of the literature that is exploring the transmission of the
cultural traits.
In particular, using a sample of rst and second generation migrants from the European Social
Surveys, it is established that lower land suitability in the country of origin is associated with higher
levels of social capital, thereby suggesting that what is captured is the portable component associated
with land productivity.
6.3.1 Empirical Strategy and Data
Empirical Strategy The goal of this section is to examine to what extend cultural parameters
embedded in land suitability at the country of origin, are a¤ecting the current levels of trust of rst
and second generation migrants in a number of European countries.
To conduct this analysis, the fth wave of the ESS micro dataset is employed. In particular the
analysis takes into consideration 5.940 rst and second generation migrants, coming from 116 countries
of origin, who are residing in 26 European countries. Whereas in the baseline analysis both generations
of migrants are chosen, the robustness section explores the intergenerational transmission of cultural
traits by focusing exclusively on second generation migrants. The choice of second generation migrants
is addressing two concerns: i) First it mitigates concerns about selection of migrants,70 and ii) practical
di¢ culties associated with the process of assimilation of migrants that could a¤ect their trust levels
(e.g. language barriers).
Overall the identifying assumption is that if indeed selection occurred along certain dimensions, it
has not occurred in a systematic way that is biasing the coe¢ cient in favor of the results.
The reduced form model is
Tjri = 0 + 1Si +2Xi +3Ij +4r + "jri (12)
where T is an index of the level of trust of individual j; residing in region r, with ancestry i. Si
proxies for the cultural component embedded in land suitability associated with individual j; living in
region r; who is of ancestry i: Notice that Si is the same for all individuals with the same ancestry i,
as it denotes the average level of land suitability for agriculture in the country of origin.
Since the analysis explores the indirect e¤ect of geography on current economic outcomes, a vector
of geographical, historical and institutional controls associated with individual j of ancestry i are
introduced in the analysis, denoted by Xi. Similar to the reasoning about the portable component of
land productivity, the reason for including this type of controls is to capture the portable components
69 In the previous two sections, in order to indirectly capture the cultural component associated with natural
land productivity, the analysis employed the measure of adjusted land productivity.
70As already discussed on Luttmer and Singhal (2011) though, who also use the European Social Survey
dataset, the fact that migrants from many di¤erent countries move to a number of European countries, makes
it less likely that selection is a major concern. Moreover, selective migration would attenuate the coe¢ cients,
thereby biasing the estimates downward. In the extreme case where all migrants would select their destination
country, it would not be feasible to trace any e¤ect of culture.
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associated with these controls that could also have an e¤ect on trust, such as legal origin or colonial
legacy. This approach relies on the literature that explores how geography shaped ethnic groups
today (e.g. Michalopoulos, 2012) and controls for the vector of country of origin geographical as well
as institutional controls, thereby capturing indirectly di¤erent ethnic characteristics. The controls
that are used are the same controls employed in the cross country analysis when testing the third
hypothesis, i.e. the e¤ect of land suitability on trust (Table 5, Column (4)).
Ij is a set of individual controls that have been already established in the trust literature to a¤ect
the current levels of trust, such as age, gender, education and religious group.
r is a vector of regional xed e¤ects, i.e. NUTS 2 regions following the classication of Eurostat.
The advantage of the using the fth wave of ESS is that it traces individuals to the region where they
reside and therefore much unobserved heterogeneity can be eliminated by introducing the regional
xed e¤ects.
"jri is an individual specic error term. The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the
dimension of the country-of-ancestry and of the country where the interview was taken.
Consistent with the predictions of the theory, the empirical analysis establishes that land suitability
has an adverse e¤ect on the current levels of trust of migrants in Europe even after controlling for the
full set of individual and aggregate controls. The results are robust to a number of alternative tests,
related to both the cross-country analysis and to the individual level analysis.
The last part of this section explores whether the e¤ect of land suitability on trust is operating
via the scope for cooperation. For that purpose it employs as a proxy for cooperation the irrigation
potential measure used in the cross country analysis. Introducing into the analysis the irrigation po-
tential measure associated with the country of origin of the migrant, captures the portable component
of the scope of cooperation. The positive and signicant coe¢ cient of irrigation potential suggests
that higher scope for irrigation is associated with higher levels of trust, via the increased incentives
it provides for cooperation. Moreover the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of land suitability is reduced,
thereby suggesting that the e¤ect of land suitability is partly operating via the reduced incentives to
cooperate for the development of agricultural infrastructure.
The Data All the data that are associated with the country of origin and vary only at the ancestry
level are the same data employed in the cross-country analysis (land suitability for agriculture,
irrigation potential, geographical and institutional controls).
The individual data come from the fth round of the European Social Survey (2010), a cross
sectional survey conducted in a number of European countries. Using the fth round allows to control
for regional xed e¤ects as it traces the location of the individual at the NUTS 2 level, based on the
classication of Eurostat.
The analysis reports attitudes of N=5.940 rst and second generation migrants, whose fathers
originate from 116 countries all over the globe and have migrated in 26 European countries. The
survey design weights, as provided by the ESS dataset, have been taken into account.
Respondents are given the statement "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10,
where 0 means you cant be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted." In order to
keep the symmetry with the "Trust" variable employed in the cross country sample, derived from the
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WVS, the variable is rescaled on a two-point scale, with the value 0, capturing the values 0-5 of the
original variable and the value 1 capturing the values 6-10. Therefore 0 is now reecting the answer
"Strongly Disagree-Disagree" and 1 reecting the answer "Strongly Agree-Agree".
The ESS also provides information about the age of the respondent, the gender, the religious
denomination in which he belongs and the highest level of education achieved.71
6.3.2 Empirical Findings
The Impact of Land Suitability on Current Levels of Trust In line with the theory and
the empirical ndings of the previous section, Table 8 establishes that higher land suitability in the
country of ancestry, is associated with lower levels of trust of the individuals and that part of this
e¤ect is operating via the scope for cooperation it generates.
In particular Column (1) controls only for regional xed e¤ects for 286 NUTS 2 regions of Europe,
based on the respondents region of residence. Crucially, land suitability can be associated with a large
number of cultural traits such as agriculture specic human capital, work ethics and e¤ort etc., that
could a¤ect the current levels of trust in many di¤erent ways. For this reason, Column (2) introduces
the full set of relevant controls that have been employed in the cross-country analysis, thereby netting
out any e¤ects associated with these controls. Column (3) introduces in the analysis individual controls
that have been established as critical determinants of trust in the related literature, such as the age of
the respondent, the gender, the educational level and the religious in which the respondent belongs, if
applicable. The negative and signicant coe¢ cient of trust suggests that even after controlling for the
full set of ethnic and individual controls, land suitability still has a negative e¤ect on migrantslevels
of trust.
Finally, Column (4) explores whether the adverse e¤ect of land suitability is operating via the
reduced incentives that fertile land provided for cooperation. For this purpose, the analysis introduces
irrigation potential, proxying for cooperation potential, as the mediating factor. Indeed the reduced
coe¢ cient of land suitability suggests that the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the current levels of
trust, is partly mitigated by the scope for cooperation. Moreover the coe¢ cient of irrigation potential
is positive and signicant thereby suggesting that the higher the scope for cooperation, the higher the
inherited trust.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
6.3.3 Robustness
The aim of this section is to establish the robustness of the results. All tables can be found in the
Appendix D, along with a number of scatter plots and summary statistics.
71The questionnaire covers 8 broad categories of religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern
Orthodox, Other Christian denomination, Jewish, Islamic, Eastern Religions, Other non-Christian Religions)
and a category of non-religious people.
As to education attained the questionnaire distinguishes seven di¤erent levels of education (less than lower
secondary, lower secondary, lower tier upper secondary, upper tier upper secondary, advanced vocational, lower
tertiary BA level, higher tertiary > MA level).
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Validity of the Land Suitability Index In line with the cross country study, to mitigate potential
concerns about the measure of land suitability, the analysis employs separately the climatic component
and the soil component. Overall, the results in Table D.2 in the Appendix D, conrm the robustness
of the results to each of the components of the suitability index.
Robustness to Ethnic Controls This part conducts some robustness analysis with respect to
the controls capturing ethnic characteristics. In particular, Column (1) of Table D.3 controls for
stratication in the year 1 CE, in order to net out the potential e¤ect of slavery. Column (2) introduces
in the analysis a control the range of land suitability for agriculture, a proxy for trade in the past.
Column (3) employs a xed e¤ect for OPEC countries in order to exclude non-fertile countries that
may have very high levels of current income due to the presence of natural resources. Column (4)
eliminates corner solutions by censoring the sample via the exclusion of migrants whose ancestors land
suitability for agriculture was less than 0.1. Reassuringly all the results remain largely una¤ected.
Robustness to Individual Controls The aim of this part is to further mitigate concerns that the
results are driven by unobserved characteristics such as parental and partnershuman capital. Column
(1) in Table D.4 of the Appendix D , controls for the level of human capital of the respondentsfather as
well as his employment status at the age of 14. Column (2) augment the analysis with the same set of
controls for the respondentsmother, whereas Column (3) adds the same controls for the respondents
partner. The signicance and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient remains largely una¤ected thereby
reinforcing the presence of an adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the current levels of trust.
Validity of the Estimation Table D.5 explores the validity of the estimation. In particular, since
the trust variable is binary, Column (1) estimates a logit model employing the full set of controls. The
coe¢ cient on land suitability is somewhat reduced, yet the results are robust under this specication.
Column (2) explores the robustness of the results with respect to the sample. More analytically, in
Column (2) all four waves of the ESS for which data on migrants origin are available, are employed.
It should be noted that the rst wave of the ESS does not provide the country of birth of the father
and is thus omitted. Moreover, since the region where the respondent resides is not available in all
waves, the analysis in this column employs country xed e¤ects. The results remain una¤ected by the
expansion of the sample.
Column (3) replicates the analysis while clustering the standard errors only at the country of origin
dimension. The coe¢ cient reduces in magnitude yet the results remain signicant at the 10%level.
Intergenerational Transmission of Cultural Traits. As already discussed in the main body
of the text, even if selection of migrants would be present, it would operate against the suggested
nding. Nevertheless, to further mitigate these concerns, Table D.6 explores the hypothesis by
restricting the sample to second generation migrants. In particular, Column (1) includes only the
second generation migrants whose fathershave been born in another country. Column (2) keeps only
the second generation migrants whose none of the two parents have been born in the country. The
coe¢ cients remain negative and signicant at the 1% and 10% respectively. Column (3) replicates the
analysis by keeping only rst generation migrants whose none of the two parents has been born in the
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host country. Comparing Columns (2) and (3) where there the coe¢ cient in Column (2) is reduced
both in signicance and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient in Column (3) suggests that the cultural
traits dissipate across the two generations under examination, yet the e¤ect is still tractable.
7 Concluding Remarks
This research argues that land productivity in the past had a persistent e¤ect on social capital and
ultimately on the process of industrialization, through its e¤ect on the desirable level of cooperation
in the agricultural sector. Importantly, the e¤ect of natural land productivity has been reversed
in the process of development. In the Malthusian era, unfavorable land endowment enhanced the
economic incentive for cooperation in the creation of agricultural infrastructure that could mitigate the
adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Nevertheless, despite the benecial e¤ects of cooperation
on the intensive margin of agriculture, low land productivity countries lagged behind during the
agricultural stage of development. However, as cooperation, and its persistent e¤ect on social capital,
have become increasingly important in the process of industrialization, the transition from agriculture
to industry among unfavorable land endowment economies was expedited, permitting some of the
economies that lagged behind in the agricultural stage of development, to overtake the high land
productivity economies in the industrial stage of development.
Variations in natural land productivity and their e¤ect on the emergence of agricultural infrastruc-
ture and cooperation had therefore a profound e¤ect on the di¤erential pattern of development across
the globe. Interestingly, investment in infrastructure that has been widely advocated as a growth
boosting strategy for developing countries spontaneously emerged centuries earlier in an e¤ort to
mitigate the adverse e¤ect of natural environment. Unfortunately, however, the benecial externalities
that were associated with these activities in the past are no longer present.
In accordance with the predictions of the theory, empirical evidence suggests that, accounting for a
wide variety of potentially confounding factors, a lower level of land suitability in the past is associated
with higher levels of contemporary social capital. The result is valid using a wider range of di¤erent
samples. In particular the analysis exploits exogenous sources of variations in land productivity i)
across countries; ii) across individuals within a country, and iii) across migrants of di¤erent ancestry
within a country. This approaches allow both to establish the intermediate elements of the theory, the
mediating factor of cooperation and more importantly to capture the portable component associated
with land suitability.
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Table 1: Land Suitability and Comparative Development in the Agricultural Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Population Density in 1500 CE
Land Suitability 2.308*** 1.176** 1.019** 0.978**
(0.532) (0.496) (0.462) (0.445)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.195 0.284** 0.293**
(0.153) (0.142) (0.133)
Log Average Elevation 0.032 -0.088 -0.125
(0.144) (0.132) (0.117)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.440** -0.327** -0.398**
(0.172) (0.154) (0.154)
Log %Land within 100 km Water 2.234*** 2.237*** 2.075***
(0.655) (0.590) (0.568)
Log Years Since Neolithic 1.083*** 0.855***
(0.231) (0.241)
Log Dist. to Frontier in 1500 CE -0.191***
(0.039)
St. Beta of Suit. 0.353*** 0.180** 0.156** 0.149**
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked-Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130
R-square 0.490 0.621 0.672 0.700
Summary: This table establishes the signicant positive e¤ect of land suitability
on population density in the year 1500, while controlling for average ruggedness,
average elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways, years since
the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and xed
e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for
agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such
as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as
well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon
density and soil pH; (ii) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for
Africa, the Americas, Australia, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (iii) a single
continent dummy is used to represent the Americas, which is natural given the
historical period examined; (iv) robust standard error estimates are reported in
parentheses; (v) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the
5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 2: Land Suitability and Comparative Development in the Industrial Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Per Capita Av, Income 1990-2000 YSI
Adj Land Suit. -1.707*** -2.027*** -1.863*** -1.743***
(0.610) (0.619) (0.598) (0.576)
Land Suit. -1.249* -35.310**
(0.727) (14.080)
Log Av. Ruggedness -0.168 -0.169 -0.086 -0.032 -5.444
(0.154) (0.144) (0.145) (0.198) (8.157)
Log Av. Elevation 0.298** 0.184 -0.092 -0.128 7.115
(0.143) (0.139) (0.132) (0.231) (8.156)
Log % Land 100 km Water 1.709** 0.672 0.040 -0.546 56.72**
(0.749) (0.681) (0.641) (0.885) (27.59)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.278* -0.004 0.100 -0.223 -0.796
(0.160) (0.164) (0.160) (0.227) (4.037)
Log Adj Years Since Neol. 0.126 0.449 0.481
(0.373) (0.321) (0.371)
Log Years Since Neol. 0.034 -1.449
(0.359) (9.528)
Ethn. Fract. -1.053** -0.556 -0.794
(0.497) (0.467) (0.524)
Polity IV 0.184*** 0.107*** 0.108**
(0.0361) (0.035) (0.047)
Disease Environment -0.0165* -0.011 -0.021
(0.00935) (0.010) (0.014)
Log Schooling 0.410*** 0.219
(0.141) (0.201)
St. Beta of Suit. -0.223*** -0.265*** -0.243*** -0.227*** -0.170* -0.258**
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlock.-Island No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leg. Origin-Col -Relig. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Native Pop. >0.80 No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 132 132 132 132 89 49
R-square 0.508 0.602 0.705 0.808 0.855 0.818
Summary: This table establishes the signicant negative e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on per capita income in
the year 2000 as well as on the timing of industrialization, while controlling for average ruggedness, average elevation,
access to navigable waterways, absolute latitude, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, average enrollment ratio and xed e¤ects for landlocked
country, island, legal origin, European colony, major religion shares and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Column (5) restricts the sample to countries with a fraction of native population higher than 80 percent and
is employing a measure of land suitability as opposed to adjusted land suitability, as an alternative approach
to capture the social component associated with land suitability, namely the social capital being the outcome
of cooperation in agriculture. Column (6) employs years since industrialization as the dependent variable
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological
indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential
evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and
soil pH; (ii) adjusted land suitability is the cross-country weighted average of the land suitability measure. The weight
associated with a given country represents the fraction of the year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral origins
to the given country in the year 1500; (iii) the set of continent dummies in Columns (1)-(4) includes a xed e¤ect
for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (iv) the set of
legal origins dummies in columns (4) and (5) includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German
origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (v) the set of major religion shares dummies in columns (4) and (5)
includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (vi) the set of
European colony dummies in columns (4) and (5) includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish
colony, other European colony and non-colony; (vii) years since industrialization refer to the number of years elapse
since the share of agriculture became less than 30% of the total economy; (viii) robust standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses; (ix) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and
* at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 3: Cooperation in the Agricultural Stage-Irrigation Potential and Actual Irrigation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Irrigation Potential Log Actual Irrigation
Land Suitability -1.745*** -1.983*** -2.023*** -2.047*** -2.421**
(0.527) (0.576) (0.593) (0.594) (1.075)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.219 0.227 0.237 0.035
(0.170) (0.174) (0.173) (0.400)
Log Average Elevation 0.183 0.164 0.146 0.823*
(0.136) (0.138) (0.132) (0.422)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.134 0.109 0.059 0.225
(0.619) (0.614) (0.602) (0.482)
Log %Land within 100 km Water -0.034 -0.069 6.398***
(0.128) (0.133) (1.580)
Log Years Since Neolithic 0.187 0.057 1.447
(0.285) (0.284) (1.151)
Log Distance to Frontier in 1500 CE -0.091* -0.081
(0.053) (0.136)
St. Beta of Suit. -0.327*** -0.372*** -0.379*** -0.384*** -0.344**
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked-Island Dummy No Yes Yes Yes Yes
OECD Member in 1985 Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Native Population >0.80 No No No No Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130 42
R-squared 0.253 0.380 0.383 0.392 0.752
Summary: This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of land suitability on the scope for cooperation,
as proxied by the irrigation potential and on actual cooperation as proxied by actual irrigation (Column 5),
while controlling for average ruggedness, average elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways,
years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year 1500, and
xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects. Column (5) restricts
the sample to a subset of countries with a fraction of native population higher than 80% and excludes early
industrialized countries, ensuring that it is the adverse e¤ect of land that is positively a¤ecting cooperation
in the year 1900 and not early industrialization or the specic human capital of the migrant population.
Notes: (i) Log irrigation potential, employed in Columns (1)-(4), measures the fraction of land that becomes
marginally arable upon the use of irrigation; (ii) data on actual irrigation, used only in Column (5), capture the
area equipped for irrigation in the year 1900 CE. The measure is expressed as the log ratio of irrigated land over
arable land. This dataset excludes countries that were not a member of the OECD in 1985, in an attempt to
exclude the countries that had already industrialized in 1900. It also excludes countries with native population
less than 80%; (iii) log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate and soil suitability for cultivation; (iv) the set of continent dummies includes a
xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (v) a single continent dummy is
used to represent the Americas, which is natural given the historical period examined; (vi) robust standard error
estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level,
and * at the 10% level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 4: Proxies of Cooperation in the Agricultural Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Exch. in Year 1 Comm. in Year 1 Transp. in Year 1
Land Suitability -0.402** -0.445** -0.342***
(0.161) (0.196) (0.119)
Log Average Ruggedness 0.089* 0.080 0.033
(0.048) (0.055) (0.037)
Log Average Elevation -0.076* -0.057 -0.023
(0.040) (0.048) (0.036)
Log Absolute Latitude 0.031 0.082* 0.044
(0.039) (0.048) (0.039)
Log %Land within 100 km Water -0.170 -0.092 -0.055
(0.222) (0.268) (0.182)
Log Years Since Neolithic 0.243*** 0.275*** 0.244***
(0.080) (0.095) (0.071)
Log Distance to Frontier in 1 CE -0.043*** -0.054*** -0.030***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.010)
St. Beta of Suit. -0.199** -0.208** -0.176***
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Landlocked-Island Dummy Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130
R-square 0.561 0.405 0.714
Summary: This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of land suitability on
cooperation, as proxied by the medium of exchange, communication and transportation
in the year 1 CE, while controlling for log land suitability diversity, average ruggedness,
average elevation, absolute latitude, access to navigable waterways, years since the
Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier in the year 1, and
xed e¤ects for landlocked country, island, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate and soil suitability for cultivation; (ii) the measures
of medium of exchange, communication and transportation and in the year 1 CE are reported
on a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various anthropological and historical sources; (iii) the
land suitability diversity measure is based on the distribution of a land suitability index
across grid cells within a country; (iv) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect
for Africa, the Americas, Australia, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (v) a single continent
dummy is used to represent the Americas, which is natural given the historical period
examined; (vi) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level, all for
two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 5: Adjusted Land Suitability and Trust
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust Civil
Dist.
Adj. Land Suit. -0.358*** -0.384*** -0.403*** -0.305*** 0.218***
(0.068) (0.084) (0.086) (0.087) (0.075)
Land Suitability -0.359***
(0.092)
Log Ruggedness 0.007 0.009 -0.023 -0.043 -0.018
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.044) (0.024)
Log Elevation -0.024 -0.024 0.0004 0.009 0.048
(0.043) (0.044) (0.038) (0.049) (0.030)
Log %Land within 100 km Water. 0.068 0.059 0.135 0.212 -0.025
(0.115) (0.123) (0.115) (0.158) (0.115)
Log Absolute Lat. 0.016 0.008 0.036 0.022 0.031
(0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.058) (0.026)
Log Years to Neol. (Adj/Unadj.) 0.062 0.058 0.174* 0.188 -0.081
(0.081) (0.076) (0.102) (0.113) (0.077)
Ethn. Fract. -0.158* -0.005 0.116 0.084
(0.089) (0.093) (0.126) (0.072)
Polity IV 0.0017 -0.012* -0.00950 0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
Disease Environment 0.001 0.001 0.0004 0.0007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Log Schooling 0.003 0.0331 -0.017
(0.032) (0.040) (0.025)
St. Beta of Suit. -0.541*** -0.579*** -0.608*** -0.608*** -0.595*** 0.540***
Continental Dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Land.-Island No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leg. Or.-Col.-Relig. No No No Yes Yes Yes
Native Pop. >0.80 No No No No Yes No
Observations 70 70 70 70 51 53
R-square 0.412 0.540 0.580 0.748 0.794 0.820
Summary: This table establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on the current level
of generalized trust, while controlling for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects. Column
(5) restricts the sample to countries with a fraction of native population higher than 80% and is employing the
measure of unadjusted land productivity, as an alternative approach to capture the portable component of land
productivity. Column (6) employs an alternative measures of social capital namely distrust in civil servants.
Notes: (i) Generalized levels of trust captures the fraction of total respondents within a given country, that answer
that "most people can be trusted " in the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people". Civil distrust captures distrust in civil servants;
(ii) log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of
climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration,
as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (iii) adjusted
land suitability is the cross-country weighted average of the land suitability measure. The weight associated with
a given country represents the fraction of the year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral origins to the given
country in the year 1500; (iv) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe,
North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (v) the set of legal origins dummies includes a
xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vi) the
set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and
other religious shares; (vii) the set of European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French
colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (viii) robust standard error estimates are reported in
parentheses; (ix) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 6: Land Suitability and Trust: The Mediating Factor of Cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust
Adj. Land Suit -0.283** -0.217**
(0.109) (0.097)
Land Suit -0.307*** -0.233**
(0.103) (0.087)
Adj. Irrig. Potent. 0.142*
(0.083)
Irrrig. Potent. 0.128*
(0.072)
Log Ruggedness -0.026 -0.037 -0.049 -0.066
(0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.044)
Log Elevation 0.003 0.012 0.026 0.049
(0.040) (0.042) (0.048) (0.048)
Log %Land within 100 km Water. 0.035 0.044 0.026 0.030
(0.031) (0.033) (0.060) (0.061)
Log Absolute Lat. 0.125 0.138 0.229 0.246
(0.118) (0.114) (0.169) (0.160)
Log Years to Neol. (Adj/Unadj.) 0.147 0.108 0.141 0.076
(0.124) (0.107) (0.128) (0.111)
Ethn. Fract. 0.023 0.043 0.165 0.168
(0.093) (0.090) (0.130) (0.109)
Polity IV -0.011* -0.009 -0.009 -0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Disease Environment 0.001 0.002 0.0002 0.0007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log Schooling 0.008 -0.005 0.049 0.030
(0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032)
St. Beta of Suit. -0.419** -0.321** -0.500*** -0.379**
Continental Dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Land.-Island Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leg. Or.-Col.-Relig. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Native Pop. >0.80 No No Yes Yes
Observations 67 67 49 49
R-square 0.744 0.768 0.799 0.825
Summary: This table establishes that the adverse e¤ect of ancestry adjusted
land suitability on current levels of trust partly operates via the reduced in-
centives for cooperation associated with fertile land, while controlling for geog-
raphy, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnolinguistic fractionaliza-
tion, institutions, disease environment, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to countries with a fraction of native
population > 80% and employ the measure of unadjusted land productivity.
Notes: (i)Trust captures the fraction of total respondents that answer that "most people
can be trusted " in the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people"; (ii) log land
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological
indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of
actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for
cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (iii) irrigation potential measures the
fraction of land that becomes marginally arable upon the use of irrigation; (iv) adjusted
land suitability is the cross-country weighted average of the land suitability measure. The
weight associated with a given country represents the fraction of the year 2000 population
that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500; (v) the set
of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North
America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (vi) the set of legal origins
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British, French, German, Scandinavian and Socialist
legal origin; (vii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for
Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, and other religious shares; (viii) the set of European colony
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British, French, Spanish, other European and non-
colony; (ix) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (x) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.48
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Table 7: Land Suitability and Trust-WVS Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust
Adj. Land Suit -0.344*** -0.303** -0.352*** -0.318***
(0.097) (0.148) (0.103) (0.097)
Land Suit. -0.172***
(0.021)
Adj. Irrrig. Potent. 0.057**
(0.025)
Log Ruggedness 0.028 0.030 -0.013*** 0.027
(0.034) (0.027) (0.004) (0.030)
Log Elevation -0.049 -0.074** -0.031*** -0.072*
(0.042) (0.036) (0.004) (0.039)
Log % Land within 100 km Water 0.055 0.053 0.202*** 0.051
(0.091) (0.081) (0.018) (0.085)
Log Absolute Lat -0.0294 -0.016 0.043*** -0.016
(0.025) (0.021) (0.004) (0.021)
Log Adj. Years to Neol. 0.192** 0.200*** 0.182***
(0.089) (0.072) (0.062)
Log Years to Neol. 0.155***
(0.019)
Ethn. Fract. -0.033 0.090 0.391*** 0.091
(0.116) (0.114) (0.021) (0.109)
Polity IV -0.014** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.019***
(0.0075) (0.006) (0.0009) (0.005)
Disease Environment 0.002 0.0007 0.004*** 0.0008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001)
Age 0.0005* -0.00008 0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.00005) (0.0003)
Continental F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes Yes Yes
Religion No No Yes Yes Yes
Education No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 86498 86498 86498 63035 86498
R-square 0.068 0.107 0.121 0.097 0.121
Summary: This table establishes the adverse e¤ect of ancestry adjusted land suitability on
the current levels of trust of the average individual. The analysis controls for a full set of
geographic and institutional controls, as well as for a number of individual characteristics such
as age, education, gender and religious group. Column (4) restricts the sample to native
population and uses the unadjusted measure of land suitability. Column (5) introduces the
mediating factor of the scope for irrigation (used as a proxy for the scope of cooperation).
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people can be trusted.
The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) land suitability is a geospatial index
of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for
cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as
well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil
pH; (iii) irrigation potential measures the fraction of land that becomes marginally arable upon
the use of irrigation; (iv) adjusted land suitability is the cross-country weighted average of the
land suitability measure. The weight associated with a given country represents the fraction of the
year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500;
(v) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North
America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (vi) the set of legal origins dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and
Socialist origin; (vii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic
share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (viii) the set of European colony
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other European
colony and non-colony; (ix) robust standard error clustered at the country level and at the religious
denomination level are reported in parentheses; (x) the variable on religious group is very detailed
(90 religious groups are reported) and is thus used as a proxy for ethnic groups that are not available
in the WVS; (xi) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table 8: Land Suitability and Trust of Second Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust
Land Suit (A) -0.036*** -0.078*** -0.088*** -0.082***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Irrrig. Potent.(A) 0.021***
(0.006)
Log Ruggedness (A) 0.012* 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Log Elevation (A) -0.011 -0.016** -0.016**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Log % Land within 100 km Water 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018)
Log Absolute Lat (A). 0.019*** 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log Years to Neol. (A) 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.034***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ethn. Fract. (A) -0.081*** -0.095*** -0.100***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Polity IV (A) -0.001 -0.003** -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Disease Environment (A) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age 0.0002** 0.0002**
(0.00009) (0.00009)
Regional F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Dummies (A) No Yes Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes Yes
Religion No No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes Yes
Observations 5940 5940 5940 5940
R-square 0.103 0.111 0.130 0.130
Summary: This table establishes the adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on the current levels
of trust of rst and second generation migrants. Column (4) introduces the mediating factor of
scope for irrigation (used as a proxy for the scope of cooperation) and suggests that this e¤ect is
partly operating via the reduced incentives for cooperation. The analysis controls for geography,
adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease
environment, schooling, and xed e¤ects for legal origin, dominant religion shares, European colony,
individual controls (age, gender, education, religious group) and unobserved regional xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people can be trusted.
The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) land suitability is a geospatial index
of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for
cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as
well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil
pH; (iii) irrigation potential measures the fraction of land that becomes marginally arable upon
the use of irrigation; (iv) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia,
Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (v) the set of
legal origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin,
Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vi) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a
xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (vii) the
set of European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish
colony, other European colony and non-colony; (viii) (A) denotes that the controls are derived from
the ancestry of the respondent; (xi) the set of regional dummies includes a xed e¤ect for 251 NUTS
2 regions; (x) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes statistical
signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for
two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Appendices
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A Elements of the Proposed Mechanism: Evidence
The theory is based on an underlying mechanism consisting of ve intermediate elements that account
for the di¤erential development of economies and their asymmetric transition from an epoch of
Malthusian stagnation to a regime of sustained economic growth.
The rst element suggests that less productive places had more incentives to develop agricultural
infrastructure, that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Resources allocated
to the development of agricultural infrastructure enhanced productivity indirectly, but came on the
account of direct agricultural production. Hence, the opportunity cost of the construction of agricul-
tural infrastructure was higher in more productive places and therefore investment in infrastructure
was more benecial in places with unfavorable land endowment.
The second element of the mechanism establishes that the development of public agricultural
infrastructure generated an incentive for cooperation. Since agricultural infrastructure is primarily a
public good, collective action is essential for its optimal provision, in light of the incentive of individuals
to minimize the allocation of their private resources to the production of public goods. Moreover, since
collective action is conducive for cooperation, places with lower natural land productivity generated
higher incentives for cooperation.
Traditional forms of agricultural infrastructure include, among others, irrigation systems, storage
facilities and drainage systems. In Egypt, as early as 4000 years ago, surface irrigation was used,
exploiting the annual ooding of the Nile (Adams, 1965; Butzer, 1976). Surface irrigation was also
exploited in Mesopotamia and China, and canals were built to funnel larger volumes of water to more
distant elds. Finally in Western Europe, the rst large-scale irrigation was developed by the Romans,
who built aqueducts to channel water from the mountains exploiting gravity as well as reservoirs to
store the channelled water. Other forms of agricultural infrastructure to enhance land productivity,
included drainage and storage technologies. Ancient civilizations like the Egyptians, the Greeks, and
the Chinese developed drainage systems, technologies that were further advanced by the Romans. In
England, land drainage was initiated in the tenth century, in an attempt to re-claim areas adjoining
the North Sea. By the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the vast majority of available land had
already been reclaimed by surface draining of lakes, marshes and fens. In addition, draining and diking
was inaugurated by the Dutch in the 16th century to increase the fraction of arable land. Similarly,
drainage in the United States took place primarily within two developmental periods, during 1870-
1920 and 1945-1960, in an attempt to enlarge the fraction of land capable of agricultural production.
Overall, an estimated region of 110 million acres of agricultural land in the United States, is claimed to
have beneted from articial drainage as of 1985. At least 70 percent of this drained land is allocated
to crops, 12 percent to pasture, 16 percent to woodland, and 2 percent in miscellaneous uses.
Storage technologies were also widespread. Prior to industrialization in England, the cost of storage
was overwhelming from the viewpoint of individual farmers (McCloskey and Nash, 1984). To mitigate
the risk associated with agricultural production, collective action, either in the form of risk sharing or
by developing communal facilities, was often adopted (Stead, 2004). Similarly, storage facilities were
developed at the community level in Sweden in an attempt to cope with adverse climatic conditions,
and had a signicant e¤ect on grain banks (magasins) during 18th and 19th century (Berg, 2007).
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Importantly, all major forms of agricultural infrastructure were associated with large-scale cooper-
ation at the community or at the state level, and particularly in early societies, collective action and
broad participation was required to undertake and construct the necessary infrastructure. Natural
experiments that took place in recent years in developing countries, found evidence that after the
development of irrigation infrastructure, the average yearly production for a bad year exceeded the
average yearly production of a good year prior to the usage of irrigation ( Bardhan (2000) for com-
munities in rural India, Upho¤ and Wijayaratna (2000) for Sri-Lanka, and Ostrom (2000) for Nepal).
In all cases, large scale cooperation at the community level was developed, thereby strengthening the
communal ties.
The third element of the mechanism advances the hypothesis that the emergence of social capital
can be traced to the level of cooperation in the agricultural sector, in the creation of infrastructure that
could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of the natural environment. Indeed, according to the Social Structural
Approach, di¤erences in the manifestation of social capital are driven by the social interactions in which
individuals are involved (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Similarly, the emergence and prevalence of norms
that facilitate fruitful interaction (such as norms of mutual trust) can be traced to the need for large-
scale cooperation (Henrich et al., 2001).A.1 Relatedly, Putnam (2000) suggests that social capital is
primarily embedded in networks of reciprocal social relations. Putnam et al. (1993) in their inuential
study about social capital, studied the cases of Northern and Southern Italy. They argue that in
Northern Italy, where the structure of the society was more civic, a higher level of social capital was
obtained, ultimately leading to higher economic prosperity. Regions in Southern Italy were faced with
a more hierarchical structure which resulted in underdevelopment of social capital that eventually led
to inferior economic outcomes.
The fourth element of the mechanism suggests that social capital has persisted over time via
di¤erent transmission mechanisms. Evolutionary theories, advance the "social learning" hypothesis,
according to which norms and cultural traits that survive and are transmitted across generations are
the ones that contribute to individual and group survival (Boyd and Richerson, 1985, 1995; Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman, 1981). The cultural transmission hypothesis suggests that preferences, beliefs
and norms are intergenerationally transmitted via socialization processes, such as social imitation and
learning (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). There are di¤erent mechanisms through which social capital can be
intergenerationally transmitted, such as imitation or deliberate inculcation by parents. The empirical
literature documents a strong correlation in the propensity to trust between parents and children
(Katz and Rotter, 1969; Dohmen et al., 2011). The persistence of trust between second-generation
immigrants and current inhabitants of the country of origin, has also been explored in the literature
(Borjas, 1992; Uslaner, 2002; Algan and Cahuc, 2010).
Finally, political institutions are argued to have a crucial role in the transmission of social capital
across generations (Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008). Tabellini (2008) advances the hypothesis
that regions that had developed better institutions and imposed more checks and balances on the
executive, experienced higher levels of trust in contemporary societies. Guiso et al. (2008) attribute
A.1 In the context of a cross-cultural study, Henrich et al. (2001) conducted ultimatum, public good, and dictator
game experiments, with subjects from fteen small-scale societies, exhibiting a wide variety of economic and
cultural conditions. They nd that, in societies where the payo¤ from extra-familial cooperation in economic
activity is higher, subjects display signicantly higher levels of cooperation in the experimental games.
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current di¤erences in social capital between the Northern and the Southern regions of Italy to the fact
that the Northern regions developed free city-states in the Middle Ages, as opposed to the hierarchical
structures that were developed in the South. Thus they conclude that at least 50% of the North-
South gap in social capital is due to the lack of a free city state experience in the South. Nunn
and Wantchekon (2011) trace the origins of mistrust in contemporary Africa to the impact of the
transatlantic slave trade.
The fth element of the mechanism suggests that social capital is complementary not only to
the agricultural but also to the industrial sector. It is designed to capture the importance of social
capital in promoting socioeconomic transitions to an industrialized regime. Evidence suggests, that
economic activities such as commercial transactions, entrepreneurship, innovation, accumulation of
human capital, credit markets and enforcement of contracts, all of which are building blocks of the
industrial sector, are further enhanced and boosted in societies with high levels of social capital
and trust. As Arrow (1972) put it: "Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an
element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
condence". Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that trust and civic cooperation are associated with
stronger economic performance (better enforcement of contracts, innovation, credit markets, human
capital accumulation). Putnam (2000) advances the hypothesis that networks of mutual obligation
may encourage entrepreneurship, whereas Greif (1993) provides evidence that large networks make it
more likely for a potential entrepreneur to mobilize resources to start a new enterprise and nd the
necessary suppliers, customers, and employees.
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B The Full Version of the Model
Consider a perfectly competitive overlapping-generations economy in the process of development where
economic activity extends over innite discrete time. To capture the endogenous transition from
agriculture to industry the analysis will employ a unied growth theory framework (Ashraf and Galor,
2011b; Galor, 2011).
B.1 Production
In every period, a single homogenous good is being produced either in an agricultural sector or in
both an agricultural and an industrial sector. In early stages of development, the economy operates
exclusively in the agricultural sector, whereas the industrial sector is not economically viable. However,
since productivity grows faster in the industrial sector, it ultimately becomes economically viable and
therefore, in later stages of development, the economy operates in both sectors.
B.1.1 Production in the Agricultural and Industrial Sectors
The output produced in the agricultural sector in period t, Y At ; is determined by land, Xt; and labor
employed in the agricultural sector, LAt ; as well as by aggregate agricultural productivity. Aggregate
agricultural productivity comprises three components: the natural level of land productivity,  2 (0; 1);
acquired productivity (based on learning by doing), AAt , and public infrastructure, Gt:
The production is governed by a Cobb-Douglas, constant-returns-to-scale production technology
given by
Y At =

AAt +Gt
a
Xa

LAt
1 a
; a 2 (0; 1); (B.1)
where the supply of land is constant over time and is normalized to X = 1.B.1 Hence, natural land
productivity, ; is complemented by acquired productivity, AAt :
The labor force in the agricultural sector is allocated between the production of public infrastructure
and the direct production of nal output. A fraction (1   zt) of the labor force employed in the
agricultural sector is employed in the production of the nal output, whereas the remaining fraction
zt is devoted to the production of public infrastructure, Gt: Hence, the output of public infrastructure
is
Gt =
ztL
A
t

; (B.2)
reecting the supposition that the marginal productivity of labor devoted to the development of
agricultural infrastructure is higher in less productive places.B.2
B.1For the emergence of a stable Malthusian equilibrium in the agricultural stage of development, diminishing
returns to labor, implied by the presence of a xed factor, is essential.
B.2The substitutability between natural land productivity and agricultural infrastructure is further explored in
the empirical section of the paper. In particular, it will be established that higher land suitability for agriculture
is associated with lower incentives to invest in agricultural infrastructure.
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Hence the production of agricultural output is
Y At =

AAt +
1

zttLt
a
Xa [(1  zt) tLt]1 a ; (B.3)
where t is the faction of labor employed in the agricultural sector and Lt denotes the total
labor force of the economy in every time period t: Aggregate productivity in the agricultural sector,
AAt +Gt

; captures the trade-o¤ between allocating labor in the production of the nal good and
the production of the public good. Places that are faced with favorable land endowment, may nd it
optimal to allocate more resources to the production of the nal good, whereas unfavorably endowed
places, may nd it optimal to invest more in infrastructure to further enhance land productivity.B.3
In the industrial sector, the output in period t, Y It , is determined by a linear, constant-returns-to-
scale production production function such that
Y It = A
I
tL
I
t = A
I
t (1  t)Lt (B.4)
where LIt denotes the labor employed in the industrial sector, (1 t) is the fraction of total labor force,
Lt; employed in the industrial sector in period t, and AIt denotes industrial productivity in period t.
The total labor force in period t, Lt, is employed in both the industrial and the agricultural sector
(once both sectors have become active). Therefore,
LAt + L
I
t = Lt, (B.5)
where Lt > 0 in every period t.
In early stages of development, productivity in the industrial sector, AIt , is rather low, particularly
compared to that of agricultural sector, and therefore the industrial sector is not viable implying that
output is produced solely in the agricultural sector. However, in later stages of development, as the
economy evolved driven by population growth, industrial productivity AIt rises su¢ ciently relative to
the productivity of agricultural sector, thereby rendering the industrial sector economically viable.
B.1.2 Collective Action in the Production of the Agricultural Infrastructure
Labor in the agricultural sector is allocated between two di¤erent activities. A fraction of the labor,
1  zt; is employed in the production of the nal good, whereas the remaining fraction, zt; is employed
in the production of agricultural infrastructure that is aimed to further enhance land productivity.
The decision over what fraction of the labor is allocated to the production of each good, is made at
the community level before production takes place. The objective of the community is to maximize
output in the agricultural sector.
The community faces a trade-o¤ in the decision to allocate labor to the production of agricultural
infrastructure. More labor in the production of agricultural infrastructure increases land productivity,
but it reduces the labor employed in the production of the nal good.
B.3Di¤erent formulations of the production function, e.g. Y At = AAt [ +Gt()]
aXa

LAt
1 a would yield
qualitatively similar results under certain assumptions, nevertheless they would complicate the model to the
level of intractability.
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Optimization Members of the community in every time period t; choose the fraction of labor
employed in the agricultural sector that will be allocated to the production of the public good, so as
to maximize agricultural output, i.e.,
fztg = argmaxY At : (B.6)
Hence, noting (B.1),
zt = a  (1  a)
2AAt
tLt
: (B.7)
Interestingly, the optimal fraction of labor allocated to the development of agricultural infrastruc-
ture is a decreasing function of natural land productivity, , as well as of acquired agricultural
productivity, At; thereby implying that countries with more favorable land endowment have a re-
duced incentive to invest in infrastructure and therefore, choose to allocate more labor to the direct
production of the nal good. Conversely, unfavorably endowed countries, choose to commit more
resources to the development of agricultural infrastructure, as a means to further enhance natural
land productivity.
B.1.3 Factor Prices and Aggregate Labor Allocation
The markets for labor and the production of the nal good are perfectly competitive. Workers in the
agricultural sector receive their average product, given that there are no property rights to land, and
therefore the return to land is zero. Given (B.3), the wage rate of agricultural labor in time t; wAt ; is
wAt 
Y At
tLt
=

AAt
tLt
+
1

zt
a
(1  zt)1 a =v1 a

AAt
tLt
+
1


, (B.8)
where v  aa(1  a)(1 a) 2 (0; 1).
The inverse demand for labor in the industrial sector, given by (B.4), is
wIt = A
I
t , (B.9)
where wIt is the wage rate of the industrial labor in period t.
From (B.8) and (B.9) it is evident that as employment in the agricultural sector decreases, the
demand for labor increases without bound, while productivity in the industrial sector remains nite.
Hence, the agricultural sector will be operative in every period, whereas the industrial sector will be
operative if and only if labor productivity in this sector exceeds the marginal productivity of labor in
the agricultural sector, under the assumption that the entire labor force is employed in the agricultural
sector. Upon the activation of both sector, equalization of wages across the two sectors is the outcome
of the assumption on perfect mobility of labor.
The conditions on the level of industrial productivity and the size of the working population that
renders the industrial sector viable, are described in the following Lemma and the associated corollary.
Lemma 1 (Condition for the Activation of the Industrial Sector) The industrial sector becomes eco-
nomically viable and thus operative in period t if and only if industrial productivity AIt ; exceeds a
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critical threshold level given by
AIt  v1 a

AAt
Lt
+
1


 A^I  ;AAt ; Lt  A^It .
Proof. Follows from (B.8)-(B.9) and the perfect mobility of labor between sectors. 
The threshold level of productivity, A^It ; reects the fact that workers will start being employed
in the industrial sector if their productivity in that sector, AIt ; is equal to or exceeds the marginal
productivity in the agricultural sector, wAt , as long as the entire labor force, Lt, is employed in the
agricultural sector (i.e. t = 1).
Corollary 1 (Condition on the Population Threshold for the Activation of the Industrial Sector) The
industrial sector is economically viable and thus operative in period t if and only if total population Lt;
exceeds a critical level given by
Lt  v
2 aAAt
AIt   v a
= L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
  L^t.
To ensure the emergence of the industrial sector, additional restrictions must be imposed on the
initial value of the industrial productivity, i.e. AI0 > v
 a:
The fraction of the total labor force that is employed in the agricultural sector in period t; is denoted
by t  LAt =Lt; where t 2 (0; 1]. According to Lemma 1, if industrial productivity is su¢ ciently low,
i.e. if AIt < A^
I
t ; the the industrial sector is not economically viable and thus the economy operates only
in the agricultural sector, implying as well that the total labor force is employed in the agricultural
sector (See Figure 1). In this stage of development, the wage rate of the economy wt; will be exactly
identied with the wage rate in agriculture wIt : As the economy grows however driven by population
growth, industrial productivity surpasses the critical level AIt  A^It ; thereby rendering the industrial
sector economically viable. As suggested by the perfect mobility assumption, wages will be equalized
across the two sectors, i.e. wt = wAt = w
I
t : Therefore, in equilibrium, the labor forces will be allocated
between the two sectors, as described by t,
t  LAt =Lt =
8>><>>:
1 if AIt < A^
I
t
v2 aAAt
AIt v a
1
Lt
if AI  A^It ,
: (B.10)
Given (B.8) and (B.9), the equilibrium wage rate in the economy in period t, wt, is
wt =
8>><>>:
wAt = v
1 a
h
AAt
Lt
+ 1
i
if AIt < A^
I
t
wIt = A
I
t if A
I
t  A^It .
(B.11)
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Only Sector A Active Both Sectors A and I Active
Figure 1: The Labor Market Equilibrium
To ensure that the model is consistent with historical evidence suggesting that at early stages of
development the agricultural sector preceded the emergence of the industrial sector, it is assumed that
the industrial sector is not economically viable in period 0. Using Lemma 1, it is assumed that
v a < AI0 < v
1 a

AA0
L0
+
1


. (A1)
B.2 Individuals
It is assumed that a continuum of Lt homogeneous individuals enters the labor market. All individuals
live for two periods. During the rst period of their lives, t   1; denoted as childhood, they are not
economically active, they are just being raised by their parents at some xed cost.B.4 In the second
period of their lives, t; denoted as parenthood, they join the labor force where they provide their one
unit of time.
B.2.1 Preferences and Constraints
The preferences of an individual that is in adulthood in period t are dened over consumption and
number of o¤springs. They are represented by the utility function
ut = (ct)
 (nt)
1  ;  2 (0; 1) , (B.12)
where ct denotes consumption, and nt denoted the number of children. To ensure the existence of an
interior solution to the maximization problem, the utility function is strictly monotonically increasing
and strictly quasi-concave.
B.4 It is assumed that each child is associated with a xed cost that can be interpreted as purchasing child-
rearing services. Imposing a time cost would not qualitatively change the predictions of the model, as long as
technological progress reduces the amount of time required to raise a child.
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Denoting the xed cost of raising a child by  > 0; the budget constraint of the individual
implies that the total income from labor force participation is allocated between child-rearing and
consumption. Hence, the budget constraint faced by a member of generation t is
ct + nt  wt, (B.13)
where wt denotes the labor income of individual t; as described by (B.11).
B.2.2 Optimization
Each individual is choosing the number of o¤springs, and thus implicitly his own level of consumption
that will maximize his utility subject to the budget constraint. Substituting (B.13) into (B.12), the
optimization problem takes the following form
nt = argmax
n
(wt   nt) (nt)1 
o
. (B.14)
The optimal number of children for a member of generation t is therefore given by
nt =
1  

wt, (B.15)
In accordance with the Malthusian theory, the number of o¤springs increases with the level of
income.
Substituting for wt using (B.11), yields
nt =
8>><>>:
1 
 v
1 a
h
AAt
Lt
+ 1
i
if AIt < A^
I
t
1 
 A
I
t if A
I
t  A^It .
(B.16)
B.3 The Time Paths of the Macroeconomic Variables
The time paths of the macroeconomic variables are governed by the dynamics of acquired factor
productivity in both the agricultural and the industrial sector, AAt and A
I
t , as well as the growth of
the total labor force, Lt. Whereas the evolution of agricultural productivity is driven by the creation of
knowledge by the population employed in that sector, the evolution of industrial productivity is driven
both by knowledge creation and the creation of social capital driven by the fraction of individuals
employed in the creation of agricultural infrastructure, i.e. it is implicitly driven by natural land
endowment.
B.3.1 The Dynamics of Sectoral Productivity
The level of the acquired productivity in the agricultural and industrial sectors, AAt and A
I
t , is a¤ected
by the productivity level in the previous time period as well as by technological progress, which
reects the incorporation of new knowledge into existing technologies. Industrial productivity is further
enhanced by the level of social capital on industrial specic knowledge creation.
10
In each time period, a fraction of the workforce that is employed in the agricultural sector is
allocated to the construction of the public good. The newly created infrastructure has two e¤ects on
the economy as a whole. A short run and a long run e¤ect. In the short run, it boosts agricultural
production directly, by mitigating the adverse e¤ect of unfavorable natural land endowment.B.5 In
the long run, the cooperation in the production of agricultural infrastructure, contributes to societal
social capital that ultimately benets the process of industrialization.B.6
B.3.2 Industrial Productivity
Industrial productivity is being enhanced by two distinct components. The rst component reects
improvements in industrial technology, driven by the new knowledge added by the population employed
in the industrial sector. The second component can be viewed as the social component, namely the
acquired level of social capital (as emerging from cooperation in the agricultural sector), and its
benecial e¤ect on industrial specic new knowledge.B.7
The evolution of productivity in the industrial sector between periods t and t+1 is determined by
AIt+1 = A
I
t + (! + ztt)LtA
I
t  AI
 
AAt ; Lt; A
I
t

; (B.17)
where the initial level of industrial productivity, AI0 > v
 a, is given.
In particular, AIt reects the inertia of past productivity in the industrial sector; !LtA
I
t ; captures
the advancement in productivity due to the application of new knowledge to the existing level of
productivity; ! 2 (0; 1).B.8
The benecial e¤ect of cooperation for the creation of agricultural infrastructure, on the industrial
productivity, is captured by zttLtAIt , where ztt is the fraction of the population employed in the
production of agricultural infrastructure.B.9
The benecial e¤ect of past cooperation on the industrial sector through the creation and accumu-
lation of social capital and ultimately through its e¤ect on the creation of industrial specic knowledge,
is being captured by the level of past productivity, AIt : Cooperation at time t is captured implicitly as
social capital in period t+ 1:
B.5For simplicity it is assumed that agricultural infrastructure fully depreciates within a period.
B.6 It is plausibly assumed that when the community decides to construct agricultural infrastructure, it cannot
internalize the externality of the emerging social capital in the latent industrial sector.
B.7Higher levels of social capital are associated with higher innovation and entrepreneurship, via reducing the
associated risks and providing the necessary network (Putnam, 2000; Greif, 1993)
B.8! 2 (0; 1) captures the fact that only a fraction of the population contributes to the creation of new knowledge
in the industrial sector. While it can be argued that people employed in the industrial sector can contribute
to the creation of new knowledge in the industrial sector, indirectly, it would be less plausible to argue that all
people employed in the agricultural sector can positively inuence knowledge creation in the industrial sector.
It is therefore assumed that a constant fraction of the total workforce is positively a¤ecting knowledge creation
in industry.
B.9One can assume that once the industrial sector is active each extended household allocates labor to both the
industrial and the agricultural sector. Hence, the entire society is exposed to the externalities of contemporary
cooperation in the agricultural sector.
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B.3.3 Agricultural Productivity
Similarly, the evolution of productivity in the agricultural sector between periods t and t + 1 is
determined by
AAt+1 = A
A
t + (Lt)
(AAt )
b  AA  AAt ; Lt , (B.18)
where the initial level of agricultural productivity, AA0 > 0, is given.
AAt captures the inertia from past productivity of the agricultural sector in period t; where
 2 (0; 1) captures the erosion in agricultural productivity due to imperfect transmission from one
generation to the other.B.10 The term (Lt)(AAt )
b captures a "learning by doing e¤ect". In particular
the formulation implies both diminishing returns to population driven knowledge creation, and a
"shing out" e¤ect (i.e.  2 (0; 1)); namely the negative e¤ect of past discoveries on current discoveries.
In addition, it is assumed that there is a lower degree of complementarity between the advancement of
the knowledge frontier and the existing stock of sector-specic productivity in the agricultural, namely
b < 1: Furthermore + b < 1:
It should be noted that agricultural infrastructure is assumed to be fully depreciated within one
period, and the productivity in the agricultural sector is not a¤ected by the level of agricultural
infrastructure.B.11
B.3.4 The Dynamics of Population Size
The labor force is evolving over time based on the fertility rate of the previous generation. The
equation describing the evolution of the adult population size is given by
Lt+1 = ntLt =
8>><>>:
1 
 v
1 a
h
AAt +
Lt

i
 LA  ARt ; Lt if Lt < L^t
1 
 A
I
tLt  LI
 
AIt ; Lt

if Lt  L^t,
(B.19)
where L0 > 0 denotes the initial size of the adult population and is exogenously given.
In the agricultural stage of development the dynamics of the population are governed by acquired
productivity in the agricultural sector as well as the size of the adult population, whereas when both
sectors become active, population dynamics are determined by the level of the productivity in the
industrial sector and the size of the adult population. Interestingly, natural land endowment directly
a¤ects population dynamics when the economy operates exclusively in the agricultural sector, whereas
after industrialization it a¤ects population dynamics only indirectly, through its e¤ect on industrial
productivity.
B.10 It is assumed that erosion takes place in the agricultural sector, since agricultural technology reects mostly
human embodied knowledge and therefore imperfect transmission, as opposed to industrial knowledge. The
assumption that there is no erosion in the industrial sector is a simplication aimed to capture this particular
aspect. Nevertheless the results would hold under any parameterization that would assure smaller depreciation
in the industrial sector.
B.11 If contemporary infrastructure is long lasting and society would internalize its future e¤ects on agricultural
output, the qualitative analysis will remain similar, however it would complicate the model to the level of
intractability.
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B.4 The Process of Development
This section focuses on the role of natural land endowment in determining the characteristics of the
Malthusian equilibrium and the timing of the take-o¤ from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to
a state of sustained economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that countries with unfavorable
natural land endowment are being dominated by more favorably endowed countries in the Malthusian
regime. Hence, in an e¤ort to mitigate the adverse e¤ect of land, they cooperate more intensely in the
production of agricultural infrastructure, which ultimately results to the emergence of higher levels of
social capital. Due to the complementarity of social capital with the industrial sector, these countries
industrialize faster, and therefore, escape Malthusian stagnation to enter a state of sustained economic
growth.
The process of economic development, given the natural land productivity, ; is fully determined by
a sequence

AAt ; A
I
t ; Lt; 
	1
t=0
that reects the evolution of the acquired productivity in the agricultural
sector, AAt , the productivity in the industrial sector, A
I
t , and the size of adult population, Lt.
Specically, noting (B.17), (B.18), and (B.19), the dynamic path of the economy is given by8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Lt+1 = ntLt =
8>><>>:
1 
 v
1 a
h
AAt +
Lt

i
 LA  ARt ; Lt if Lt < L^t
1 
 A
I
tLt  LI
 
AIt ; Lt

if Lt  L^t,
AAt+1 = A
A
t + (Lt)
(AAt )
b = AA
 
AAt ; Lt

AIt+1 = A
I
t + (! + ztt)LtA
I
t = A
I
 
AAt ; A
I
t ; Lt

(B.20)
where, consistent with the process of development, the initial conditions,
 
AA0 ; A
I
0; L0

, are set to
satisfy assumption (A1).
B.4.1 The Dynamical System
To analyze the evolution of the economy from the agricultural to the industrial regime, a series of
phase diagrams is employed, that captures the evolution of the system within the Malthusian epoch,
as well as the endogenous transition to industrialization. The analysis underlines the role of natural
land endowment and cooperation in the development of infrastructure in the agricultural sector, in
determining the characteristics of the Malthusian equilibrium and the timing of the take-o¤ to the
industrial era.B.12
The phase diagrams, depicted in Figures 2-3, describe the evolution of the system in the
 
AAt ; Lt

plane, conditional on the level of AIt . The evolution of industrial productivity, A
I
t ; driven by knowledge
creation and social capital, triggers a phase transition of the dynamical system and allows for the onset
B.12The analysis is focusing on the transition from a Malthusian regime to an industrialization regime and the
forces that led to a faster industrialization. The forces that eventually led to the demographic transition and the
emergence of the modern growth regime are not being explored in the context of this research. The underlying
assumption behind this approach is the historical observation that a "reversal of fortune" has been observed
initially with respect to the timing of industrialization. The model could be expanded to account for the current
growth regime however this extension would just increase the complexity of the model without adding new
insights.
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of industrialization and the take-o¤ to an era of sustained economic growth, driven by the evolution
of the industrial sector.
Three geometric elements are crucial for building the phase diagrams and are instrumental for the
determination of motion within the system: the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, which separates the
regions in which the economy is exclusively operating in the agricultural sector from those where it
operates in both the industrial and the agricultural sector; the AA locus, which denotes the set of all
pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

for which the acquired productivity in the agricultural sector is constant; and the LL
locus, which denotes the set of all pairs for which the size of the workforce is constant, conditional on
the latency of the industrial sector.
The Conditional Malthusian Frontier The Conditional Malthusian Frontier is a geometric locus,
in
 
AAt ; Lt

space, that separates the phase diagram into two regions. Below the Malthusian frontier
is the region where the economy operates exclusively on the agricultural sector, whereas below the
Malthusian frontier is the region where it operates in both sectors. Once the economys trajectory
crosses this frontier, the industrial sector becomes operative.
The Conditional Malthusian Frontier denotes the set of all pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

such that, for a given level
of industrial productivity, AIt , individuals are indi¤erent as to whether to work in the industrial sector
or in the agricultural sector. Following Corollary 1, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt (see
Figures 3-4), is
MMjAIt 
n 
AAt ; Lt

: Lt = L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
o
. (B.21)
Lemma 2 (The Properties of the Conditional Malthusian Frontier) If
 
AAt ; Lt
 2MMjAIt , then along
the MMjAIt frontier,
Lt =
v2 aAAt
AIt   v a
 L^  AAt ; AIt  ,
where @L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

=@AAt > 0, and @L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

=@AIt < 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from (B.21), Corollary 1, and di¤erentiation. 
The Conditional Malthusian Frontier is therefore an upward sloping ray from the origin in the 
AAt ; Lt

space. From Corollary 1, it becomes evident that the region strictly below the frontier
denotes that production takes place exclusively in the agricultural sector whereas the region (weakly)
above the frontier, denotes that the economy operates both in the industrial and the agricultural
sector. As AIt increases in the process of development, the Conditional Malthusian Frontier rotates
clockwise in
 
AAt ; Lt

space.
Lemma 3 (The Dynamics of Population Size with respect to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier)
Given AAt > 0 and A
I
t > 0, for all Lt  L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

,
Lt+1   Lt T 0 , AIt T 1 
Proof. Follows immediately from (B.19). 
Hence, if the industrial sector has become economically viable, the evolution of the labor force
relies upon the level of AIt with respect to the threshold level, = (1  ). More analytically, for a
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level of industrial productivity being below the critical level, = (1  ), the wage rate in the economy
is not su¢ ciently high to sustain fertility beyond replacement, thereby implying that the size of the
workforce declines in size over time. Conversely if AIt is above the critical threshold, then the wage rate
is su¢ ciently high to sustain fertility above the replacement level and hence the workforce increases
in size over time.
The AA Locus Let the AA locus be the set of all pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

such that the level of agricultural
productivity, AAt , is in a steady state:
AA   AAt ; Lt : AAt+1  AAt = 0	 . (B.22)
Lemma 4 (The Properties of the AA Locus) If
 
AAt ; Lt
 2 AA, then along the AA locus,
Lt = (1  )1=
 
AAt
(1 b)=  LAA  AAt  ,
where @LAA
 
AAt

=@AA > 0 and @2LAA
 
AAt

=
 
@AAt
2
> 0.
Proof. Noting (B.22), the functional form of LAA
 
AAt

is obtained by algebraically manipulating
(B.18) under AAt+1 = A
A
t . The remainder follows directly from di¤erentiation. 
Corollary 2 (The Dynamics of Agricultural Productivity with respect to the AA Locus) Given AAt > 0,
AAt+1  AAt T 0 if and only if Lt T LAA
 
AAt

Hence, the AA locus (see Figures 3-4), is a curve originating from the origin in
 
AAt ; Lt

space,
strictly convex and upward sloping. Above the AA locus, AAt grows over time, due to the fact that
there is a su¢ ciently large cohort of adults that ensure the advancement of the knowledge frontier to
a level that can overcome the erosion e¤ect of imperfect intergenerational transmission of knowledge
on AAt . Respectively, below the AA locus, the advancement of the knowledge frontier is not su¢ cient
to overcome the eroding e¤ects of imperfect intergenerational transmission on AAt ; and therefore,
agricultural productivity diminishes over time:
The LL Locus Let the LL locus be the set of all pairs
 
AAt ; Lt

such that, conditional on the latency
of the industrial sector, the size of the adult population, Lt, is in a steady state:
LL 
n 
AAt ; Lt

: Lt+1   Lt = 0 j Lt < L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
o
. (B.23)
Lemma 5 (The Properties of the LL Locus) If
 
AAt ; Lt
 2 LL, then along the LL locus,
Lt=
(1  )v2 aAAt
   (1  )v a L
LL
 
AAt

,
where  > (1  )v a; dLLLt =dAAt > 0, and d2LLLt =
 
dAAt
2
= 0.
Proof. Noting (B.23), LLL
 
AAt

is derived from using eq. (B.19) under the assumption that Lt+1 = Lt
and upon di¤erentiation. 
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Corollary 3 (The Dynamics of Population Size with respect to the LL Locus) Given AAt > 0 and
AIt > 0, for all Lt < L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

,
Lt+1   Lt S 0 if and only if Lt T LLL
 
AAt

Hence, the LL locus (see Figures 3-4), originates from the origin in
 
AAt ; Lt

space, and is an
upward sloping ray. Below the LL locus, Lt grows over time due to the fact that since population
is su¢ ciently low, it allows for a high wage rate which permits fertility to be above replacement.
Reversely, Lt declines over time above the LL locus, since the population is higher than its steady
state level, thereby implying a su¢ ciently low wage rate that sustains fertility below the replacement
level. The following lemma is setting the conditions that determine the position of the LL locus, in 
AAt ; Lt

space, relative to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt .
Lemma 6 (The Position of the LL Locus relative to the Conditional Malthusian Frontier) Given
AIt > 0, for all A
A
t such that

AAt ; L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t
 2MMjAIt and  AAt ; LLL  AAt  2 LL,
L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

T LLL
 
AAt

if and only if AIt S (1 ) .
Proof. Follows from comparing the functional forms of L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

and LLL
 
AAt

as specied in
Corollary 1 and Lemma 5 respectively. 
Thus, for low levels of industrial productivity, AIt < =(1 ), the Conditional Malthusian Frontier,
MMjAIt , is located above the LL locus, suggesting that only the agricultural sector is operative. In the
process of development though, MMjAIt rotates clockwise driven by the growth of A
I
t and ultimately
the two loci coincide when AIt = =(1   ): After this point, for AIt > =(1   ) the Conditional
Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt , drops below the LL locus, rendering the industrial sector viable.
So far it has become evident that growth in the latent industrial sector productivity, AIt , has an
inuence on the global dynamics of the size of the workforce, which in turn reects a transition of the
system from the Malthusian to the Post-Malthusian regime. The following lemma is summarizing the
dynamics of the workforce.
Lemma 7 (The Dynamics of the Workforce with respect to the LL Locus and the Conditional Malthu-
sian Frontier) Given AIt > 0, for all A
A
t > 0,
1. If AIt <

(1 ) , then
the Conditional Malthusian Frontier is above the LL locus, i.e.,
L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

> LLL
 
AAt

,
and
Lt+1   Lt
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
< 0 if Lt > LLL
 
AAt

= 0 if Lt = LLL
 
AAt

> 0 if Lt < LLL
 
AAt

;
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2. If AIt >

(1 ) , then
the Conditional Malthusian Frontier is below the LL locus, i.e.,
L^
 
AAt ; A
I
t

< LLL
 
AAt

,
and, for all Lt,
Lt+1   Lt > 0.
Proof. Part (1) follows immediately from Lemmas 3 and 6, and Corollary 3. Part (2) follows from
the same Lemmas while observing that, above the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, Lt+1   Lt > 0 if
AIt > = (1  ), and if Lt is below the LL locus. 
B.4.2 The Phase Diagrams
Figures 2-3, illustrated the steady state in agricultural stage of development, and the transition from
agriculture to industry. Figure 2 illustrates the agricultural stage of development, in which the economy
is in a steady state and is characterized by Malthusian dynamics, Figure 3 illustrates the endogenous
take-o¤ to industrialization, where the economy enters a regime of sustained growth in per worker
output and population.
The Agricultural Stage of Development Figure 2 illustrates the economy while operating
exclusively in the agricultural stage of development, i.e. when population is rather low and thus
productivity in the (latent) industrial sector, AIt ; is below the critical level = (1  ) :
F igure 2 : The Agricultural Stage of Development
This implies that the MMjAIt frontier in this stage resides above the LL locus, thereby implying
that the economy is in a Malthusian regime and is characterized by a globally stable steady state
equilibrium, (AAss; Lss), as dened by the point of intersection of the AA and LL loci. Using the
functional forms of LAA
 
AAt ; 

and LLL
 
AAt ; 

, specied in Lemmas 4 and 5 respectively, the
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Malthusian steady-state values of productivity in the agricultural sector, AAss; and the size of the
adult population, Lss, are given by
AAss =
1
(1  ) 11 b 

   (1  ) v a
(1  )v2 a
  1+b+
 AAss () ; (B.24)
Lss =
1
(1  ) 11 b 

   (1  ) v a
(1  )v2 a
 1 b 1+b+
 Lss () . (B.25)
The system is characterized by a globally stable steady-state equilibrium.B.13 At early stages
of development, productivity in the latent industrial sector is quite low and therefore the economy
operates exclusively in the agricultural sector. Therefore the MMjAIt locus is located above the LL
locus. In addition, in the region above the MMjAIt locus, as follows from Lemma 3, the size of the
workforce diminishes over time, which eventually places the economy below the Conditional Malthusian
Frontier. Since the industrial sector is not yet sustainable in this stage of development, the economy
converges to an agricultural regime characterized by a Malthusian equilibrium. In the region below
the MMjAIt locus and above the LL locus, there is rather high workforce that implies wage rates so
small as to place fertility below replacement rates and therefore the workforce diminishes over time.
Conversely, below the LL locus, the size of the workforce is su¢ ciently small to allow for high wage
rates and therefore for fertility above replacement, thereby implying an increasing population size.
Since the analysis takes place in the context of a discrete dynamical system, additional conditions
are necessary to ensure that convergence to the steady state takes place monotonically over time and
not in an oscillatory way.B.14 Figure 2 is depicting the trajectories under the assumption that the
parametric conditions described in Lemma 8 that ensure that the conditional dynamical system is
locally nonoscillatory in the vicinity of the conditional Malthusian steady state.
The following Lemma imposes conditions on the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the condi-
tional dynamical system evaluated at the steady-state equilibrium.
Lemma 8 (The Local Stability Properties of the Conditional Malthusian Steady State) If AIt <
= (1  ), then the conditional steady-state equilibrium,  AAss; Lss, of the dynamical system in (B.20)
is:
1. characterized by the local monotonic evolution of both state variables, ARt and Lt, if and only if
the Jacobian matrix,
J
 
ARss; Lss

=
264 @A
A
 
AAss; Lss;!

=@AAt @A
A
 
AAss; Lss;!

=@Lt
@L
 
AAss; Lss

=@ARt @L
 
ARss; Lss

=@Lt
375 ,
B.13The unstable trivial steady state located at the origin of
 
AAt ; Lt

space is eliminated given AA0 > 0 and
L0 > 0:
B.14The analysis would not be qualitatively di¤erent even in the case where the evolution towards the steady
state took place in an oscillatory manner, since this is a feature that appears to be present during the Malthusian
epoch. See, for example Galor (2011).
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has eigenvalues that are real and positive, i.e., if
 <
"
(1  ) v

[(1  ) b1 b + b(1  ) 11 b + (1  ) 1(1 b) ]

#1=a
.
2. is locally asymptotically stable.
Proof. Under AIt < = (1  ), the Jacobian matrix of the conditional dynamical system, comprising
eqs. (18) and (19), is given by
J
 
AAt ; Lt

=
264 @A
A
t+1=@A
A
t @A
A
t+1=@Lt
@Lt+1=@A
A
t @Lt+1=@Lt
375
=
264  + b(Lt)
(AAt )
b 1 (Lt) 1(AAt )b
1 
 v
2 a 1 
 v
 a
375 , (B.26)
which, when evaluated at the conditional steady state given by (24) and (25), yields
J
 
AAss; Lss

=
"
 + b(1  ) (1  )
h
 (1 )v a
(1 )v2 a
i
1 
 v
2 a 1 
 v
 a
#
 Jss. (B.27)
To ensure that the system has two positive eigenvalues, it must be established that:
Det (Jss) > 0; and
Tr (Jss) > 0;8 2 (0; 1) :
From (B.27) it follows that forDet (Jss) > 0,  <
h
(1 )v


+b(1 )
(1 ) + 1
i1=a
is a su¢ cient condition.
In addition it is clear from (B.27), that Tr (Jss) > 0;8 2 (0; 1) :
Given so far that the discrete dynamical system has two positive eigenvalues, it is clear from the
phase diagram in Figure 3, that
 
AAss; Lss

is a locally asymptotically stable node of the conditional
dynamical system for any ; and convergence takes places monotonically. 
The Industrial Stage of Development Figure 3 illustrates the dynamical system in the industrial
stage of development, i.e. when population is su¢ ciently high and thus industrial productivity, AIt ,
exceeds the critical level, = (1  ) :
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Figure 3: Industrialization and the Take-o¤
At this stage of development, the MMjAIt frontier resides below the LL locus, as established in
Lemma 7, and the economy enters a stage of sustained growth. Above the MMjAIt frontier, the wage
rate increases over time, thereby allowing an increase in the size of the workforce as well as a sustained
increase in productivity and output per worker.
The Transition from Agriculture to Industry The growth in productivity of the latent indus-
trial sector in the process of development, from its initial level below the critical threshold, = (1  ),
to a level beyond this threshold is driving the transition from agriculture to industry.
Consistent with historical evidence, the transition from agriculture to industry, requires the emer-
gence of the agricultural sector prior to the emergence of the industrial sector, i.e. the initial level of
industrial productivity must satisfy the following condition.
AI0 < = (1  ) . (A3)
To assure the transition to the industrialization era, it is su¢ cient to assume that (latent) industrial
productivity grows monotonically and eventually exceeds the critical magnitude, = (1  ).
Let gt+1 denote the rate of productivity growth in the industrial sector between periods t and t+1.
It follows directly from (B.17) that
gIt+1 
AIt+1  AIt
AIt
= (! + zt)Lt  gI
 
Lt; A
A
t ; 

. (B.28)
thereby implying that productivity in the industrial sector is growing over time, which ensures the
transition from the agricultural stage of development to industry.
B.5 The Evolution of the Economy
The evolution of the economy is initially characterized by a Malthusian steady-state. The economy
initially operates exclusively in the agricultural sector but ultimately it experiences an endogenous
industrialization and a subsequent take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
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B.5.1 The Agricultural Economy
In early stages of development, the economy operates exclusively in the agricultural sector due to
the fact that the productivity in the (latent) industrial sector, AIt , is too low to allow the industrial
sector to become operative (satisfying assumptions (A1) and (A3)). In this stage of development, the
economy is in a Malthusian regime and the dynamical system, illustrated in Figure 2, has a globally
stable steady-state equilibrium, (AIss; Lss); towards which it gravitates monotonically.
Since at this stage of development only the agricultural sector is operative, the whole adult
population is employed in this sector, and therefore from (B.3) it follows that the steady-state level of
income per worker is
yss =

1   (B.29)
Using (B.24) and (B.25), the steady-state level of income per worker captures the property of the
Malthusian steady-state, that the long-run level of income is constant and independent of the level
of technology. Therefore a higher productivity per worker is counterbalanced by a larger size of the
working population.
B.5.2 The Transition to Industry
The driving force behind the transition from agriculture to industry, is the growth of productivity in the
(latent) industrial sector. In the process of development, increases in the industrial productivity, rotate
the Conditional Malthusian Frontier, MMjAIt clockwise in the
 
AAt ; Lt

space of Figure 2. Eventually,
productivity of the industrial sector surpasses the critical threshold level 1  v
1 a
h
AAt
Lt
+ 1
i
; which
renders the industrial sector operative and drops the Conditional Malthusian Frontier below the LL
locus as depicted in Figure 3.
As the economy enters the era of industrialization, there no longer exists a globally stable Malthu-
sian steady state in the
 
AAt ; Lt

space. Upon entering into the industrialization regime, the economy
enters into an era of sustained endogenous growth, where income per worker is growing over time
driven by the growth of industrial productivity.
B.6 Natural Land Endowment and Comparative Development
The e¤ect of natural land endowment on comparative development, through the emergence of coop-
eration and social capital, can be examined based on the e¤ect of the land endowment on Malthusian
equilibrium outcomes in the agricultural stage of development, and on the timing of industrialization
and the take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
Proposition 1 (The E¤ect of Natural Land Endowment on the Equilibrium in the Agricultural Stage
of Development) Under assumption (A2), as long as the economy remains exclusively agricultural, an
increase in the quality of natural land endowment has no e¤ect on steady state income per capita and
a benecial e¤ect on the steady-state levels of productivity in the agricultural sector and the size of the
adult population,i.e.
dyss=d = 0
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and for  >
h
2(1 )v
(2 a)
i1=a
dAAss=d > 0 and dLss=d > 0
Proof. Follows immediately from di¤erentiating (B.24), (B.25), and (B.29) with respect to  while
noting assumption (A2).B.15 
Figure 4: The E¤ect of an Increase in Natural Land Endowment on the Malthusian Equilibrium
Geometrically, as depicted in Figure 4, a higher value of ; while it leaves the AA locus una¤ected,
it causes the LL locus to reside closer to the Lt-axis in
 
AAt ; Lt

space, thereby yielding higher steady-
state levels of adult population size and agricultural productivity.
Therefore, an economy that is characterized by more favorable natural land endowment, is also
associated with a relatively superior conditional Malthusian steady state in terms of the economys
level of agricultural productivity per worker and the size of its working population.
In accordance with the predictions of the Malthusian theory (Ashraf and Galor, 2011), the long-run
level of income per capita is not a¤ected by variations in natural land productivity, thereby implying
that adjustments in population and productivity were such that equalized long-run income per capita
across countries.
The inferiority of the conditional Malthusian steady state, in a society with more favorable natural
land endowment, stems from the fact that agricultural production in these places is higher, and they
can therefore sustain a larger population.
Variations in natural land endowment, however, have an e¤ect on the level of cooperation in the
production of agricultural infrastructure and on the timing of industrialization (through the creation
and transmission of social capital) and thus, on the take-o¤ to a state of sustained economic growth.
This e¤ect is summarized in the following proposition.
B.15Note that if  <
h
2(1 )v
(2 a)
i1=a
; then this would imply that dAAss=d < 0 and dLss=d < 0; i.e. that for
su¢ ciently low levels of land productivity, an increase in land productivity may adversely a¤ect steady state
values of population and agricultural productivity. However, this result captures the e¤ect of land productivity
through the incentives for investment in infrastructure. Had this channel been shut o¤, i.e., investment in
infrastructure is not feasible, then dAAss=d > 0 and dLss=d > 0 8 : Therefore to be consistent with historical
evidence that suggests that more fertile places were sustaining larger populations, the analysis is limited to the
range of productivities where  >
h
2(1 )v
(2 a)
i1=a
:
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Proposition 2 (The E¤ect of Natural Land Endowment on the Timing of Industrialization and the
Take-o¤ from Malthusian Stagnation) Consider an economy in a conditional Malthusian steady-state
equilibrium. Under assumptions (A2) and (A4), an increase in natural land productivity, can have a
detrimental e¤ect on the timing of the adoption of industry and, thus, on the timing of the take-o¤
from Malthusian stagnation, i.e.,B.16
dgIss=d > 0 i¤  >
h
2(1 )(1 )v
(2 2b a)
i1=a
Proof. Follows immediately from di¤erentiating (B.28) in the steady state with respect to . It should
be noted that the constraint  > [2(1  )(1  )v=(2  2b  a)]1=a is a necessary but not su¢ cient
conditionB.17. 
Hence, if natural land productivity is su¢ ciently high, then it can have an adverse e¤ect on produc-
tivity growth in the (latent) industrial sector at the conditional Malthusian steady-state equilibrium.
The earlier take-o¤ from the conditional Malthusian steady state by a society with less favorable
natural land endowment, stems from the fact that the cooperation in the agricultural sector to develop
infrastructure that could mitigate the adverse e¤ect of land, generates higher social capital, a crucial
element for the development of the industrial sector. Therefore productivity growth in the (latent)
industrial sector is higher for less productive countries in the process of development.
Figure 5: Overtaking of the Low Land Productivity Economy in the Industrialization Era
Geometrically, as depicted in Figure 4, for su¢ ciently high ; a higher value of  causes theMMjAIt
frontier to reside closer to the Lt-axis in
 
AAt ; Lt

space. This, combined with the fact that industrial
productivity in the more productive place takes place at a lower pace, implies that favorably endowed
places may industrialize later, as depicted in Figure 5.
Following Propositions 1 and 2, variation in natural land endowment across societies is associated
with the phenomenon of overtaking.
B.16 It should be noted that the restrictions on  in Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 8, are mutually consistent
for a range of parameter values.
B.17Solving the model numerically conrms the predictions of the model for a range of plausible parameter
values that satisfy all the constraints.
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Corollary 4 (Natural Land Endowment and Overtaking) Consider two societies indexed by i 2 fU;Pg.
Suppose that society U is characterized by a lower natural land endowment and that U < P , where
i is the natural land endowment of society i. Society U will then be characterized by an inferior
productivity in the Malthusian regime, but it can overtake society P via an earlier take-o¤ into the
industrial regime.
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C Robustness-Cross Country Regressions
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Figure C.1: Land Suitability and Trust - World Map
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Figure C.2: Land Suitability and Trust-Europe
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Figure C.3: Land Suitability and Population Density in the Year 1500 (conditional on geographical
characteristics, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and
continental xed e¤ects)
28
Figure C.4: Land Suitability and Economic Outcomes in the Industrial Era (conditional on geographical
and institutional characteristics, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological
frontier, disease environment, schooling and continental xed e¤ects)
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Figure C.5: Land Suitability and Irrigation Potential (conditional on geographical characteristics, years since
the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and continental xed e¤ects)
30
Figure C.6: Land Suitability and Medium of Exchange in the Year 1CE (conditional on geographical
characteristics, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and
continental xed e¤ects)
31
Figure C.7: Land Suitability and Medium of Communication in the Year 1CE (conditional on geographical
characteristics, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and
continental xed e¤ects)
32
Figure C.8: Land Suitability and Medium of Transportation in the Year 1CE (conditional on geographical
characteristics, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and
continental xed e¤ects)
33
Figure C.9: Adjusted Land Suitability and Trust (conditional on geographical and institutional
characteristics, years since the Neolithic transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier, disease
environment and continental xed e¤ects)
34
T
a
b
le
C
.1
:
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
ti
cs
-R
ed
uc
ed
Fo
rm
M
od
el
-C
ro
ss
C
ou
nt
ry
Sa
m
pl
e
S
u
m
m
a
ry
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
P
a
ir
w
is
e
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
s
M
ea
n
S
.D
.
M
in
.
M
a
x
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
)
T
ru
st
0
.2
9
7
0
.1
4
7
0
.0
5
1
0
.6
5
3
1
.0
0
0
(2
)
A
d
ju
st
ed
L
a
n
d
S
u
it
a
b
il
it
y
0
.4
9
9
0
.2
1
8
0
.0
2
0
0
.8
7
6
-0
.4
3
6
1
.0
0
0
(3
)
L
o
g
A
d
js
u
te
d
Y
ea
rs
S
in
ce
N
eo
li
th
ic
4
.5
7
1
0
.9
9
4
1
.2
8
2
6
.2
1
8
-0
.1
2
5
0
.1
6
6
1
.0
0
0
(4
)
L
o
g
A
v
er
a
g
e
R
u
g
g
ed
n
es
s
5
.9
8
8
0
.9
6
5
3
.0
5
1
7
.9
0
8
-0
.2
5
0
-0
.0
6
0
0
.7
2
8
1
.0
0
0
(5
)
L
o
g
A
v
er
a
g
e
E
le
v
a
ti
o
n
3
.4
2
5
0
.7
5
1
0
.0
0
0
4
.1
5
9
0
.3
9
9
-0
.0
5
7
0
.0
2
7
-0
.2
5
5
1
.0
0
0
(6
)
L
o
g
A
b
so
lu
te
L
a
ti
tu
d
e
0
.3
9
6
0
.2
4
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.6
9
3
0
.1
0
4
0
.3
9
3
-0
.0
7
6
-0
.6
1
3
0
.2
8
5
1
.0
0
0
(7
)
%
o
f
L
a
n
d
w
it
h
in
1
0
0
k
m
o
f
C
o
a
st
o
r
R
iv
er
8
.6
9
6
0
.3
0
7
7
.8
2
4
9
.2
5
0
0
.1
0
1
0
.2
3
0
0
.2
8
6
0
.1
4
6
0
.3
6
6
0
.0
2
8
1
.0
0
0
(8
)
E
th
n
ic
F
ra
ct
io
n
a
li
za
ti
o
n
0
.3
5
2
0
.2
3
4
0
.0
0
2
0
.9
3
0
-0
.3
0
0
-0
.0
9
8
0
.0
5
1
0
.3
7
5
-0
.5
4
4
-0
.4
6
2
-0
.2
6
8
1
.0
0
0
(9
)
P
o
li
ty
IV
5
.5
4
1
3
.7
0
4
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.2
7
0
0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
5
7
-0
.3
1
6
0
.3
6
9
0
.3
6
3
0
.0
1
1
-0
.2
9
7
1
.0
0
0
(1
0
)
D
is
ea
se
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t
2
0
8
.1
1
9
1
5
.1
6
4
1
8
6
.0
0
0
2
4
8
.0
0
0
-0
.2
3
0
0
.0
2
5
0
.0
1
6
0
.3
3
2
-0
.6
5
5
-0
.4
3
0
-0
.1
9
8
0
.4
2
5
-0
.3
1
0
1
.0
0
0
(1
1
)
L
o
g
S
ch
o
o
li
n
g
4
.0
3
0
0
.5
5
3
0
.9
2
8
4
.4
9
8
0
.2
7
5
0
.1
1
2
-0
.0
8
8
-0
.3
4
0
0
.5
0
9
0
.4
0
9
0
.0
8
5
-0
.4
3
6
0
.4
0
4
-0
.2
9
7
1
.0
0
0
N
o
te
:
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
=
6
7
35
Table C.2: Robustness of the Land Suitability Index-Climatic Component in the Malthusian Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Pop. Dens. Log. Irrig. Med. of Exch. Comm. Transp.
in 1500 CE Potent. in 1 CE in 1 CE in 1 CE
Climatic Suitability 1.047*** -1.526*** -0.432*** -0.516*** -0.454***
(0.316) (0.401) (0.133) (0.140) (0.106)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
R-square 0.710 0.379 0.581 0.437 0.749
Summary: This table establishes robustness of the results to the climatic component. Analytically
it establishes the signicant positive e¤ect of climatic suitability for agriculture on population
density in the year 1500, on irrigation potential, on medium of exchange, communication and
transportation in the year 1 CE, while controlling for geography, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Climatic suitability for agriculture is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the
ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration; (ii) irrigation potential measures the fraction of land
that becomes marginally arable upon the use of irrigation; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a
xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (iv) a single continent
dummy is used to represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical period examined; (v)
the set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute
latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vi)
robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests.
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Table C.3: Robustness of the Land Suitability Index-Climatic Component in the Malthusian Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Pop. Dens. Irrig. Med. of Exch. Comm. Transp.
in 1500 Potent. in 1 CE in 1 CE in 1 CE
Soil Suitability 0.616 -2.352*** -0.431** -0.452 -0.203
(0.616) (0.785) (0.206) (0.281) (0.158)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
R-square 0.690 0.368 0.551 0.392 0.698
Summary: This table establishes robustness of the results to the soil component. Analytically
it establishes the signicant positive e¤ect of soil suitability for agriculture on population
density in the year 1500, on irrigation potential, on medium of exchange, communication and
transportation in the year 1 CE, while controlling for geography, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Soil suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii)
irrigation potential measures the fraction of land that becomes marginally arable upon the use of
irrigation; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia,
Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (iv) a single continent dummy is used to represent the Americas,
which in natural given the historical period examined; (v) the set of geographical controls includes log
average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and
a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vi) robust standard error estimates are reported in
parentheses; (vii) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level,
and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.4: Robustness of the Land Suitability Index-Climatic and Soil Component and Current
Outcomes
(A.1) (A.2) (B.1) (B.2)
Log Per Capita Trust Log Per Capita Trust
Av. GDP 1990-2000 Av. GDP 1990-2000
Adjusted Climatic Suitability -1.371*** -0.191**
(0.498) (0.090)
Adjusted Soil Suitability -2.523*** -0.351***
(0.734) (0.105)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leg.l Orig.-Eur. Col.-Rel. Sh. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Adj. Years Since Neol. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ethn. Fractionalization Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polity IV Yes Yes Yes Yes
% of Pop at Risk of Malaria Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Schooling Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 132 70 132 70
R-square 0.765 0.714 0.776 0.750
Summary: This table tests the robustness of the validity of the land suitability index. In particular
it establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of ancestry adjusted climatic suitability (Panel A) and
ancestry adjusted soil suitability (Panel B) on income per capita in the year 2000 and the level
of generalized trust, while controlling for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition,
ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, schooling, and xed e¤ects
for legal origin, major religion shares, European colony, and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Generalized levels of trust captures the fraction of total respondents within a given country,
that answer that "most people can be trusted " in the question "Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people"; (ii) climatic suitability is
a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability
for cultivation such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration; (iii) Soil
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of soil
suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (iv) adjusted climatic (soil) suitability is
the cross-country weighted average of climatic (soil) suitability. The weight associated with a given country
represents the fraction of the year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country
in the year 1500; (v) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe,
North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (vi) the set of geographical controls include
log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and
a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vii) the set of legal origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect
for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (viii) the set
of major religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share,
and other religious shares; (ix) the set of European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony,
French colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (x) robust standard error estimates
are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 % ** at the 5%, and * at the
10%, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.5: Robustness of the Population Density Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L Pop. Den L. Pop. Den L.Pop. Den L. Pop. Den L Pop. Den L. Pop. Den
in 1500-(E&J) in 1000-(E&J) in 1-(E&J) in 1500-(M) in 1000-(M) in 1-(M)
Land Suit. 0.373*** 0.355*** 0.255** 0.456*** 0.495*** 0.499***
(0.084) (0.090) (0.103) (0.081) (0.072) (0.114)
Continents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 130 126 117 45 44 42
R-square 0.718 0.640 0.682 0.887 0.898 0.916
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the e¤ect of land suitability on past economic
outcomes using di¤erent population density measures. In particular it employs population density
in the 1500, 1000 and 1, both from McEvedy and Jones (1978) as well as from Maddison
(2003) historical estimates. The analysis controls for geography, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Data on historical population estimates come from Mc Evedy and Jones (1978) and from Maddison
(2003); (ii) log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological
indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential
evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density
and soil pH; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia,
Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (iv) a single continent dummy is used to represent the Americas, which
in natural given the historical period examined; (v) the set of geographical controls includes log average
ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect
for landlocked country and island; (vi) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii) ***
denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level,
all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.6: Robustness-Trade Channel in the Malthusian Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Pop. Dens. Log. Irrig. Med. of Exch. Comm. Transp.
in 1 CE Potent. in 1 CE in 1 CE inr 1 CE
Land Suitability 0.865* -1.988*** -0.432*** -0.463** -0.364***
(0.446) (0.613) (0.162) (0.199) (0.120)
Log Land Suit.. Diversity 0.381** -0.205 0.101 0.063 0.077
(0.152) (0.198) (0.061) (0.062) (0.053)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
R-square 0.710 0.396 0.570 0.408 0.720
Summary: This table explores the trade channel. It establishes the signicant positive e¤ect
of land suitability on population density in the year 1500 as well as the adverse e¤ect of
land suitability on irrigation potential, medium of exchange, communication and transportation
in the year 1 CE, while controlling for geography, land inequality, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Log land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of
actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation,
such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii) land diversity measure is based on the distribution of a land
suitability index across grid cells within a country; (iii) irrigation potential measures the fraction of land
that becomes marginally arable upon the use of irrigation; (iv) the set of continent dummies includes a
xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (v) a single continent
dummy is used to represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical period examined; (vi)
the set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute
latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vii)
robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (viii) *** denotes statistical signicance at
the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests.
40
Table C.7: Robustness-Trade Channel in the Modern Era
(1) (2)
Log Per Capita Trust
Av GDP 1990-2000
Adjusted Land Suitability -1.276** -0.322***
(0.508) (0.115)
Log Adjusted Land Suitab. Diversity -0.405* 0.017
(0.215) (0.047)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes
Legal Origin-European Colony-Major Relig. Shares Yes Yes
Insitututional Controls-Education Yes Yes
Observations 132 70
R-square 0.8019 0.749
Summary: This table explores the trade channel in the modern era. It establishes the signicant
adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on income per capita in the year 2000 and the level of
generalized trust, while controlling for geography, adjusted land suitability diversity, adjusted years
since the Neolithic transition, ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, xed
e¤ects for legal origin, European colony, major religion shares and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Generalized levels of trust captures the fraction of total respondents within a given country,
that answer that "most people can be trusted " in the question "Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people"; (ii) land
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators
of climate and soil suitability for cultivation; (iii) land suitability diversity is the range of the land
suitability index; (iv) adjusted land suitability (diversity) is the cross-country weighted average of the
land suitability (diversity) measure. The weight associated with a given country represents the fraction
of the year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500; (v)
the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America,
South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (vi) the set of geographical controls includes log
average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and
a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vii) the set of legal origins dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin;
(viii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share,
Protestant share, and other religious shares; (ix) the set of European colony dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (x)
robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes statistical signicance at
the 1 % ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.8: Robustness-Slavery in the Malthusian Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Pop. Dens. Log. Irrig. Med. of Exch. Comm. Transp.
in 1 CE Potent. in 1 CE in 1 CE inr 1 CE
Land Suitability 1.239*** -2.213*** -0.299* -0.222 -0.228**
(0.439) (0.588) (0.163) (0.169) (0.114)
Log Social Stratication in 1 CE 1.094*** -0.783** 0.416*** 0.892*** 0.458***
(0.392) (0.394) (0.143) (0.147) (0.126)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
R-square 0.718 0.405 0.593 0.540 0.756
Summary: This table is exploring the slavery channel. It establishes the signicant positive
e¤ect of land suitability for agriculture on population density in the year 1 CE, on irrigation
potential, on the fraction of irrigated land in 1900, on communication, medium of exchange and
transportation in the year 1, while controlling for geography, years since the Neolithic transition, distance
from the nearest technological frontier, social stratication and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological
indicators of climate and soil suitability for cultivation; (ii) social stratication captures the number of
classes within a society. The index is assigned a value of 1 for egalitarian societies, a value of 2 for two
social classes and a value of 3 for three or more social classes (slaves or casts); (iii) irrigation potential
measures the fraction of land that becomes marginally arable upon the use of irrigation; (iv) the set of
continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia, Europe and Sub-Saharan
Africa. (v) a single continent dummy is used to represent the Americas, which in natural given the historical
period examined; (vi) the set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation,
log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island;
(vii) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (viii) *** denotes statistical signicance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis
tests.
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Table C.9: Robustness-Slavery in the Modern Era
(1) (2)
Log Per Capita Trust
Av. GDP 1990-2000
Adjusted Land Suitability -1.876*** -0.355***
(0.595) (0.088)
Log Adjusted Social Stratication in 1 CE 1.165** 0.548*
(0.558) (0.303)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes
Legal Origin-European Colony-Major Religion Shares Yes Yes
Institutional Controls-Education Yes Yes
Observations 127 68
R-square 0.812 0.779
Summary: This table explores the slavery channel in the modern era. It establishes the signicant
adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on income per capita in year 2000 and on the level of
generalized trust, while controlling for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic
fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, social stratication in the year 1 CE and
xed e¤ects for legal origin, European colony, major religion shares and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Generalized levels of trust captures the fraction of total respondents within a given country, that
answer that "most people can be trusted " in the question "Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people"; (ii) land suitability is a
geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate and soil
suitability for cultivation; (iii) social Stratication captures the number of classes within a society. The
index is assigned a value of 1 for egalitarian societies, a value of 2 for two social classes and a value of
3 for three or more social classes (slavery or castes); (iv) adjusted land suitability (social stratication)
is the cross-country weighted average of the land suitability (social stratication) measure. The weight
associated with a given country represents the fraction of the year 2000 population that can trace its
ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500; (v) the set of continent dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa;
(vi) the set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute
latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vii) the
set of legal origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin,
Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (viii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (ix) the set of European
colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other European
colony and non-colony; (x) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 % ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.10: Robustness-Inuential Observations in the Malthusian Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Pop. Dens. Log. Irrig. Med. of Exch. Comm. Transp.
in 1 CE Potent. in 1 CE in 1 CE inr 1 CE
Land Suitability 1.280** -1.838** -0.491*** -0.584** -0.297***
(0.615) (0.797) (0.130) (0.282) (0.078)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
Pseudo R-square 0.474 0.239 0.440 0.349 0.551
Summary: This table establishes that the e¤ect of land suitability on population density in 1500, on
irrigation potential, on medium of exchange, communication and transportation is robust to outliers
using Quantile Regression Analysis. The analysis controls for geography, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Soil suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii)
irrigation potential measures the fraction of land that becomes marginally arable upon the use of
irrigation; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, the Americas, Australia,
Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; (iv) a single continent dummy is used to represent the Americas,
which in natural given the historical period examined; (v) the set of controls includes log average
ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a
xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island, years since Neolithic transition and distance from the
nearest technological frontier; (vi) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (vii)
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.11: Robustness-Inuential Observations in the Modern Era
(1) (2)
Log Per Capita Trust
Av. GDP 1990-2000.
Adj. Land Suitability -0.908*** -0.356***
(1.69e-14) (3.07e-15)
Controls Yes Yes
Number of Observations 132 70
Pseudo R-square 0.6187 0.545
Summary: This table establishes that the adverse e¤ect of adjusted land
suitability on income per capita in 2000 and on the generalized level of trust is
robust to outliers using Quantile Regression Analysis. The analysis controls for
geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic fractionalization,
quality of institutions, disease environment and xed e¤ects for legal origin,
European colony, major religion shares and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Generalized levels of trust captures the fraction of total respondents within
a given country, that answer that "most people can be trusted " in the question
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant
be too careful in dealing with people"; (ii) land suitability is a geospatial index of
the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate and soil
suitability for cultivation; (iii) adjusted land suitability is the cross-country weighted
average of the land suitability measure. The weight associated with a given country
represents the fraction of the year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral origins
to the given country in the year 1500; (iv) the set of continent dummies includes
a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America,
Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (v) the set of geographical controls includes log
average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude,log access to navigable
waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vi) the set of legal
origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German
origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vii) the set of major religion shares
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share,
and other religious shares; (viii) the set of European colony dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and
non-colony; (ix) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (x) ***
denotes statistical signicance at the 1 % ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%, all for
two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.12: Robustness-Regional Controls in the Malthusian Era
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Pop. Dens. Log. Irrig. Med. of Exch. Comm. Transp.
in 1 CE Potent. in 1 CE in 1 CE inr 1 CE
Land Suitability 0.972** -2.047*** -0.415** -0.479** -0.376***
(0.431) (0.594) (0.167) (0.193) (0.124)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130 130 130
R-square 0.710 0.396 0.570 0.408 0.720
Summary: This table explores the robustness of the results to the use of alternative regional controls.
It establishes the signicant positive e¤ect of land suitability on population density in the year 1500
as well as the adverse e¤ect of land suitability on irrigation potential, medium of exchange, communi-
cation and transportation in the year 1 CE, while controlling for geography, years since the Neolithic
transition, distance from the nearest technological frontier and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of
actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation,
such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (ii) irrigation potential measures the fraction of land that
becomes marginally arable upon the use of irrigation; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a
xed e¤ect for Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacic Region,
Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa and South Asia ; (iv) the set of geographical
controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to
navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (v) robust standard error
estimates are reported in parentheses; (vi) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level,
** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.13: Robustness-Regional Controls in the Modern Era
(1) (2)
Log Per Capita Trust
Av. GDP 1990-2000
Adjusted Land Suitability -1.743*** -0.305***
(0.576) (0.086)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes
Legal Origin-European Colony-Major Relig. Shares Yes Yes
Insitututional Controls-Education Yes Yes
Observations 132 70
R-square 0.808 0.748
Summary: This table explores the robustness of the results to alternative regional
controls. It establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability
on income per capita in year 2000 and the level of generalized trust while
controlling for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic
fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, xed e¤ects for legal
origin, European colony, major religion shares and unobserved regional xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Generalized levels of trust captures the fraction of total respondents within a
given country, that answer that "most people can be trusted " in the question "Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful
in dealing with people"; (ii) land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land
for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate and soil suitability for cultivation;
(iii) adjusted land suitability is the cross-country weighted average of the land suitability
measure. The weight associated with a given country represents the fraction of the year 2000
population that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500; (iv)
the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacic Region, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East
and North Africa and South Asia; (v) the set of geographical controls includes log average
ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways
and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vi) the set of legal origins dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian
origin and Socialist origin; (vii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (viii)
the set of European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony,
Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (ix) robust standard error estimates
are reported in parentheses; (x) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 % ** at the 5%,
and * at the 10%, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table C.14: Robustness- OPEC and Very Low Productivity Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Per Cap. Trust Log Per Cap. Trust
Av. GDP 1990-2000 Av. GDP 1990-2000
Adjusted Land Suitability -1.453*** -0.196** -1.370** -0.365**
(0.522) (0.086) (0.598) (0.140)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
L. Or-Eur. Col.- Relig. Sh. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insitutu.l Controls-Ed. Yes Yes Yes Yes
OPEC Yes Yes No No
Land Suitability>0.1 No No Yes Yes
Observations 132 70 110 57
R-square 0.821 0.778 0.842 0.728
Summary: This table explores the robustness of the results to the potential of being driven by
very low fertility countries. The rst two columns control for OPEC countries, whereas the last
two columns exclude countries with very low natural land productivity. The table establishes
the signicant adverse e¤ect of adjusted land suitability on income per capita in year 2000 and
the level of generalized trust while controlling for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic
transition, ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, xed e¤ects for
legal origin, European colony, major religion shares and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) Generalized levels of trust captures the fraction of total respondents within a given country,
that answer that "most people can be trusted " in the question "Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people"; (ii) land
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of
climate and soil suitability for cultivation; (iii) adjusted land suitability is the cross-country weighted
average of the land suitability measure. The weight associated with a given country represents the
fraction of the year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country in the
year 1500; (iv) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe,
North America, South America. Sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania; (v) the set of geographical controls
includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable
waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (vi) the set of legal origins dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and
Socialist origin; (vii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share,
Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (viii) the set of European colony dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and
non-colony; (ix) OPEC is a dummy for oil producing countries; (x) robust standard error estimates
are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 % ** at the 5%, and * at
the 10%, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table D.2: Robustness of Land Suitability Index-WVS
(1) (2)
Trust
Adj. Soil Suit -0.386***
(0.142)
Adj. Clim. Suit -0.377***
(0.114)
Regional F.E Yes Yes
Cross Country Controls
Education-Gender-Religion Yes Yes
Observations 86498 86498
R-square 0.120 0.120
Summary: This table tests the robustness of the validity of the land suitability
index. In particular it establishes the signicant adverse e¤ect of ancestry adjusted
climatic suitability and ancestry adjusted soil suitability the individual level of trust,
while controlling for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic
fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, schooling, and xed
e¤ects for legal origin, dominant religion shares, European colony, individual control
(age, gender, education, religious group) and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i)The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people
can be trusted. The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii)
climatic suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation such as growing
degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration; (iii) soil
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density
and soil pH; (iv) adjusted climatic (soil) suitability is the cross-country weighted
average of climatic (soil) suitability. The weight associated with a given country
represents the fraction of the year 2000 population that can trace its ancestral
origins to the given country in the year 1500; (v) the set of continent dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South
America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (vi) the set of geographical controls
includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log
access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island;
(vii) the set of legal origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British legal
origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin;
(viii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic
share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares; (ix) the set of
European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony,
Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (x) robust standard error
estimates are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes statistical signicance at
the 1 % ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table D.3: Robustness to Confounding Factors-WVS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust
Adjusted Land Suitability -1.424*** -0.418*** -0.380*** -0.208*** -0.332***
(0.510) (0.105) (0.094) (0.071) (0.095)
Log Social Stratication in 1 CE 0.223***
(0.085)
Log Land Suitability Diversity.(A) 0.181***
(0.056)
OPEC 0.163***
(0.024)
Continental Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education-Gender-Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Land Suitability>0.1 No No No No Yes
Logit Model Yes No No No No
Marginal E¤ect -0.241*** - - - -
Observations 86403 84505 86498 86498 78091
R-square 0.117 0.123 0.122 0.126 0.103
Summary: This table explores the validity of the estimation. In particular Column (1) estimates
a logit model. Column (2) explores the slavery channel by controlling for ancestry adjusted
stratication in the year 1 CE. Column (3) explores the trade channel by controlling for diversity
in land suitability. Column (4) introduces an OPEC dummy in the analysis to capture resource
rich countries with very low land productivity. Column (5) is censoring the sample by excluding
countries with extremely low natural land productivity. The baseline analysis controls for geography,
adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease
environment, schooling, and xed e¤ects for legal origin, dominant religion shares, European colony,
individual control (age, gender, education, religious group) and unobserved continental xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people can be trusted. The
index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) land suitability is a geospatial index of the
suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation,
such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH; (iii) irrigation
potential measures the fraction of land that becomes marginally arable upon the use of irrigation; (iv)
adjusted land suitability is the cross-country weighted average of the land suitability measure. The
weight associated with a given country represents the fraction of the year 2000 population that can
trace its ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500; (v) the set of continent dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and
Sub-Saharan Africa; (vi) the set of legal origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin,
French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vii) the set of geographical
controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to
navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (viii) the set of major religion
shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other
religious shares; (ix) the set of European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony,
French colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (x) the set of continent dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America. Sub-Saharan
Africa and Oceania; (xi) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (xii) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all
for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table E.2: Robustness of the Land Suitability Index-ESS
(1) (2)
Trust
Soil Suit (A) -0.045***
(0.017)
Climate Suit. (A) -0.117***
(0.014)
Regional F.E Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Controls (A) Yes Yes
Age-Gender-Education-Religion Yes Yes
Observations 5940 5940
R-square 0.129 0.129
Summary: This table explores the robustness of the results to the soil
and the climate component of the land suitability index. It establishes
the adverse e¤ect of each component of land suitability on current levels
of trust of migrants. Column (1) introduces the soil component whereas
Column (2) introduces the climatic component. The analysis controls for
geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic fractionalization,
quality of institutions, disease environment, schooling, and xed e¤ects for
legal origin, dominant religion shares, European colony, individual controls
(age, gender, education, religious group) and unobserved regional xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people
can be trusted. The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) Climatic
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation such as growing degree
days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration; (iii) soil suitability
is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH;
(iv) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia, Australia,
Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa; (v) the
set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation,
log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for
landlocked country and island; (vi) the set of legal origins dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin
and Socialist origin; (vii) the set of major religion shares dummies includes a xed
e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share, and other religious shares;
(viii) the set of European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony,
French colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (ix) (A)
denotes that the controls are derived from the ancestry of the respondent; (x) the
set of regional dummies includes a xed e¤ect for 251 NUTS 2 regions; (xi) robust
standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (xii) *** denotes statistical
signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table E.3: Robustness to Confounding Factors-ESS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust
Land Suit (A) -0.097*** -0.076*** -0.097*** -0.070***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Social Stratication in 1 CE -0.066***
(0.013)
Land Suitability Diversity.(A) -0.020***
(0.007)
OPEC -0.025**
(0.010)
Regional F.E Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Controls (A) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Land Suitability>0.1 No No No Yes
Age-Gender-Education-Religion Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5823 5940 5940 5655
R-square 0.131 0.130 0.130 0.125
Summary: This table tests the robustness of the results in on a number of additional
ethnic controls. Column (1) introduces a control for social stratication in the year
1 CE to explore the slavery channel. Column (2) introduces an index of suitability
diversity to explore the trade channel. Column (3) introduces a control for OPEC
countries. Column (4) excludes very low fertility countries to capture the possibility of
corner solutions. The analysis controls for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic
transition, ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, schooling,
and xed e¤ects for legal origin, dominant religion shares, European colony, individual
controls (age, gender, education, religious group) and unobserved regional xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people can be trusted.
The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) land suitability is a geospatial index
of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for
cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration,
as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and
soil pH; (iii) social stratication captures the number of classes within a society. The index is
assigned a value of 1 for egalitarian societies, a value of 2 for two social classes and a value of
3 for three or more social classes (castes or slaves); (iv) land suitability diversity is based on
the range of a land suitability index; (v) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect
for Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan
Africa; (vi) the set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log average elevation,
log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country
and island; (vii) the set of legal origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin,
French origin, German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (viii) the set of major
religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant share,
and other religious shares; (ix) the set of European colony dummies includes a xed e¤ect for
British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other European colony and non-colony; (x) (A)
denotes that the controls are derived from the ancestry of the respondent; (xi) the set of regional
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for 251 NUTS 2 regions; (xii) OPEC is a dummy for oil producing
countries; (xiii) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (xiv) *** denotes
statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent
level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table E.4: Robustness to Parental and Partner Controls-ESS
(1) (2) (3)
Trust
Land Suit (A) -0.086*** -0.086*** -0.094***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Regional F.E Yes Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Controls (A) Yes Yes Yes
Age-Gender-Education-Religion Yes Yes Yes
Paternal Education-Employment Yes Yes Yes
Maternal Education-Employment No Yes Yes
Partners Education-Employment No No Yes
Observations 5940 5940 5873
R-square
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results to the
inclusion of parental and partners control that could potentially a¤ect
trust of the individual. Column (1) introduces controls on the paternal
level of education and employment at the age of 14 (of the respondent).
Column (2) add the same controls for the mother of the respondent.
Finally Column (3) adds a control on the marital status of the respondent
and the partners educational level. The analysis controls for geography,
adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic fractionalization, quality
of institutions, disease environment, schooling, and xed e¤ects for legal
origin, dominant religion shares, European colony, individual controls (age,
gender, education, religious group) and unobserved regional xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people
can be trusted. The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) land
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree
days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil
pH; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia,
Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan
Africa; (iv) the set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log
average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a
xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (v) the set of legal origins dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin,
Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vi) the set of major religion shares
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant
share, and other religious shares; (vii) the set of European colony dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other
European colony and non-colony; (viii) (A) denotes that the controls are derived
from the ancestry of the respondent; (ix) the set of regional dummies includes
a xed e¤ect for 251 NUTS 2 regions; (x) robust standard error estimates are
reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided
hypothesis tests.
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Table E.5: Land Suitability and Trust of Second Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3)
Trust
Land Suit (A) -0.448* -0.029*** -0.082*
( 0.234) (0.008) (0.047)
Regional F.E Yes Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Controls (A) Yes Yes Yes
Age-Gender-Education-Religion Yes Yes Yes
ESS Four Rounds No Yes Yes
Logit Model Yes No No
Double Clustering Yes Yes No
Marginal E¤ect 0.442* - -
Observations 5771 19794 5940
Summary: This table establishes the validity of the estimation. Column (1)
estimates the logit model (since the trust variable is a binary variable). Column
(2) expands the analysis to four waves of the ESS for which the country
of origin of the father is availble. Column (3) clusters the standard errors
only at the dimension of the country of origin. The analysis controls for
geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition, ethnic fractionalization,
quality of institutions, disease environment, schooling, and xed e¤ects for
legal origin, dominant religion shares, European colony, individual controls
(age, gender, education, religious group) and unobserved regional xed e¤ects.
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people
can be trusted. The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) log
land suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture
based on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as
growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as
well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon
density and soil pH; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for
Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and
Sub-Saharan Africa; (iv) the set of geographical controls includes log average
ruggedness, log average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable
waterways and a xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (v) the set of
legal origins dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin,
German origin, Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vi) the set of major
religion shares dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share,
Protestant share, and other religious shares; (vii) the set of European colony
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony,
other European colony and non-colony; (viii) (A) denotes that the controls are
derived from the ancestry of the respondent; (ix) the set of regional dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for 251 NUTS2 regions; (x) robust standard error estimates
are reported in parentheses; (xi) *** denotes statistical signicance at the 1
percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for
two-sided hypothesis tests.
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Table E.6: Land Suitability and Trust of Second Generation Migrants
(1) (2) (3)
Trust
Land Suit (A) -0.149*** -0.074* -0.097***
(0.029) (0.044) (0.019)
Country F.E Yes Yes Yes
Geography-Institutional Controls (A) Yes Yes Yes
Age-Gender-Education-Religion Yes Yes Yes
Father Born in Di¤erent Country Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Born in Di¤erent Country No Yes Yes
First Generation Migrants No No Yes
Second Generation Migrants Yes Yes No
Observations 2403 1266 3364
Summary: This table establishes the robustness of the results to potential
selection issues, by employing only second generation migrants. Column (1)
keeps only the sample of the respondents born in an ESS country but whose
fathershave a di¤erent ancestry. Column (2) keeps only the sample of migrants
whose parents come from a di¤erent country. Column (3) keeps only the rst
generation migrants whose both parents have been born in the host country. The
analysis controls for geography, adjusted years since the Neolithic transition,
ethnic fractionalization, quality of institutions, disease environment, schooling,
and xed e¤ects for legal origin, dominant religion shares, European colony,
individual controls (age, gender, education, religious group) and unobserved
regional xed e¤ects. The results are robust to the sample of second generation
migrants, thereby capturing the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits.
Notes: (i) The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether most people
can be trusted. The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating more trust; (ii) land
suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on
ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree
days and the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, as well as ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil
pH; (iii) the set of continent dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Africa, Asia,
Australia, Europe, North America, South America, Oceania and Sub-Saharan
Africa; (iv) the set of geographical controls includes log average ruggedness, log
average elevation, log absolute latitude, log access to navigable waterways and a
xed e¤ect for landlocked country and island; (v) the set of legal origins dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British legal origin, French origin, German origin,
Scandinavian origin and Socialist origin; (vi) the set of major religion shares
dummies includes a xed e¤ect for Catholic share, Muslim share, Protestant
share, and other religious shares; (vii) the set of European colony dummies
includes a xed e¤ect for British colony, French colony, Spanish colony, other
European colony and non-colony; (viii) (A) denotes that the controls are derived
from the ancestry of the respondent; (ix) the set of country xed e¤ects includes
a xed e¤ect for 26 ESS countries. The regional dummies are available only
for the fth wave of ESS and thus the analysis employs countries xed e¤ects
instead; (x) robust standard error estimates are reported in parentheses; (xi)
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent
level, and * at the 10 percent level, all for two-sided hypothesis tests.
59
F Variable Denitions and Sources
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F.1 Cross-Country Variables
Outcome Variables
Population Density in the Year 1, 1000, and 1500. Population density (in persons per square km) for
given year is calculated as population in that year, as reported by McEvedy and Jones (1978), divided by
total land area as reported by the World Banks World Development Indicators. The cross-sectional unit of
observation in McEvedy and Jones(1978) data set is a region delineated by its international borders in 1975.
Historical population estimates are provided for regions corresponding to either individual countries or, in some
cases, to sets comprised of 23 neighboring countries (e.g., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). In the latter case,
a set-specic population density gure is calculated based on total land area and the gure is then assigned
to each of the component countries in the set. The same methodology is also employed to obtain population
density for countries that exist today but were part of a larger political unit (e.g., the former Yugoslavia) in 1975.
Historical population estimates are also available from Maddison (2003), albeit for a smaller set of countries
than McEvedy and Jones (1978).
Income Per Capita in 2000. Real GDP per capita, in constant 2000 CE international dollars, as reported
by Penn World Table.
Years since Industrialization. The timing of industrialization is determined as the year in which the share
of the agricultural sector became less than 30% of the aggregate economic activity. The measure employed is
provided by O. Galor. The construction of the data is based upon Mitchell (1975) and the threshold is decided
using 5-year averages in order to lter out most of the yearly uctuations around the threshold.
Irrigation in 1900. Data on irrigation are reported by Freydank and Siebert (2008). They have constructed
a set of annual values of area equipped for irrigation for all 236 countries during the time period 1900 - 2003.
The values are provided in 1000 ha units. The Irrigation variable is using the data for the year 1900 and is
expressed as the ratio of irrigated land over arable land.
Irrigation Potential. Data on irrigation potential is obtained from AQUASTAT. The index of irrigation
potential is calculated as the fraction of land that becomes marginally suitable for cultivation upon the intro-
duction of irrigation divided by the total arable land under rain-fed conditions. The fraction of land suitable
for cultivation denotes the extent of very suitable, suitable, moderately suitable or marginally suitable land.
Communication in Year 1, Transportation in Year 1, Medium of Exchange in Year 1. Data on a)
Communication in the year 1 CE b) Transportation in the year 1 CE c) Medium of Exchange in the year ,1
CE are constructed from Peregrines (2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution, and aggregated at the country level
by Ashraf and Galor (2011). Each of these three sectors is reported on a 3-point scale, as evaluated by various
anthropological and historical sources. The level of technology in each sector is indexed as follows. In the
communications sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence of both true writing and mnemonic
or non-written records, a value of 1 under the presence of only mnemonic or non-written records, and a value of
2 under the presence of both. In the transportation sector, the index is assigned a value of 0 under the absence
of both vehicles and pack or draft animals, a value of 1 under the presence of only pack or draft animals, and
a value of 2 under the presence of both. In the Medium of Exchange sector, the index is assigned a value
of 0 under the absence of domestically used articles and currency, a value of one under the presence of only
domestically used articles and the value of 2 under the presence of both. In all cases, the sector-specic indices
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are normalized to assume values in the [0; 1]-interval. Given that the cross-sectional unit of observation in
Peregrines dataset is an archaeological tradition or culture, specic to a given region on the global map, and
since spatial delineations in Peregrines dataset do not necessarily correspond to contemporary international
borders, the culture-specic technology index in a given year is aggregated to the country level by averaging
across those cultures from Peregrines map that appear within the modern borders of a given country.
Mean Generalized Trust. The fraction of World Values Survey (WVS) respondents that agreed with the
statement most people can be trusted.
Distrust in Civil Servants. It is the country average answer to the question: Do you have a lot of condence,
quite a lot of condence, not very much condence, no condence at all in civil servants?. The variable is equal
to 1 if the answer is no condence, and 0 otherwise. The variable comes from the World Values Survey (WVS).
Geographical Variables
Land Suitability. A geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological indicators
of climate suitability for cultivation, such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual to potential evapo-
transpiration, as well as ecological indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and
soil pH. This index was initially reported at a half-degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002). Formally,
Ramankutty et al. (2002) calculate the land suitability index (S) as the product of climate suitability (Sclim)
and soil suitability (Ssoil), i.e., S = Sclim Ssoil. The climate suitability component is estimated to be a function
of growing degree days (GDD) and a moisture index () gauging water availability to plants, calculated as the
ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration, i.e., Sclim = f1(GDD)f2(). The soil suitability component,
on the other hand, is estimated to be a function of soil carbon density (Csoil) and soil pH (pHsoil), i.e. Ssoil
= g1(Csoil)g2(pHsoil). The functions, f1(GDD), f2(), g1(Csoil), and g2(pHsoil) are chosen by Ramankutty
et al. (2002) by empirically tting functions to the observed relationships between cropland areas, GDD, ,
Csoil, and pHsoil. For more details on the specic functional forms chosen, the interested reader is referred to
Ramankutty et al. (2002). Since Ramankutty et al. (2002) report the land suitability index at a half-degree
resolution, Michalopoulos (2012) aggregates the index to the country level by averaging land suitability across
grid cells within a country. This study employs the country-level aggregate measure reported by Michalopoulos
(2012) as the control for land suitability in the baseline regression specications for both historical population
density and contemporary income per capita.
Land Suitability (Adjusted). The cross-country weighted average of the land suitability measure. The
weight associated with a given country in the calculation represents the fraction of the year 2000 CE population
(of the country for which the measure is being computed) that can trace its ancestral origins to the given country
in the year 1500 CE . The ancestry weights are obtained from the World Migration Matrix (1500 CE2000 CE)
of Putterman and Weil (2010).
Land Suitability Diversity. The land suitability diversity measure is based on the range of the land suitability
index, reported at a half-degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002), across grid cells within a country. This
variable is obtained from the data set of Michalopoulos (2012).
Land Suitability Diversity (Adjusted). The cross-country weighted average of the land suitabilitydiversity
measure. The weight associated with a given country in the calculation represents the fraction of the year 2000
CE population (of the country for which the measure is being computed) that can trace its ancestral origins to
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the given country in the year 1500 CE . The ancestry weights are obtained from the World Migration Matrix
(1500 CE2000 CE) of Putterman and Weil (2010).
Climatic Suitability. Climatic suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based
on ecological indicators of climate suitability for cultivation such as growing degree days and the ratio of actual
to potential evapotranspiration. This index was initially reported at a half-degree resolution by Ramankutty
et al. (2002) whereas the country-level aggregate measure is obtained by Michalopoulos (2012).
Soil Suitability. Soil suitability is a geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture based on ecological
indicators of soil suitability for cultivation, such as soil carbon density and soil pH. This index was initially
reported at a half-degree resolution by Ramankutty et al. (2002) whereas the country-level aggregate measure
is obtained by Michalopoulos (2012).
Absolute Latitude. The absolute value of the latitude of a countrys approximate geodesic centroid as reported
by the CIAs World Factbook.
Percentage of Land within 100 km of Waterway. The percentage of a countrys total land area that is
located within 100 km of an ice-free coastline or sea-navigable river. This variable was originally constructed
by Gallup et al. (1999) and is part of Harvard Universitys CID Research Datasets on General Measures of
Geography available online.
Average Elevation. The average elevation of a country in thousands of km above sea level, calculated using
geospatial elevation data reported by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006) at a 1-degree resolution. The
measure is thus the average elevation across the grid cells within a country.
Average Ruggedness. The measure is the average degree of ruggedness across the grid cells within a country,
calculated using geospatial elevation data reported by the G-ECON project (Nordhaus, 2006) at a 1-degree
resolution. This variable is obtained from the data set of Michalopoulos (2012).
Small Island and Landlocked Dummy. 0/1-indicators for whether or not a country is a small island nation,
and whether or not it possesses a coastline. These variables are constructed by Ashraf and Galor (2011a) based
on information reported by the CIA in The World Factbook online resource.
Disease Environment. The total number of di¤erent types of infectious diseases in a country, as reported by
Fincher and Thornhill (2008), based on the Global Infectious Disease and Epidemiology Network (GIDEON)
online database.
Distance Variables
Distance to Frontier in the Year 1, 1000 and 1500.: The distance, in thousands of kilometers, from a
countrys modern capital city to the closest regional technological frontier in the year 1500 CE, as reported
by Ashraf and Galor (2011a). Specically, the authors employ historical urbanization estimates from Tertius
Chandler (1987) and George Modelski (2003) to identify frontiers based on the size of urban populations,
selecting the two largest cities from each continent that belong to di¤erent sociopolitical entities.
Years since Neolithic Revolution. The number of thousand years elapsed, until the year 2000 CE, since
the majority of the population residing within a countrys modern national borders began practicing sedentary
agriculture as the primary mode of subsistence. This measure, reported by Putterman (2008), is compiled using
a wide variety of both regional and country-specic archaeological studies as well as more general encyclopedic
works on the transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture during the Neolithic.
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Years since Neolithic Revolution (Adjusted). The cross-country weighted average of the timing of the
Neolithic Revolution. The weight associated with a given country in the calculation represents the fraction
of the year 2000 CE population (of the country for which the measure is being computed) that can trace its
ancestral origins to the given country in the year 1500 CE . The ancestry weights are obtained from the World
Migration Matrix, 1500 CE2000 CE, of Putterman and Weil (2010).
Institutional Variables
Ethnic Fractionalization. A fractionalization index, constructed by Alesina et al. (2003), that captures the
probability that two individuals, selected at random from a countrys population, will belong to di¤erent ethnic
groups.
Polity IV. The 19602000 CE mean of an index that quanties the extent of institutionalized democracy, as
reported in the Polity IV data set. The Polity IV democracy index for a given year is an 11-point categorical
variable (from 0 to 10) that is additively derived from Polity IV codings on the (i) competitiveness of political
participation, (ii) openness of executive recruitment, (iii) competitiveness of executive recruitment, and (iv)
constraints on the chief executive.
Legal Origins. A set of dummy variables, reported by La Porta et al. (1999), that identies the legal origin of
the Company Law or Commercial Code of a country. The ve legal origin possibilities are: (i) English Common
Law, (ii) French Commercial Code, (iii) German Commercial Code, (iv) Scandinavian Commercial Code, and
(v) Socialist or Communist Laws.
European Colony. An indicator for whether or not a country was colonized by a European nation as coded
by Acemoglu et al. (2005a). The variable equals 1 for colonized countries.
Major Religion Shares. A set of variables, from La Porta et al. (1999), that identies the percentage of a
countrys population belonging to the three most widely spread religions of the world. The religions identied
are: (i) Roman Catholic, (ii) Protestant, (iii) Muslim, and iv) Other.
Percentage of Native Population. The variable of the percentage of native population is constructed by
(Ashraf and Galor, 2011), based on the migration matrix of Putterman and Weil (2010).
Schooling. Schooling is the average total enrollment rate for the period 1990-2000. The data are derived from
the World Bank.
Social Stratication. Social Stratication is a measure of social complexity and captures the number of
classes within a society. It is constructed from Peregrines (2003) Atlas of Cultural Evolution. The level of
stratication is indexed as follows. The index is assigned a value of 1 for egalitarian societies, a value of 2 for
two social classes and a value of 3 for three or more social classes. The index is constructed for the year 1 CE.
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F.2 WVS Variables
Outcome Variables
Trust. The "Trust" index is the response to the question whether "most people can be trusted" or "one needs
to be too careful". The index takes values 0-1 with 1 indicating that most people can be trusted. The index is
taken from the four waves (1981-2002) of the WVS sample.
Individual Controls
Age. The age of the respondent. The age is taken from the four waves (1981-2002) of the WVS sample.
Gender. The gender of the respondent. The gender is taken from the four waves (1981-2002) of the WVS
sample.
Religious Denomination. The religious group in which the respondent belongs. Respondents are classied
in 90 religious groups, The data is taken from the four waves (1981-2002) of the WVS sample.
Level of Education. The higher level of education attained by the respondent. The questionnaire distinguishes
seven di¤erent levels of education (inadequately completed elementary education, completed (compulsory)
elementary education, (compulsory) elementary education and basic vocational qualication, secondary, in-
termediate vocational qualication, secondary, intermediate general qualication, full secondary, maturity level
certicate, higher education - lower-level tertiary certicate, higher education - upper-level tertiary certicate).
The data is taken from the four waves (1981-2002) of the WVS sample.
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F.3 ESS Variables
Outcome Variables
Trust. Respondents are given the statement "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted, or that you cant be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0
means you cant be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted." In order to keep the symmetry
with the "Trust" variable employed in the cross country sample, derived from the WVS, the variable is rescaled
on a two-point scale, with the value 0, capturing the values 0-5 of the original variable and the value 1 capturing
the values 6-10. Therefore 0 is now reecting the answer "Strongly Disagree-Disagree" and 1 reecting the
answer "Strongly Agree-Agree".
Individual Controls
Age. The age of the respondent. The age is taken from the th wave of the ESS (2010) The robustness section
employs data from rounds 2-5 (2004-2010) for which the origin of the migrant is available at the country level.
Gender. The gender of the respondent. The gender is taken from the th wave of the ESS (2010) The
robustness section employs data from rounds 2-5 (2004-2010) for which the origin of the migrant is available at
the country level.
Religious Denomination. The religious group in which the respondent belongs. The questionnaire covers 8
broad categories of religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Other Christian
denomination, Jewish, Islamic, Eastern Religions, Other non-Christian Religions) and a category of non-religious
people. The data is taken from the th wave of the ESS (2010) The robustness section employs data from
rounds 2-5 (2004-2010) for which the origin of the migrant is available at the country level.
Level of Education. The higher level of education attained by the respondent. The questionnaire distinguishes
seven di¤erent levels of education (less than lower secondary, lower secondary, lower tier upper secondary, upper
tier upper secondary, advanced vocational, lower tertiary BA level, higher tertiary > MA level). The same
classication holds for the fathers, mothers and partners education. The data is taken from the th wave of
the ESS (2010) The robustness section employs data from rounds 2-5 (2004-2010) for which the origin of the
migrant is available at the country level.
Parental Employment Status at Age 14 of the Respondent. The employment status of the father
(mother) when the respondent was 14. The questionnaire distinguishes six di¤erent levels of education (em-
ployee, self employed, not working, father (mother) dead/absent, refusal, dont know). The data is taken from
the th wave of the ESS (2010) The robustness section employs data from rounds 2-5 (2004-2010) for which
the origin of the migrant is available at the country level.
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